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INTRODUCTION 
What is the moral content of constitutional rights? In one sense, 
the "moral reading " of the Bill of Rights proposed, most famously, 
by Ronald Dworkin, is surely correct: 
The clauses of the American Constitution that protect individuals 
and minorities from government are found mainly in the so-called Bill 
of Rights - the first several amendments to the document - and the 
further amendments added after the Civil War. . . . Many of these 
clauses are drafted in exceedingly abstract moral language. The First 
Amendment refers to the "right" of free speech, for example, the 
Fifth Amendment to the process that is "due" to citizens, and the 
Fourteenth to protection that is "equal." According to the moral 
reading, these clauses must be understood in the way their language 
most naturally suggests: they refer to abstract moral principles and 
incorporate these by reference, as limits on government's power.1 
The Bill of Rights, by means of open-ended terms such as "freedom 
of speech, " "equal protection, " or "due process, "2 refers to moral 
criteria, which take on constitutional status by virtue of being thus 
referenced. We can disagree about whether the proper methodol­
ogy for judicial application of these criteria is originalist or non­
originalist. The originalist looks, not to the true content of the 
moral criteria named by the Constitution, but to the framers ' beliefs 
about that content;3 the nonoriginalist tries to determine what the 
criteria truly require, and ignores or gives less weight to the fram­
ers' views.4  Bracketing this disagreement, however, it is surely cor­
rect to say - as Dworkin and many other prominent constitutional 
scholars have said5 - that the Constitution, through the open­
ended clauses of the Bill of Rights, incorporates parts of morality. 
Yet there is also a sense in which this "moral reading " of the 
Constitution is mistaken, or at least needs to be qualified. Constitu­
tional rights have a special formal structure - a formal structure so 
familiar to us that this structure, and therewith its significance, have 
1. RoNALD DwoRKIN, FREEDOM'S LAw: THE MORAL READING OF nm AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 7 (1996) [hereinafter DwoRKIN, FREEDOM'S LAw]; see also RONALD 
DwoRKIN, TAKING RioHrS SERIOUSLY 132-37 (1977) (advancing moral reading of the Bill of 
Rights) [hereinafter DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHI'S SERIOUSLY]. 
2. U.S. CoNST. amends. I, XIV, V. 
3. See, e.g., RoBERT BoRI<, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 143-85 (1990) (defending 
ori�alism). 
4. See Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the Administrative State: Beyond the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 759, 781 n.69 (1997) (citing leading 
nonoriginalists); Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1085 (1989) (describing disagreements between originalists and 
nonoriginalists ). 
5. See Adler, supra note 4, at 781 n.69 (citing sources). 
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become invisible. I will call this structure the "Basic Structure. " 
Constitutional rights are rights against rules. A constitutional right 
protects the rights-holder from a particular rule (a rule with the 
wrong predicate6 or history); it does not protect a particular action 
of hers from all the rules under which the action falls. 7 As a conse­
quence of the Basic Structure, a constitutional right has only deriva­
tive moral content - or so this article will try to show. To say that 
X's treatment pursuant to a rule R violates X's "constitutional 
rights," or that the treatment is "unconstitutional," does not entail 
that the treatment itself is morally wrong, or morally problematic, 
or that there is moral reason to overturn the treatment ceteris 
paribus, or that the treatment violates X's moral rights, or that 
moral wrong has been done to X, or anything like this. All the 
statement entails is that there exists moral reason to repeal or 
amend the rule R. 
Let us begin by considering a famous and, for my purpose, ex­
emplary case: the flag-desecration case, Texas v. Johnson. 8 Mr. 
Johnson, who had burned an American flag during a political dem­
onstration, was prosecuted for and then convicted of violating a 
Texas statute that read: " 'A person commits an offense if he inten­
tionally or knowingly desecrates . .. a state or national flag.' "9 He 
was sentenced to one year in prison and fined $2,000. Johnson chal­
lenged his sanction on constitutional grounds, claiming that it vio­
lated his right to free speech under the First Amendment. When 
the case reached the U. S. Supreme Court, the Court agreed with 
Johnson's claim, and overturned his sanction. 10 Crucially, the 
Court did not hold that Johnson was constitutionally immune from 
sanction, under any statute, for the actions that had prompted the 
State's prosecution. "We . . .  emphasize that Johnson was prose­
cuted only for flag-desecration - not for trespass, disorderly con­
duct, or arson."11 Rather, what violated Mr. Johnson 's rights was 
6. By the "predicate " of a rule, I mean the act-description contained in the rule's canoni­
cal formulation. See infra text accompanying note 58 (discussing the concept of "rules" and 
their "predicates"). 
7. See Lawrence A. Alexander, Is There An Overbreadth Doctrine?, 22 SAN DIEGO L. 
REv. 541, 545 (1985) ("The Constitution's individual rights provisions by and large do not 
protect specific conduct per se. . .. Rather, the Constitution ordinarily limits the types of 
reasons that government may act upon in regulating conduct."). 
8. 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
9. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 400 n.l (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.§ 42.09 (West 1989)). 
10. See 491 U.S. at 418. 
11. 491 U.S. at 413 n.8. Although the Court did state that Johnson had not stolen the flag 
he burned, 491 U.S. at 412 n.8, this statement should not, in my view, be read to imply that 
Johnson's conviction was unconstitutional only by virtue of his action's being innocent under 
every description. See 491 U.S. at 412 n.8 (stating that "[o]ur inquiry is, of course, bounded 
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being sanctioned pursuant to a rule with the wrong rule-predicate 
- one that targeted the wrong type of action. As the Court ex­
plained: "'A law directed at the communicative nature of conduct 
[such as a law prohibiting "flag desecration "] must ... be justified 
by the substantial showing of need that the First Amendment re­
quires,' "12 and the State of Texas was unable to make that substan­
tial showing. 
Texas v. Johnson exemplifies what I have called the Basic Struc­
ture: that constitutional rights are rights against rules. Mr. 
Johnson 's very action of flag-desecration might also have been an 
action of destroying government property (if the flag he desecrated 
had belonged to the government),13 or pollution (if the flag was 
burned, and dangerous chemicals were thereby released into the 
atmosphere), or battery (if the flag was burned in close proximity to 
a bystander, who was badly injured), or perhaps, as the Court sug­
gested, arson, disorderly conduct, or trespass. 14 Had Mr. Johnson 
been sanctioned under a rule that employed one of these constitu­
tionally unobjectionable predicates, no constitutional right of 
Johnson's would have been violated. 15 Indeed, nothing in the 
by the particular facts of this case and by the statute under which Johnson was convicted" 
(emphasis added)); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 313 n.1, 319 (1990) (overturning 
charge against flag burners pursuant to federal flag-mutilation statute, without disturbing 
charge against certain claimants for causing willful injury to federal property); R.A.V. v. City 
of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 379-80, 396 (1992) (overturning charge against teenager pursuant to 
Minnesota ordinance prohibiting hate speech, where teenager's particular action was burning 
a cross inside the fenced yard of a black family). See generally infra Part I (describing how 
constitutional rights generally function as shields against rules, not shields for actions). Why, 
then, did the Court even note that Johnson was innocent of theft? Perhaps because the 
Court thought this fact relevant to his as-applied challenge. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 403 n.3 
(sustaining Johnson's as-applied challenge to flag-desecration statute without reaching his 
facial challenge); infra text accompanying notes 140-45 (discussing how as-applied adjudica­
tion is consistent with the proposition that constitutional rights do not shield actions). 
12. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406 (emphasis deleted) (quoting Community for Creative Non­
Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586, 622 (1983) (Scalia, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. Clark v. 
Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984). 
13. See United States v. Haggerty, 731 F. Supp. 415, 416, 422 (W.D. Wash. 1990) (over­
turning charge pursuant to federal flag-mutilation statute, for action of burning flag belong­
ing to U.S. Postal Service, without disturbing charge pursuant to statute prohibiting wilful 
injury to federal property), affd. sub nom. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990). 
14. On the nature of actions as particular things that can be picked out under multiple 
descriptions, see infra text accompanying notes 63-67. It appears that, in fact, Mr. Johnson's 
particular action of flag-burning did not fall under the further description of "battery." See 
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 399. 
15. It remains open to discussion whether and, if so, when the application of a no-trespass 
rule to speech will violate the First Amendment. Compare Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 
(1946) (holding that the application of a no-trespass law to a speaker, who was on the prem­
ises of a company town, violated the First Amendment) with Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 
(1976) (declining to recognize free speech right to picket on premises of shopping center, and 
distinguishing Marsh). See generally infra text accompanying notes 354-64 (discussing viabil­
ity of First Amendment challenges to rules that pick out nonexpressive properties of actions). 
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Court's decision precluded Texas from sanctioning Mr. Johnson 
pursuant to an unobjectionable rule, in a future prosecution, for the 
very action of his that had given rise to the flag-desecration prose­
cution.16 Where the State of Texas had gone wrong was in prose­
cuting Johnson under the wrong rule - under a rule that 
prohibited "flag desecration." And what violated Mr. Johnson's 
First Amendment rights, in Texas v. Johnson, was being sanctioned 
for his action under that rule - not being sanctioned for that action 
simpliciter. 
Consider, now, two possible accounts of the moral content of 
Mr. Johnson's First Amendment rights. First, consider what I will 
call the Direct Account. 
The Direct Account 
To say that some treatment of X (sanctioning X pursuant to a 
rule, or subjecting X to the duty that the rule announces) "vio­
lates X's constitutional rights" entails the following: the treat­
ment is directly wrong, and X has the legal right to secure 
judicial invalidation of the treatment. "Directly wrong" means 
that there is sufficient moral reason17 for the court to invalidate 
the treatment (overturn X's sanction, or free X from the duty), 
quite independent of any further invalidation of the rule under 
which the treatment falls. 
On the direct account of Texas v. Johnson, itis morally improper to 
sanction Mr. Johnson for "flag desecration," even if his action hap­
pened to have been an action of property-destruction, pollution, or 
battery. To sanction him for "flag desecration" is to sanction him 
on the wrong grounds - on the basis of his speech, rather than the 
harmful, nonexpressive properties of his action - and there is 
moral reason for the State of Texas not to do that. To be sure, if Mr. 
Johnson was a polluter, batterer, or property-destroyer, he ought to 
16. See Montana v. Hall, 481U.S. 400, 402 (1987) ("It is a 'venerable principl[e] of double 
jeopardy jurisprudence' that '[t]he successful appeal of a judgment of conviction, on any 
ground other than the insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, poses no bar to 
further prosecution on the same charge' [i.e., a charge that would otherwise be the same for 
double jeopardy purposes]." (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting United States 
v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 90-91 (1978))). 
17. Throughout this article, I use the term "moral reason" in a generic way, which is 
meant to be neutral between consequentialist and deontological moral views. To say that 
"moral reason" obtains to overturn a claimant's treatment, or a rule, means that: (1) over­
turning the treatment or rule does not violate any deontological constraints, and is required 
under applicable consequentialist criteria; or (2) overturning the treatment or rule is required 
by deontological constraints. On the difference between deontological and consequentialist 
moral views, see generally SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, THE REJECTION OF CoNSEQUENTIALISM 1-40 
(1994). 
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be sanctioned. But he ought to be sanctioned pursuant to the right 
kind of rule, and it is not a matter of moral indifference which rule 
the State of Texas deploys against him. 
By contrast, what I will call the Derivative Account of constitu-
tional rights says something quite different. 
The Derivative Account 
To say that some treatment of X (being sanctioned pursuant to 
a rule, or subjecting X to the duty that the rule announces) 
"violates X's constitutional rights" entails the following: there 
is sufficient moral reason to change in some measure the scope 
of the rule, and X has the legal power to secure the invalida­
tion - the repeal or amendment - of the rule, including his 
own treatment. There may or may not be moral reason to 
overturn X's treatment, ceteris paribus. 
On the derivative account of Texas v. Johnson, it would be (or 
might be )18 a matter of moral indifference which rule the State of 
Texas deployed against Johnson, if Johnson's action of flag­
desecration also happened to have been an action of property-de­
struction, pollution, or battery. If his action happened to have been 
wrongful under a different description, there would be (or might 
be) nothing at all morally problematic in sanctioning Mr. Johnson 
pursuant to the flag-desecration statute. Rather, what is morally 
problematic, on the Derivative Account, is for Texas to have in 
place a statute that prohibits flag-desecration. This is morally prob­
lematic because some actions covered by that statute are innocent 
actions. Some actions of flag-desecration do not have further, 
wrong-making properties such that they are properly sanctioned or 
coerced - they are not also actions of property-destruction, pollu­
tion, battery, etc. - and therefore Texas is morally required to re­
peal or amend the flag-desecration statute.19 
Mr. Johnson's own action of flag-desecration may have been in­
nocent of further wrong-making properties; it may not have been. 
18. I say "might be" here to signal the following: The Derivative Account does not entail 
that it is a matter of moral indifference which statute Texas uses to sanction Johnson. Rather, 
on the Derivative Account, the propriety of a claimant's particular treatment is simply not 
the proper moral focus of reviewing courts. Instead, their proper moral focus is on whether 
the underlying rule should be repealed or amended. See infra section III.A.3 (explaining 
how, within the Derivative Account, the judicial decision to uphold or invalidate a claimant's 
treatment depends upon the extent to which the court revises the underlying rule). So the 
proponent of the Derivative Account in Johnson will say that, although the choice of rule 
with respect to Johnson may make a moral difference, that is not entailed by his having a 
constitutional right. 
19. See infra text accompanying notes 315-42 {detailing how rule against "flag 
desecration" violates liberties, by including otherwise innocent speech-acts within its scope). 
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But that is irrelevant to Johnson's constitutional claim. On the 
Derivative Account, his case is simply an occasion20 for the review­
ing court to invalidate - to repeal or amend - Texas's statute. 
Because the statute does moral wrong to someone (whether Mr. 
Johnson, or other persons), the reviewing court rightly invalidates 
the statute, including but not limited to the sanction Mr. Johnson 
has received.21 
Which of these two accounts, direct or derivative, is the correct 
account of the moral content of constitutional rights? To put the 
distinction between the two most succinctly: on the Direct Ac­
count, constitutional adjudication essentially involves the invalida­
tion of the rights-holder's own treatment (her sanction, or her duty), 
while on the Derivative Account, it essentially involves the judicial 
repeal or amendment of rules. Which of these two accounts best 
describes the connection between constitutional law and morality? 
In this article, I will argue that the Derivative Account is the 
correct one. The Derivative Account provides an elegant, unified, 
and morally straightforward view of constitutional rights and consti­
tutional adjudication. It holds true, I will claim, not just for the free 
speech rights at stake in Texas v. Johnson, but for the entire array of 
substantive constitutional rights that figure in modem constitu­
tional law: rights to speech,22 to religious freedom,23 to equal pro­
tection,24 and to substantive due process.25 The Direct Account, by 
contrast, turns out to involve a view about morality - about the 
moral significance of the description under which someone is sanc­
tioned, coerced, or otherwise set back by a legal rule - that is mor­
ally untenable, at least for purposes of constitutional law. And 
20. For a similar view of the particular cases that federal courts adjudicate as mere occa­
sions for broader, constitutional change, see Owen M. Fxss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 
93 HAR.v. L. REv. 1, 11 {1978). 
21. Indeed, there is nothing in the Derivative Account itself that requires the judicial 
invalidation of the statute to include an invalidation of the claimant's own treatment, 
although the standing component of Article III may impose such a requirement. See infra 
text accompanying notes 401-08, 574-78 (arguing that requirement of personal benefit to the 
claimant is extrinsic to the Derivative Account). 
22. See U.S. CoNsr. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of 
speech"). 
23. See U.S. CoNsr. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law . . .  prohibiting the free 
exercise [of religion]"). 
24. See U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV ("nor shall any State ... deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws"). 
25. See U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV ("nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law"); U.S. CoNsr. amend. V ("nor shall any person ... 
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"); infra text accompany­
ing notes 53-60 (explaining article's focus on free speech, free exercise, equal protection and 
substantive due process rights). 
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although the Direct Account may be attractive to constitutional 
lawyers and scholars on institutional grounds - because it is consis­
tent with a certain, purist view about the limited powers of federal 
courts - that view should be rejected. The purist view is that fed­
eral courts lack the legal power to repeal or amend rules; the legal 
force of the court's judgment extends only to the parties, and there­
fore the judicial focus in constitutional cases can only be, as the 
Direct Account claims, the moral propriety of the claimant's own 
treatment.26 But the purist view is wrong; federal courts do have 
the power to repeal or amend rules, and they can, consistent with 
Article III of the Constitution,27 adopt the rule-centered rather 
than claimant-centered perspective required by the Derivative 
Account. 
This article has three Parts. Part I sets the stage for my argu­
ment, by demonstrating that the Basic Structure obtains. This is, I 
should emphasize, a descriptive claim. My claim is that the follow­
ing description of the current constitutional case law, as set forth by 
the U.S. Supreme Court and followed by the lower federal courts, is 
true: constitutional rights are rights against rules. Things could be 
different; constitutional rights could be structured as shields around 
actions, rather than shields against rules; but they are not. The Ba­
sic Structure is our official structure, as constitutional doctrine now 
stands. This is true across the Bill of Rights, not just of free speech. 
For example, it would violate the gender-discrimination component 
of the Equal Protection Clause to sanction X pursuant to a rule that 
prohibits "the purchase of alcohol by men under twenty-one,"28 
even if X's action is sanctionable under some other rule (such as a 
rule against credit-card fraud). It would violate the race­
discrimination component of the Equal Protection Clause to sanc­
tion a black person under a law banning interracial marriages,29 
even if the black person is also a bigamist. Or - to switch from 
equal protection to religious freedom - it would violate the free 
exercise rights of members of the Santeria religion (who engage in 
ritual animal sacrifice) to sanction them pursuant to a law targeted 
26. See infra section III.B (describing possible institutional objections to the Derivative 
Account). 
27. See U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2 (confining federal judicial power to "Cases" and 
"Controversies"). 
28. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (invalidating, under Equal Protection Clause, 
statute prohibiting sale of low-alcohol beer to men but not women between the ages of 18 
and 21). 
29. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating, under Equal Protection 
Clause, statute prohibiting interracial marriages). 
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at Santeria,30 even for their ritual sacrifice of eagles, cougars, pan­
das and other endangered species. 
Parts II and ill are the heart of the article. In Part II, I reject 
the Direct Account. This Part considers, and finds wanting, a wide 
array of possible defenses for the Direct Account: for the claim 
that X's constitutional right entails the existence of moral reason to 
overturn X's own treatment, independent of further invalidating 
the rule under which that treatment falls. Some of these defenses 
are, on balance, unpersuasive: for example, the view that (in gen­
eral) a necessary condition for a morally and constitutionally justi­
fied sanction is that the sanctioned person be sanctioned under the 
right kind of rule.31 Some of these defenses, albeit persuasive or 
even compelling, explain at best a limited set of constitutional 
rights: for example, the view that sanctioning or coercing a black 
person under a law that contains the predicate, "black," is to stig­
matize and thereby directly wrong her.32 And some of the defenses 
are simply question-begging: for example, the standard appeal to 
the "illegitimate purpose" of the legislator, such as a purpose to 
suppress speech, as somehow morally tainting the treatments meted 
out pursuant to the law that the legislator enacts.33 
Part III, in tum, argues in favor of the Derivative Account. On 
the Derivative Account, the reason X's constitutional rights can be 
violated by one rule, even if the very action she performed is prop­
erly sanctioned or coerced under a different rule, is quite straight­
forward. It is straightforward to explain how, given two different 
rules that intersect to cover the very same action, the moral criteria 
set forth in the Bill of Rights require that one of the rules, but not 
the other, be repealed or amended. Freedom of speech requires 
that a rule against "flag desecration" be repealed, because some 
actions of flag-desecration are innocent, and the ones that are not 
innocent will fall under other rules. Conversely, freedom of speech 
does not require that a rule against "arson" be repealed, because all 
actions of arson are seriously wrong. It is, or may be,34 a matter of 
moral indifference whether the arsonous flag-desecrator is sane-
30. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) 
(invalidating, under Free Exercise Clause, statute prohibiting animal sacrifice that was 
targeted at the Santeria religion). 
31. See infra section II.A.1. 
32. See infra section 11.B.2. 
33. See infra note 278 (arguing that the idea of an illegitimate legislative purpose or moti­
vation is ambiguous, and that the different ways in which this ambiguous idea might be made 
more precise do not, in fact, underwrite the Direct Account). 
34. See supra note 18. 
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tioned for "flag desecration" or, instead, for "arson"; but it is not a 
matter of moral indifference, under the First Amendment, whether 
we leave in place a rule against "flag desecration." Similarly, as I 
shall argue, it is, or may be, a matter of moral indifference whether 
the thieving, nineteen-year-old, male drinker is prosecuted pursu­
ant to a gender-discriminatory rule prohibiting the sale of alcohol to 
nineteen-year-old men, or pursuant to a neutral law prohibiting 
credit-card fraud; but it is not a matter of moral indifference, under 
the Equal Protection Clause, whether we leave in place the gender­
discriminatory rule. And so forth for the rest of the Bill of Rights. 
Part III also raises and rebuts possible institutional objections to 
the Derivative Account. These include, inter alia, the purist view of 
the powers of federal courts. Federal courts do, indeed, have the 
legal power to repeal or amend rules, and Article III of the Consti­
tution permits them to adopt the rule-centered perspective required 
by the Derivative Account. The remedies that federal courts enter 
in constitutional cases - including not merely class-action cases, 
but also individual cases, whether enforcement actions or anticipa­
tory suits brought by claimants - should always be understood as 
repealing or amending rules. This is technically plausible, morally 
attractive, and consistent with the concept of "adjudication" em­
bodied in Article III. 
Finally, the conclusion to the article surveys the doctrinal impli­
cations of the arguments advanced in Parts I, II, and III. Although 
the methodology of the article is theoretical, not doctrinal, my ulti­
mate purpose is a doctrinal one. Constitutional theory is ultimately 
important because of its practical import, for the practices of re­
viewing courts and other institutions. Originalists will want Roe v. 
Wade35 to be decided one way; nonoriginalists will, or may, want it 
decided a different way. So too, as we shall see, the defenders of 
the Direct and Derivative Accounts will disagree on a wide variety 
of doctrinal matters. These include matters such as timing, remedy, 
and the propriety of facial invalidation. The paradigmatic constitu­
tional suit for the Direct Account is a retrospective as-applied chal­
lenge by a claimant who has already acted and been sanctioned 
under a rule,36 while the paradigmatic constitutional suit for the 
35. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see Adler, supra note 4, at 780-85 (describing debate between 
originalists and nonoriginalists over legitimacy of Roe). 
36. See, e.g., In re R.MJ., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) (retrospective, as-applied challenge under 
Free Speech Clause); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (retrospective, as-applied chal­
lenge under Free Exercise Clause); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (retrospec­
tive, as-applied challenge under the substantive component of the Due Process Clause); see 
also Loving v. Vrrginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (retrospective challenge under Equal Protection 
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Derivative Account is a prospective facial challenge to a rule, by a 
claimant who has yet to act and seeks first the rule's immediate 
repeal.37 In recent years, these matters - in particular, the propri­
ety of facial invalidation38 - have generated heated controversies 
among scholars and at the Supreme Court. 39 This article provides a 
theoretical foundation for addressing such matters. Although it is 
beyond the scope of this article to defend a specific position on the 
numerous doctrinal questions implicated by the morally derivative 
Clause). See generally infra text accompanying notes 290-92, 588-91 (discussing the status of 
sanctions, within the Direct Account, as the paradigmatically concrete setbacks to claimants). 
37. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997) (anticipatory, facial challenge to rule, 
under Free Speech Clause); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 
520 (1993) (anticipatory, facial challenge to rule, under Free Exercise Clause); Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (anticipatory, facial challenge to rule, under the 
substantive component of the Due Process Clause); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (an­
ticipatory, facial challenge to rule, under Equal Protection Clause). See generally infra text 
accompanying note 598 (discussing timing of constitutional suits, within Derivative Account). 
38. See generally Michael Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. 
L. REv. 235 (1994) (discussing distinction between facial and as-applied challenges, and sur­
veying case law). 
39. The controversy about facial challenges was triggered by the Court's announcement, 
in United States v. Salerno, that: "A facial challenge to a legislative Act is . . .  the most 
difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of 
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). Since 
this announcement, the Justices have heatedly debated the propriety of facial invalidation, 
particularly in the area of abortion rights. See Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, 517 U.S. 1174, 
1175 (1996) (denying certiorari) (memorandum of Stevens, J.); Fargo Women's Health Org. 
v. Schafer, 507 U.S. 1013, 1013 (1993) (denying stay) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Ada v. 
Guam Socy. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 506 U.S. 1011, 101 (1992) (denying certiorari) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Casey, 505 U.S. at 972-73 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in the judgment 
in part and dissenting in part). 
The Justices have debated the propriety of facial challenges in many other areas as well, 
including free speech, see National Endowment for the Arts v. Fmley, 118 S. Ct. 2168, 2193-96 
(1998) (Souter, J., dissenting); Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2355-56 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part); Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. 
FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 631-34 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in 
part); United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 429-36 (1993); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 
U.S. 761, 779-81 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); the Establishment Clause, see Bowen v. 
Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 626-30 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); equal protection, see Romer 
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 643 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); the Takings Clause, see Pennell v. 
City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 15-19 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part); and other aspects of substantive due process, such as assisted suicide, see Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2302, 2304-05 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgments of 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997), and Vacca v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997)). 
Ripeness became a matter of some controversy in Reno v. Catholic Social Services, 509 
U.S. 43 (1993), which dismissed as unripe a challenge by certain would-be beneficiaries to a 
benefit-conferring rule, on the grounds that the claimants had not yet applied for and been 
denied the benefit they sought. Reno calls into question the availability of prospective chal­
lenges to benefit-conferring rules. See Reno, 509 U.S. at 67-70 (O'Connor, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (criticizing majority's ripeness holding); 509 U.S. at 77-83 (Stevens, J., dissent­
ing) (same); 2 KENNETH CuLP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
TREATISE § 15.14, at 381-84 (1994) (same). 
Fmally, the scope of judicial remedies has, in recent years, been much debated by consti­
tutional scholars, in the form of a dispute about the legitimacy of Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 
(1958). See infra notes 502-05 and accompanying text (describing this dispute). 
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cast of constitutional rights, the conclusion will show just how wide­
ranging the doctrinal implications of the Derivative Account are. 
In particular, and most profoundly, the Derivative Account ex­
plicates the basic doctrinal structure of modem constitutional law. 
Every constitutional lawyer and scholar knows well the various 
rule-validity "tests" around which constitutional adjudication is 
structured: narrow-tailoring tests, under the First Amendment, that 
require rules regulating speech to be sufficiently closely tailored to 
sufficiently important interests;40 antidiscrimination tests under the 
Equal Protection Clause, that require rules discriminating on the 
basis of race41 or gender42 to be more or less strictly scrutinized; 
and the parallel antidiscrimination test, for rules discriminating 
against religious groups or practices, that has become canonical for 
the Free Exercise Clause.43 But what is the function of these famil­
iar tests? What do they accomplish? The proponent of the Direct 
Account will claim this: To sanction or coerce X pursuant to a rule 
that fails a test is to do moral wrong to X; it is to inflict a treatment 
upon X such that moral reason obtains ceteris paribus to overturn 
X's treatment.44 
But this is incorrect. On the Derivative Account - the correct 
account - the pervasive and familiar constitutional tests, governing 
the predicates and history of rules, are simply tests for whether a 
rule should be judicially repealed or amended. The essential func­
tion of constitutional courts is to assess rules against these kind of 
moral tests, and to repeal or amend those rules that are moral fail­
ures. This is what my article tries to show. 
40. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (describing strict, narrow-tailoring 
scrutiny for content-based rules regulating speech); Clark v. Community for Creative Non­
Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (describing intermediate, narrow-tailoring scrutiny for 
content-neutral rules regulating speech). 
41. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) ("[R]acial classifications [should] be sub­
jected to the 'most rigid scrutiny,' and, if they are ever to be upheld, they must be shown to 
be necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible state objective, independent of • • .  
racial discrimination." (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944))). 
42. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) ("[T]o withstand constitutional challenge 
. . .  classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be sub­
stantially related to the achievement of those objectives."). 
43. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877, 879 (1990) (holding that state may 
not seek "to ban . . .  acts or abstentions only when they are engaged in for religious reasons, 
or only because of the religious belief that they display" but that "the right of free exercise 
does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of 
general applicability' " (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, 
J., concurring in judgment))). 
44. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 1-4 (arguing that a 
separate and special overbreadth doctrine does not exist, and that instead both the Court's 
overbreadth decisions and its ordinary constitutional decisions are grounded upon the right 
of claimants to be judged in accordance with a constitutionally valid rule of law). 
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I. THE BASIC STRUCTURE 
A constitutional right provides a legal advantage, of some kind, 
for the rights-holder.45 But what kind of advantage is that? We can 
imagine a legal world in which constitutional rights were structured 
as protective shields around certain types of actions. A particular 
action of some person would either have this protective shield - if 
the action were, say, sufficiently harmless, or sufficiently important 
to the actor - or not. If the action bore the protective shield, then 
the rights-holder would be legally immune from being sanctioned 
for performing the action, or coerced not to perform it, pursuant to 
any rule. Conversely, if a particular action of some person did not 
have the protective shield, then the state would be free to sanction 
the actor for performing the action, or to coerce the actor not to 
perform it, pursuant to any rule. Protected actions would be pro­
tected, not just from discriminatory or overbroad rules, but from 
perfectly neutral, ordinary rules as well. Conversely, unprotected 
actions could be legally sanctioned, or coerced, pursuant to rules 
that discriminated on the basis of race, gender, viewpoint, or reli­
gion. This would just be how constitutional rights worked. 46 
But of course constitutional rights work nothing like this.47 
Constitutional rights in our own legal world are structured," not as 
shields around particular actions, but as shields against particular 
rules. What violates X's constitutional right, what she has a consti­
tutional right against, is for a particular rule to be (fully) in legal 
45. See CARL WELLMAN, REAL RlGKrS 8-11 {1995) (defining a legal right as a complex of 
favorable Hohfeldian positions, that is, claim-rights, liberties, immunities, and powers, that 
function to confer a legal advantage upon the rights-holder). 
46. This is not a crazy idea, given the centrality of actions to morality. At bottom, any 
particular action is either morally permissible, or morally impermissible - the latter either 
because the action breaches a deontological side-constraint, or because it makes the world 
worse in some manner picked out by a consequentialist standard. See GEOFFREY SCARRE, 
UTILITARIANISM 129 (1996) (noting that many philosophers now believe that the criterion of 
overall well-being is best construed, within utilitarianism, as a criterion for evaluating partic­
ular actions, not for evaluating rules somehow generalized from actions); SCHEFFLER, supra 
note 17, at 80-114 {discussing deontological, i.e., nonconsequentialist, side-constraints). 
,47. I am certainly not the first to note the point that a person's constitutional claim is 
more or less a function of the rule pursuant to which he is sanctioned or otherwise set back, 
and not solely a function of the action he performed. Scholars who have previously noted 
and discussed this feature of constitutional law include Larry Alexander, see Alexander, 
supra note 7, at 544-47; and Henry Monaghan, see Monaghan, supra note 44, at 4-14. How­
ever, the point is far from universally recognized. See, e.g., GERALD GUNTiiER, CONSTITU­
TIONAL LAW 1192 (1991) ("[In First Amendment challenges outside the overbreadth context] 
the Court asks simply whether the challenger's activities are protected by the First Amend­
ment."); Monaghan, supra note 44, at 5 (noting that "many co=entators assume that con­
ventional constitutional challenges are invariably restricted to such fact-dependent claims of 
privilege"). 
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force:48 a rule with the wrong predicate or history. We saw that 
point in the flag-desecration case: sanctioning Mr. Johnson for de­
stroying a government-owned flag pursuant to a rule prohibiting 
"flag des�cration" would violate his constitutional rights, while 
sanctioning him for destroying a government-owned flag pursuant 
to a rule prohibiting the "destruction of government property" 
would not. As we shall see in a moment, Texas v. Johnson exempli­
fies the structure of substantive49 constitutional rights across the 
Bill of Rights. 
I will call this the Basic Structure of constitutional rights. Con-
stitutional rights are rights against rules. 
The Basic Structure: Rights against Rules 
A constitutional right is a legal right that is targeted against a 
particular rule - a rule with the wrong predicate or history. 
Specifically, a constitutional right furnishes the rights-holder a 
legal power to secure, in some measure,50 the judicial invalida­
tion of a particular rule. To say that X's constitutional rights 
have been violated entails that a reviewing court should at X's 
instance invalidate, in some measure, a particular rule.51 It 
does not entail that any other rule should be invalidated, in any 
measure. 
In particular, then, constitutional rights are not shields for 
actions. To say that sanctioning X pursuant to a particular rule 
violates her constitutional rights does not entail that the partic­
ular action at stake, by virtue of which X has been sanctioned, 
is constitutionally protected from being sanctioned pursuant to 
all other rules.52 Similarly, to say that it violates X's constitu-
48. "Fully" here is meant to be neutral between the Direct and Derivative Accounts. The 
Direct Account says that the rule should not be fully in force, insofar as the claimant is 
sanctioned or coerced; the Derivative Account says that the rule should not be fully in force, 
insofar as it is properly amended or even wholly repealed. 
49. See infra note 60 and accompanying text (explaining focus on substantive challenges). 
50. Again, "in some measure" is meant to be neutral between the Direct and Derivative 
Accounts. See supra note 48. 
51. This article is concerned with constitutional rights, insofar as these arc enforced by 
reviewing courts. It remains an open question whether the concept of a judicially unenforced 
constitutional right is even coherent. See Adler, supra note 4, at 775-79 {discussing judicial 
enforcement of constitutional rights). In any event, the central problem addressed here is 
whether the legal rights that figure in constitutional adjudication are morally direct or deriva­
tive. That is a sufficiently discrete and salient problem, see infra section 111.B (presenting 
institutional arguments against judicial repeal of rules), to merit separate attention. 
52. The Basic Structure presupposes some concept of sanctioning X "pursuant to" a legal 
rule, such that sanctioning X "pursuant to" Rule1 can be constitutional, while sanctioning her 
"pursuant to" Ru!� can be unconstitutional. What, precisely, does this involve? The answer 
to that question - what it means, precisely, for state officials to be guided by a legal rule -
is difficult and controversial, involving large issues about the nature of law and of rule-guided 
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tional rights to subject her to the legal duty a particular rule 
announces does not entail that actions within the scope of that 
duty are constitutionally protected from coverage by all other 
rules. 
15 
The claim I advance, in this Part of the article, is simply a descrip­
tive claim. I claim that the Basic Structure is, in fact, our structure: 
that it holds true of our practice of constitutional adjudication. My 
claim is not that constitutional adjudication need be structured this 
way - structuring constitutional rights as shields for actions is cer­
tainly a conceptual possibility - nor do I claim, here, that the Basic 
Structure is better than an act-shielding structure. Rather, the plan 
of this article is to describe, in this Part, the existing structure of 
constitutional rights; and then to determine, in Parts II and ill, 
whether the Direct Account or Derivative Account provides a 
more plausible account of the connection between constitutional 
rights, thus structured, and morality. 
Relatedly, note that my description of the Basic Structure is 
neutral between the Direct and Derivative Accounts. A constitu­
tional right furnishes some kind of legal advantage against a partic­
ular rule. The Direct and Derivative Accounts are both consistent 
with, and build upon, this basic, descriptive claim. Where they dif­
fer, crucially, is as to the precise nature and moral grounding for the 
legal advantage that a constitutional right secures. On the Direct 
Account, a constitutional right advantages X by empowering her to 
secure the judicial invalidation of her own treatment - her own 
sanction or duty - by virtue of there obtaining sufficient moral 
reason to overturn that treatment. On the Derivative Account, a 
constitutional right advantages X by empowering her to secure the 
judicial invalidation of the rule under which her treatment falls, by 
virtue of there obtaining sufficient moral reason to invalidate that 
rule. 
We shall pursue this contrast at much greater length in Parts II 
and III. Let us start, however, at the foundation: by seeing how 
constitutional rights under the Free Speech Clause, Free Exercise 
behavior. The answer I have in mind (although I believe that the arguments presented in this 
article for the most part do not depend upon a specific conception of rule-guidance or of law) 
is as follows: state officials (1) believe, or claim to believe, that X has performed an action 
prohibited by Rule1 or failed to perform an action required by Rule1; and (2) given that 
eventuality, take or claim to take Rule1 as authoritative for issuing the disadvantageous direc­
tive that constitutes X's sanction. See infra text accompanying notes 312-14 (distinguishing 
nonmoral fact that state officials take rules as authoritative, or claim to do so, from moral fact 
that the enactment of rules changes the moral reasons bearing upon officials); note 54 ( defin­
ing "sanction"). 
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Clause, Equal Protection Clause, and the substantive component of 
the Due Process Clause, function not as shields around particular 
actions, but as shields against particular rules. 
Why these particular provisions? I concentrate, in this article, 
on these provisions both because they refer to moral criteria,s3 and 
also because they are the main constitutional provisions by virtue of 
which sanctionss4 or duties can violate substantive constitutional 
rights.ss Sanctions and sanction-backed duties deserve special focus 
53. See DwoRKIN, FREEDOM'S LAw, supra note 1, at 7. 
54. By "sanction" I mean something like this: a legal directive, addressed to a person by 
name, that constitutes a disadvantage for him (paradigmatically, a legal duty to pay a fine or 
serve a term of imprisonment), and that state officials impose pursuant to a conduct­
regulating rule. See JosEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REAsoN AND NORMS 157 (1990) (noting that 
"most sanctions consist in the withdrawal of rights or the imposition of duties"). Sanctions 
can, of course, be either civil or criminal, but because free speech, free exercise, substantive 
due process, and equal protection doctrines are indiscriminately applied to rules backed by 
civil and criminal sanctions, see infra text accompanying notes 68-129 (summarizing doc­
trines), I will not distinguish between the two. The Derivative Account explains in a crisp 
way why the doctrines are indiscriminate in this manner. Conduct-regulating rules can vio­
late liberties and breach antidiscrimination norms whether the sanctions that back them up 
are civil or criminal. See infra sections III.A.1-2. 
55. This leaves to one side Eighth Amendment challenges to special types of sanctions, 
such as the death penalty, see, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188-207 (1976) (opinion 
of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.), or the conditions of the claimant's imprisonment, see, 
e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-35 (1994). The Eighth Amendment does not, 
under current jurisprudence, normally provide a viable basis by which to challenge an ordi· 
nary sentence of imprisonment, see Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (rejecting 
proportionality challenge to life sentence); see also Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (re­
jecting claim that law against public intoxication prohibited mere status, and that sanction 
pursuant to such law therefore violated Eighth Amendment). The Eighth Amendment does 
prohibit excessive fines, but the jurisprudence on that is inchoate, see United States v. 
Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. 2028, 2033 (1998) (holding forfeiture unconstitutional, under Excessive 
Fmes Clause) ("This Court has had little occasion to interpret, and has never actually applied 
[until now], the Excessive Fmes Clause."), as is the due process jurisprudence on the exces­
siveness of punitive damages, see BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), which likewise is not 
discussed here. 
My statement also, clearly, leaves to one side double-jeopardy challenges, Ex Post Facto 
Clause challenges, and others that arise where the claimant has not merely been sanctioned 
pursuant to a single, preexisting rule. What we need to understand first is why, in that simple 
and standard case, sanctioning X under one clear and preexisting rule can violate his consti· 
tutional rights, even though his action may be wrongful under another description. See infra 
text accompanying notes 163-64 (further discussing double jeopardy). 
Will not other parts of the Bill of Rights, along with free speech, free exercise, equal 
protection, and substantive due process, also advantage X in this way? In practice, the an­
swer, currently, is no. For example, the "regulatory takings" component of the Takings 
Clause is certainly applicable to duty-conferring laws, such as laws for landowners, see Lucas 
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); but the Takings Clause, properly 
understood, is not a protection against sanctions and duties. Rather, it is a complex kind of 
benefit-conferring provision. See, e.g., Williamson County Reg!. Planning Commn. v. Hamil­
ton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985) ("The Fifth Amendment does not proscribe the taking of 
property; it proscribes taking without just compensation."). As for the Establishment Clause, 
although that provision in theory covers conduct-regulating rules addressed to private par­
ties, see, e.g., Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 305-06 (1985) 
(rejecting "entanglement" challenge, by religious foundation, to requirements of Fair Labor 
Standards Act), in practice successful challenges to such rules are not a significant part of 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 
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because these are the most elementary and accepted sources of con­
stitutional violations:56 whatever else might be "unconstitutional," 
sanctioning an action, or coercing actors to perform or refrain from 
actions, surely can be.57 Relatedly, I use the term "rule" to mean 
what, more precisely, might be called a "prescription" or a "conduct 
rule": a rule that prohibits or requires certain types of actions, that 
has a canonical, written formulation, that becomes legally.authori­
tative through enactment, and that functions as a decision rule by 
which legal officials impose sanctions on those who perform, or fail 
to perform, the actions that the rule prohibits or requires.58 By the 
In any event, Takings Clause and Establishment Clause challenges (and, for that matter, 
excessiveness challenges under the Eighth Amendment or due process) can be readily assimi­
lated to the argument structure presented in this article. If the Basic Structure holds true of 
such challenges - if, for example, X's sanction can constitute a regulatory taking of his 
property even though the very action involved can be sanctioned under a different rule; or if 
X's sanction can be excessive under one rule but need not be, for the very same action, under 
another - then the arguments presented in Part II against the Direct Account would apply. 
As for constitutional challenges to special types of sanctions (such as the death penalty, or 
harsh conditions of confinement), I am less sanguine that the Basic Structure holds true of 
such challenges, although, again, if it did the arguments presented in Part II would apply. I 
will not even speculate here about the relevance of such arguments to double jeopardy or ex­
post-facto type challenges; that is simply too far beyond the scope of this article. 
56. Consider, by contrast, the continuing scholarly debates about the propriety of consti­
tutional challenges to the denial of benefits. See Symposium, The Unconstitutional Condi­
tions Doctrine, 72 DENV. U. L. REv. 859 (1995). 
57. Joel Feinberg expresses this point elegantly at the very beginning of his famous trea­
tise on the criminal law. In explaining why his project is to answer the question, "What sorts 
of conduct may the state rightly make criminal?" Feinberg explains: "My reason for restrict­
ing the inquiry to the criminal law is partly methodological. Even if one were concerned to 
give a complete account of social power, one would begin with the relatively blunt and visible 
forms of political coercion where interferences with liberty are 'writ large.'" JOEL FEINBERG, 
HARM TO OTHERS: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 3 (1983). 
I say "coercing actors to perform or refrain from actions" rather than "imposing a duty 
upon actors," given the justiciability problems (within the Direct Account) raised by duties 
that are not clearly coercive. See infra text accompanying notes 290-92, 588-97. 
58. See GEORG HENRIK VON Wrumrr, NORM AND ACTION: A LomCAL ENQUIRY 7 
(1963) (defining "prescription" in this sense) ("Prescriptions are given or issued by someone. 
They 'flow' from or have their 'source' in the will of a norm-giver or, as we shall also say, a 
norm-authority. They are, moreover, addressed or directed to some agent or agents, whom 
we shall call norm-subject(s) . . . .  In order to make its will known to the subject(s), the 
authority promulgates the norm. In order to make its will effective, the authority attaches a 
sanction or threat of punishment to the norm.''). For philosophical discussion of the different 
types of rules, including what I am calling "prescriptions," see id. at 1-16; FREDERICK 
SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DE­
CISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 1-15 (1991); MAx BLACK, MODELS AND METAPHORS 
95-139 (1962). 
Meir Dan-Cohen, in a well-known article, has explained that the conduct-regulating and 
decision-authorizing aspects of a prescription may come apart. The state may use one de­
scription of actions to tell the public what it should or should not do, and another to tell its 
officials which actions or failures to act should be sanctioned. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision 
Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HAR.v. L. REv. 625, 
626 (1984). For ease of exposition, I assume that the state's conduct rule and decision rule 
are one and the same; however, nothing in my critique of the Direct Account or defense of 
the Derivative Account depends upon that assumption. 
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"predicate" of a rule, I mean the description of actions contained in 
the rule's canonical formulation, such that actors are obliged to re­
frain from performing, or to perform, any particular action falling 
under that description, and state officials are authorized to sanction 
any non-complying actor. Finally, my discussion focuses upon sub­
stantive rather than procedural challenges - that is, I ignore 
Fourth Amendment,59 Sixth Amendment, procedural due process, 
and other such challenges to the investigatory and adjudicatory pro­
cedures by which a civil or criminal sanction is imposed upon the 
claimant - because the theoretical as well as doctrinal problems of 
procedural rights are quite distinct.60 It is enough to show in detail, 
as this article attempts to do, that substantive constitutional rights 
are better explained by the Derivative Account. 
* * * 
It is hard to imagine a crisper formulation of the proposition 
that constitutional rights do not shield actions than the following 
passage from Supreme Court's opinion in the R.A. V. 61 case. 
Rules - even the rules that the state uses to regulate conduct and impose sanctions -
need not, as a conceptual matter, have a canonical formulation. See John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., 
Legality, Vagueness and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REv. 189, 190-201 
(1985) (describing nineteenth-century institution of common-law crimes); SCHAUER, supra, at 
14 (noting that "specificity, conclusiveness [and) authoritative formulation [are not] neces­
sary conditions for the existence of a mandatory rule"). Persons sanctioned by the state 
pursuant to a non-canonically formulated rule will have a constitutional vagueness or retro­
activity claim, see Jeffries, supra, at 190-201; it is beyond the scope of this article to analyze 
the moral content and power of this constitutional right, and to decide whether it is itself 
morally direct or derivative. Assume that the right fails; X is sanctioned pursuant to a 
common-law rule. Then, on the Derivative Account, the judicial decision overturning X's 
sanction simply amounts to a repeal or amendment of the common-law rule (whether that is, 
in turn, styled an interpretation of the rule, or an override). That would be my construal, for 
example, of Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307-11 (1940) (overturning, on free speech 
grounds, conviction of speaker for common law breach of the peace). 
59. For an illuminating analysis, in the Fourth Amendment context, of a problem (Why 
do guilty persons have a Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches?) quite 
parallel to the problem discussed here (Why do persons who are guilty under some descrip· 
tion have substantive constitutional rights against being sanctioned or coerced pursuant to 
the wrong kind of rules?), see Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 96 CoLUM. L. REv. 1456 (1996). 
60. In general, procedures are valuable either instrumentally (as a mechanism by which 
to secure good outcomes) or because of the intrinsic value of participation. See Jerry L. 
Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U. L. REv. 
885, 886 (1981 ); Robert S. Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes - A Plea for 
"Process Values," 60 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 4 (1974). The substantive rights under discussion 
here have a moral grounding that is, I believe, at least partly distinct from this moral ground­
ing for procedural rights. See infra sections III.A.1-2. And even if this is untrue, see JoHN 
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST. A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 73-104 (1980) 
(presenting "process theory" of constitutional rights), the problem of explaining why a con· 
stitutional right can be violated by virtue of a flawed rule-predicate whose application by 
enforcement officers and courts is procedurally perfect, will prove sufficiently complex to 
merit separate attention. 
61. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
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The proposition that a particular instance of speech can be proscrib­
able on the basis of one feature (e.g., obscenity) but not on the basis 
of another (e.g., opposition to the city government) is commonplace 
and has found application in many contexts. We have long held, for 
example, that nonverbal expressive activity can be banned because of 
the action it entails, but not because of the ideas it expresses - so 
that burning a flag in violation of an ordinance against outdoor fires 
could be punishable, whereas burning a flag in violation of an ordi­
nance against dishonoring _the flag is not. Similarly, we have upheld 
reasonable "time, place, or manner" restrictions, but only if they are 
"justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech." 
And just as the power to proscribe particular speech on the basis of a 
noncontent element (e.g., noise) does not entail the power to pro­
scribe the same speech on the basis of a content element; so also, the 
power to proscribe it on the basis of one content element (e.g., ob­
scenity) does not entail the power to proscribe it on the basis of other 
content elements.62 
This passage describes not just the Free Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment, but all the provisions of the Bill of Rights that, within 
current constitutional jurisprudence, secure judicial protection for 
actors from sanctions and sanction-backed duties. 
Let us begin with free speech. The Free Speech Clause concerns 
a special kind of action: a speech-act. Speech-acts, like actions 
more generally, are what philosophers call "particulars" or "to­
kens."63 That is, an action is a particular thing - specifically, a 
particular bodily movement - that can be picked out under differ­
ent descriptions, which describe the various properties that one and 
the same bodily movement has.64 "Property," here, denotes some 
type, or class, of bodily movements - for example, the type, or 
class, of bodily movements that cause a certain kind of effect, or 
that constitute a certain kind of event.65 A particular finger-pulling 
of yours can, at once, be an action of "shooting a gun," "killing a 
human being," "disturbing the neighbors," and "stopping an in-
62. 505 U.S. at 385-86 (citations omitted) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 
U.S. 781, 791 (1989)). 
63. On the distinction between "tokens" or "particulars," and "types" or "universals," 
see D.M. ARMSTRONG, UNIVERSALS: AN OPINIONATED INTRODUCTION 1-7 (1989). 
64. See MICHAEL S. MooRE, Acr AND CruME: THE PHn.osoPHY OF ACTION AND rrs 
IMPUCATIONS FOR CruMINAL LAw 60-77' 280-301 (1993) (analyzing actions as particulars); id. 
at 78-112 (arguing that each particular action is a particular volition-caused bodily move­
ment). Although the so-called "coarse-grained" view of actions as particulars is not a univer­
sal one, see ROBERT AUDI, ACTION, INTENTION, AND REASON 2 (1993) (describing coarse­
grained view as "more widely held, and perhaps dominant, at present"), a legal right that 
protected one and the same action from sanction pursuant to different rules would, necessar­
ily, presume a coarse-grained view. It would identify some particular, dynamic human thing 
(call it a "shmaction," if indeed "actions" are fine-grained) that no rule could pick out. 
65. See ARMSTRONG, supra note 63, at 1-7. 
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truder," all of which descriptions refer to the diverse states or 
events that the very same finger-pulling causes or constitutes.66 
Similarly, a particular mouth movement of yours (performed, say, 
during an anti-war demonstration in a public park) can, at once, be 
an action of "protesting the war," "offending the bystanders," "dis­
turbing the wildlife," and "breaking windows" (if your pitch is suffi­
ciently shrill). A particular hand-motion of yours can, at once, be 
an action of "striking a match," "burning acrylic," "desecrating a 
flag," and "battering a bystander."67 
So a speech-act, like any action, has multiple properties.68 By 
definition, one property that a speech-act has is the property of 
communicating, of "expressing," a statement. But a speech-act al­
ways also has some nonexpressive property - at a minimum, an 
innocuous property like producing sound waves, or darkening pa­
per. And sometimes, as in the action of burning a flag, or sabotag­
ing military production to protest the war, or performing a 
"symbolic" assassination, the nonexpressive properties of a speech­
act - its causal or constitutive connection to states or events, in­
dependent of the fact that the act-token is communicative - can be 
quite morally serious. Thus it has long been a staple of First 
Amendment jurisprudence, as R.A. V. rightly explains, that a 
speech-act can be sanctioned or prohibited by a rule whose predi-
66. See, e.g., R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 379-81 (speech-act also action of trespass); United States 
v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 313 n.1 {1990) (speech-act also action of injuring federal property); 
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 784-90 {1989) (speech-act also action of causing 
loud noise); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 291-92 {1984) 
(speech-act also action of camping); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 369-70 (1968) 
(speech-act also action of destroying government documents). 
67. It might be objected, again, that I am assuming an unduly coarse-grained view of act 
individuation. It is consistent with the status of actions as particulars to say that, where the 
same bodily movement falls under two radically different types, we have not one but two 
actions. It might be the case that some, but not all, of the different properties that a particu­
lar bodily movement has are properties of the same action. See MooRE, supra note 64, at 
366-74. I believe, however, that the most plausible act-shielding constitutional right would be 
significantly coarse-grained, in this sense: it would delineate some type of action sufficiently 
important or harmless that actors, or certain actors (e.g., black actors), should be free to 
perform it. But how is the freedom of actors to perform a type of action violated? It is 
violated by coercing them not to perform the bodily movement that instantiates the action, or 
sanctioning them by virtue of that bodily movement. So, wh�ther or not the rule-predicate 
pursuant to which that bodily movement is coerced and sanctioned picks out the same "ac­
tion," for nonlegal purposes, it would for purposes of our act-shielding right. 
For this reason, in my descriptive efforts I focus on showing that sanctioning or coercing 
the very same (significantly) coarse-grained action can be unconstitutional under one de­
scription and constitutional under another. But, in any event, my descriptive claims are 
equally true, I think, on a more moderately coarse-grained view. Otherwise, why would con­
stitutional challenges be styled as facial or as-applied challenges to particular rules? See infra 
text accompanying notes 133-34. Therefore, I will not belabor the point through a separate 
discussion of the moderately coarse-grained view. 
68. Or, more generally, like any token. See ARMsmoNo, supra note 63, at 1-7. 
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cate picks out certain nonexpressive properties of actions, even 
though sanctioning or prohibiting the very same speech-act under a 
rule whose predicate picks out certain expressive act-properties 
would be unconstitutional. 
The leading case for this doctrine is United States v. O'Brien.69 
Mr. O'Brien burned his draft card on the steps of a federal court­
house as an act of political protest against the Vietnam War, and 
was prosecuted and convicted pursuant to a federal statute that pro­
hibited destroying or mutilating draft cards.70 The Supreme Court 
upheld O'Brien's conviction,71 despite the assumed expressive cast 
of his particular action of draft-card-destruction.72 The Court's rea­
soning centered on the predicate of the particular statute pursuant 
to which O'Brien was convicted. 
This Court has held that when "speech" and "nonspeech" elements 
are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important 
governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify 
incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms . . . .  Whatever 
imprecision inheres in these terms, we think it clear that a govern­
ment regulation is sufficiently justified if it . . .  furthers an important 
or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is un­
related to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental re­
striction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is 
essential to the furtherance of that interest.73 
In short, Mr. O'Brien's conviction satisfied the First Amendment 
because the act-property set forth by the statute's predicate was a 
(sufficiently important) nonexpressive property of actions: the 
property of causing draft cards to be damaged.74 Had O'Brien, in­
stead, been convicted for violating a rule that prohibited draftees 
69. 391 U.S. 367 {1968). 
70. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 369-70. 
71. See 391 U.S. at 386. 
72. See 391 U.S. at 376 ("[E]ven on the assumption that the alleged communicative ele­
ment in O'Brien's conduct is sufficient to bring into play the First Amendment, it does not 
necessarily follow that the destruction of a registration certificate is constitutionally protected 
activity."). 
73. 391 U.S. at 376-77 (emphasis added). 
74. See 391 U.S. at 382 ("In conclusion, we find that because of the Government's sub­
stantial interest in assuring the continuing availability of issued Selective Service certificates, 
because amended § 462{b) is an appropriately narrow means of protecting this interest and 
condemns only the independent noncommunicative impact of conduct within its reach, and 
because the noncommunicative impact of O'Brien's act of burning his registration certificate 
frustrated the Government's interest, a sufficient governmental interest has been shown to 
justify O'Brien's conviction."). The O'Brien reference to the government's "substantial in­
terest" implies that rules picking out insignificant nonexpressive act-properties might be 
invalid, insofar as these include speech-acts within their scope. I believe this is indeed the 
correct interpretation of the Free Speech Clause and the Court's free speech case law. See 
infra text accompanying notes 354-64. 
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from "protesting the war," or "desecrating draft cards," his convic­
tion would certainly have been unconstitutional. Although First 
Amendment doctrine is dense and complicated, it is at least clear 
that certain rules that pick out expressive act-properties - specifi­
cally, rules that are "content-based" - are subject to intensive 
scrutiny and are almost always unconstitutional.75 This was the 
case, for example, in Texas v. Johnson. The statutory term "flag 
desecration" picked out an expressive property of actions - to des­
ecrate a flag is, necessarily, to perform a bodily movement that 
communicates disrespect - and triggered strict scrutiny by the 
Court.76 
Consider what the First Amendment would look like if 
O'Brien's distinction between rules whose predicates pick out 
nonexpressive versus expressive properties of actions did not ob­
tain. Either speech-acts with seriously harmful nonexpressive char­
acteristics, such as expressive burnings, sabotages, assassinations, 
and so forth, would be constitutionally protected: someone who 
was speaking as well as harming would have a successful First 
Amendment defense to a prosecution for battery, property­
destruction, or homicide. Alternatively, expressive burnings, acts of 
sabotage, or assassinations could be sanctioned pursuant to grossly 
overbroad or discriminatory laws that prohibited, say, "offensive ut­
terances," "language disrespectful to the Nation," or "the making 
of a misleading statement about the President, by a registered 
member of the Independent Party."77 
Besides the O'Brien distinction between the expressive and 
nonexpressive properties of speech-acts, there is a second distinc-
75. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988); see also Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. 
Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 123-27 (1991) (arguing that, in 
general, content-based laws should not be subject to "compelling interest" scrutiny but rather 
should be automatically unconstitutional). 
76. Although the Court initially pointed out that Texas had defined "desecration" in a 
way that left open the possibility of nonexpressive desecration, see Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 
397, 403 n.3 (1989) (defining "desecration" as physical mistreatment of flag that causes seri­
ous offense), the Court's subsequent analysis belied this point and took "desecration" (even 
as defined by Texas) to be expressive. See 491 U.S. at 412 (holding that Texas statute is 
"content-based" because the offensive cast of expressive flag-desecration is not a secondary 
effect, unrelated to its expressive cast). 
77. For a cogent statement of the First Amendment distinction between rules picking out 
nonexpressive versus expressive properties of speech-acts, see Alexander, supra note 7, at 
545 (" '[C]riticizing the government' is not protected conduct viewed in isolation from the 
various ways government might attempt to regulate/criticizing the government.' 'Criticizing 
the government' may be validly - constitutionally - regulated if the criticism is broadcast 
from a soundtruck at night, and the regulation proscribes the use of soundtrucks at night . . . .  
But 'criticizing the government' is not validly regulated if the regulation proscribes, or was 
motivated by a desire to proscribe, 'criticizing the government.' "). 
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tion, relevant here, within First Amendment jurisprudence. That is 
the distinction between low-value and full-value speech. The classic 
low-value categories are obscenity, incitement, "fighting words," 
and libel.78 What this means is that a speech-act token falling 
within a low-value category - the action of displaying a sexually 
prurient, patently offensive movie that lacks serious literary, artis­
tic, political or scientific value;79 or inciting a crowd, with likely suc­
cess, to imminent lawless action;80 or uttering a face-to-face insult 
that, by its very utterance, tends to cause an immediate breach of 
the peace;81 or knowingly stating an injurious falsehood about an­
other person82 - can be sanctioned pursuant to an appropriate 
rule. But it has long been a :fixture of the Court's First Amendment 
jurisprudence that sanctioning a low-value speech-act pursuant to 
the wrong kind of rule will be unconstitutional. The doctrine that 
expresses this proposition, of course, is the First Amendment "over­
breadth" doctrine. 83 
In [overbreadth] cases, an individual whose own speech . . .  may val­
idly be prohibited or sanctioned is permitted to challenge a statute on 
its face because it also threatens others not before the court - those 
who desire to engage in legally protected expression but who may 
refrain from doing so rather than risk prosecution or undertake to 
have the law declared partially invalid. If the overbreadth is "sub­
stantial," the law may not be enforced against anyone, including the 
party before the court, until it is narrowed to reach only unprotected 
activity . . . . 84 
So, for example, to use the exemplary case of Gooding v. Wilson, 85 
it violated the First Amendment to sanction a political protester 
pursuant to a statute prohibiting '"[the utterance of] opprobrious 
78. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992); Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. 
at 127 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
79. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973). 
80. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). . 
81. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). The Chaplinsky Court 
defines fighting words disjunctively to include also speech-acts which "by their very utterance 
inflict injury," 315 U.S. at 572, but whether the Frrst Amendment category of fighting words 
truly includes non-peace-breaching, injurious speech-acts is seriously questionable after 
R.A.V. 
82. See New York T!Illes Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 {1964). 
83. For scholarly discussions of the overbreadth doctrine, see Alexander, supra note 7; 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853 (1991); Alfred Hill, 
The Puzzling First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 25 HoFSTRA L. REv. 1063 {1997); 
Monaghan, supra note 44; Martin Redish, The Warren Court, the Burger Court and the First 
Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 1031 (1983); Note, The First Amend­
ment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HAR.v. L. REv. 844 (1970). 
84. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503 (1985). 
85. 405 U.S. 518 {1972). 
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words or abusive language' "S6 - given the breadth of the statutory 
terms "opprobrious" and "abusive" - even though what the pro­
tester in fact had said, to a police officer, was, "White son of a bitch, 
I'll kill you."S7 Or, to switch from "fighting words" to obscenity, it 
would presumably violate the First Amendment to sanction X pur­
suant to a law generally prohibiting the display of "pictures of chil­
dren not fully clothed" - given the umpteen nonpornographic 
pictures of this kind that parents display - even if X himself is a 
child pornographer.ss Similar examples could readily be con­
structed for incitements9 and libel. 
The reader familiar with the First Amendment overbreadth doc­
trine, and the Court's conceptualization thereof, may protest at this 
point that the application of an overbroad rule to an assaultive pro­
tester, or a child pornographer, or another such actor X whose own 
speech is proscribable under a different rule, does not actually in­
volve the violation of X's "constitutional rights." Rather, this 
reader may explain, overturning X's sanction is simply a prophylac­
tic measure designed to protect other, innocent speakers falling 
under the same rule as X90 But this response misconstrues what I 
mean by "constitutional right." The response assumes that consti­
tutional rights necessarily have a special and robust moral content; 
X's constitutional rights can only be violated, the response assumes, 
86. Wilson, 405 U.S. at 519 (quoting GA. ConE . .ANN.§ 26.6303 (Harrison Supp. 1971)). 
87. 405 U.S. at 520 n.1 (citing Wilson v. State, 156 S.E.2d 446, 449 (Ga. 1967)); see also 
Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974) (invalidating Louisiana ordinance that 
made it unlawful to "curse or revile or to use obscene or opprobrious language toward or 
with reference to any member of the city police," where speaker allegedly cursed and 
screamed at police officer (citing NEW ORLEANS, LA., ORDINANCE 828 M.C.S. § 49-7 (1972)). 
88. Surely this would be true if "not fully clothed" were defined to include the display of 
any body part except for the head, arms, or feet. See Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 
590 {1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that statute prohibiting nude or sexual photo­
. graphs, etc., of children, with nudity defined only to include genitals, pubic areas, and 
postpubertal female breasts, is overbroad); cf. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 112-14 (1990) 
(rejecting overbreadth challenge to statute regulating child pornography, by virtue of stat­
ute's predicate requiring more than nudity); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764-74 (1982) 
(same). 
More generally, as the Court bas stated in Miller, the foundational obscenity case: "State 
statutes designed to regulate obscene materials must be carefully limited . . . .  [Obscene] con­
duct must be specifically defined by the applicable state law, as written or authoritatively 
construed." Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973) {footnote omitted). The obscene 
cast of the claimant's own conduct is not a sufficient condition for his constitutional claim to 
fail. 
89. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969) (scrutinizing predicate of crimi­
nal syndicalism statute, and invalidating statute because it covered actions not within the 
narrow category of incitement). 
90. See, e.g., Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503-04 (1985) (explicating 
overbreadth as a special prophylactic doctrine that obtains where the speaker's own constitu­
tional rights are not violated); Ferber, 458 U.S. at 769-70 (1982) (same); Broadrick v. 
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-13 (1973) (same). 
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if moral wrong was done to X I do not mean to assume that. 
Rather, by "constitutional right," I simply mean a legal right (tech­
nically, a legal power) to secure the judicial invalidation, in some 
measure, of one or more rules (of a particular rule on the rule­
centered view, or of all rules covering a particular action on the act­
shielding view).91 This concept of a "constitutional right" is both 
plausible and deliberately catholic. It is, by design, consistent with 
both the Direct Account and the Derivative Account, and leaves 
open, for further debate, what the moral content of constitutional 
rights truly is. The Direct Account ought not triumph at the defini­
tional stage, by defining "constitutional right" to exclude the very 
possibility of constitutional rights having derivative moral content. 
And it is, further, clear that "constitutional rights," as here ca­
tholically defined, do not have an act-shielding structure in the 
overbreadth context. The assaultive protester has a constitutional 
right, in my sense, to secure the invalidation of her sanction pursu­
ant to an overbroad rule prohibiting "opprobrious words or abusive 
language"; neither she nor anyone else has a constitutional right to 
secure the invalidation of her sanction, for the very same action, 
imposed pursuant to a narrowly tailored rule prohibiting fighting 
words. The child pornographer has a constitutional right, in my 
sense, to secure the invalidation of her sanction pursuant to an 
overbroad rule prohibiting all pictures of unclothed children; 
neither she nor anyone else has a constitutional right to secure the 
invalidation of her sanction, for the very same action, imposed pur­
suant to a narrowly tailored rule prohibiting child pornography. 
The First Amendment case that ties together all the doctrine I 
have just summarized, and shows, better than any other, how free 
speech rights are not act-shielding, is the R.A. V. case itself. In 
R.A. V., a speaker whose speech-act was doubly bad - not only was 
the speech-act an instance of low-value speech, but it also possessed 
harmful nonexpressive properties - nonetheless secured the invali­
dation of his indictment. This particular speaker, a teenager, had 
decided to express his views by burning a cross on the front yard of 
a black family who happened to live across the street from him.92 
The teenager was prosecuted for breaching a Minnesota ordinance 
that broadly prohibited racist, sexist, and anti-religious expression: 
" 'Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, 
appellation, characterization or graffiti [which] arouses anger, 
91. See supra note 45 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying notes 434-39. 
92. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 379-80 (1992). 
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alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, 
religion or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of 
a misdemeanor.' "93 The teenager's particular action was an action 
of trespass and perhaps arson,94 and also, the entirt:t Court assumed, 
of uttering "fighting, words. "95 But the entire Court also agreed (on 
differing rationales )96 that sanctioning the teenager pursuant to the 
particular statute Minnesota had chosen would be unconstitutional. 
The entire Court concurred in overturning the indictment of our 
doubly harmful teenager, by virtue of the Minnesota statute's 
flawed predicate. 
In sum, First Amendment cases like Texas v. Johnson, O'Brien, 
the overbreadth cases, and R.A. V. show unequivocally that free 
speech rights do not possess an act-shielding structure. In theory, 
one might think, constitutional liberties such as liberty of speech 
should indeed have an act-shielding structure. What a constitu­
tional liberty should do, one might claim, is to shield from all rules 
particularly important actions - those actions falling within the 
category defined by the liberty (for example, full-value expression, 
or religiously motivated conduct) that do not have overriding, 
harmful properties.97 But our actual constitutional practices belie 
this claim. It is unsurprising then, that when we move from liberties 
to equality - from the Free Speech to the Equal Protection Clause 
- our practices remain rule-centered rather than act-shielding. For 
if constitutional liberties do not give rise to protective shields 
around actions, then a fortiori constitutional guarantees, such as the 
Equal Protection Clause, that have nothing to do with important 
types of actions, should not. 
And indeed the Equal Protection Clause does not. "Discrimina­
tory purpose" has, for some time now, been the touchstone of equal 
protection analysis. A rule has a "discriminatory purpose," within 
equal protection law, if the rule-predicate refers explicitly to partic­
ular races, genders, or other "suspect" classes, or if the legislators 
93. 505 U.S. at 380 (citing ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGis. CooE § 292.02 (1990)). 
94. See 505 U.S. at 380 n.1. 
95. See 505 U.S. at 381; 505 U.S. at 402 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); 505 U.S. 
at 432 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
96. The majority overturned the teenager's indictment, on the assumption that the ordi­
nance had been narrowed to cover a content-based and viewpoint-based subset of "fighting 
words." See 505 U.S. at 391-96. The concurring Justices agreed that the teenager's indict­
ment should be overturned, but their rationale was that the ordinance was overbroad, by 
including speech-acts that were not "fighting words." See 505 U.S. at 411-15 {White, J., con­
curring in the judgment). 
97. Cf. infra text accompanying notes 315-33 (discussing true nature of constitutional 
"liberties"). 
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intended the rule to have a disparate impact along suspect lines.98 
Having a "discriminatory purpose" is close to99 a necessary condi­
tion for a successful equal protection challenge.100 A rule that 
merely has a disparate impact, not a "discriminatory purpose," will 
not violate the Equal Protection Clause. This doctrine stems from 
the Court's well-known decision in Washington v. Davis, 101 where it 
upheld a qualifying exam for D.C. police officers, even though 
blacks were disqualified by the test in disproportionate numbers; 
and from the extension of Davis to gender in the Feeney case,102 
which upheld Massachusetts's civil service preference for veterans, 
even though virtually all veterans in Massachusetts were men. 
To construe the Equal Protection Clause as act-shielding would 
eviscerate the doctrines here described. As an illustration, consider 
Craig v. Boren, 103 perhaps the leading example of an equal protec­
tion challenge to a conduct-regulating rule (the type of rule dis­
cussed in this article). An Oklahoma statute prohibited the sale of 
low-alcohol beer to minors, with a "minor" defined as a man under 
the age of twenty-one, and a woman under the age of eighteen.104 
98. See FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U. S. 307, 313 (1993) ("[A] statutory 
classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitu­
tional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably 
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification."); Person­
nel Admr. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271-80 (1979) (holding that rule that employs a nonsus­
pect predicate will still trigger heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, but 
only if predicate was selected, by rule-formulator, because of rule's adverse effects on a sus­
pect class). 
Beach also adverts here to the possibility of an equal protection challenge enhanced by 
the presence of fundamental rights. The Court has indeed recognized discrimination-type 
challenges in the area of fundamental rights, but, most recently - at least with respect to 
conduct-regulating rules - it has proceeded directly under the relevant fundamental right, 
and has not relied upon the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu 
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (free exercise); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 
505 U.S. 377 (1992) (free speech). 
99. I say "close to" because the Court has, on occasion, invalidated statutes under the 
rational-basis prong of equal protection scrutiny. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 
(1996); Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commn., 488 U.S. 336 (1989); City of 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Hooper v. Bernalillo County 
Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982); United States Dept. of 
Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). Such cases, or at least some of them, can be under­
stood as involving "suspect" classes that the Court was unwilling to label as such - for 
example, the class of new state residents in Hooper and Zobel, the class of homosexual per­
sons in Romer, and the class of mentally retarded persons in Cleburne. 
100. It will be sufficient if the interest behind the rule lacks enough importance to justify 
purposeful discrimination. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 197 (1976) ("classifications 
by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to 
achievement of those objectives"). 
101. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
102. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256 (1979). 
103. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
104. See Craig, 429 U. S. at 191-92. 
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A vendor of low-alcohol beer brought an anticipatory challenge to 
the statute. The Court sustained her challenge, finding an insuffi­
cient connection between gender and the state's claimed objective 
- traffic-safety - to justify the statute's explicit gender classifica­
tion.105 The vendor was constitutionally free from the particular 
legal duty to which the gender-discriminatory statute purported to 
subject her. But this could hardly mean, given Davis and Feeney, 
that the vendor was also free from the duties to which a host of 
gender-neutral rules might subject her, and under which her (vari­
ous) actions of selling low-alcohol beer to minors might fall: for 
example, a rule requiring her to possess a valid license, to refrain 
from selling alcohol to someone obviously intoxicated, or to sell al­
cohol for take-away consumption only in closed containers. t06 
Indeed, the Court in Craig v. Boren made clear that Oklahoma 
could cure the defect in its statute by widening the statutory duty, 
so as necessarily to include within its scope every single action cov­
ered by the now-discriminatory duty. "[T]he Oklahoma Legislature 
is free to redefine any cutoff age for the purchase and sale of [low­
alcohol beer] that it may choose, provided that the redefinition op­
erates in a gender-neutral fashion."107 Sanctioning the vendor for 
breaching a rule that banned sales to women as well as men under 
the age of twenty-one would not violate the vendor's constitutional 
rights, or anyone else's. This is a tight, logical consequence of the 
doctrinal focus on discriminatory purpose; but note that it would 
hold true even if the doctrine were changed to make either dispa­
rate impact or discriminatory purpose the basis for an equal protec­
tion violation. The concept of disparate impact, like the concept of 
discriminatory purpose, takes as its referent a particular rule.108 It 
105. See 429 U.S. at 199-204. 
106. Here, as in the overbreadth context, the point that the vendor was not asserting "her 
own" constitutional rights, but instead was asserting (under the rubric of jus tertii) the consti­
tutional rights of others - male purchasers of low-alcohol beer, see 429 U.S. at 192-97 (hold­
ing that vendor had jus tertii standing) - is misplaced. The vendor did have a constitutional 
right in my minimal sense: a legal right to secure the invalidation, in some measure, of the 
rule that purported to impose a duty upon her. See supra text accompanying notes 90-91 
(discussing this issue in the overbreadth context). 
In any event, my point would also hold for a rule that penalized the purchase of alcohol 
by men between 18 and 21. Clearly, overturning a young man's sanction or duty pursuant to 
this rule would not entail that he had a general constitutional immunity for othenvise-illegal 
actions of purchasing alcohol. 
107. Craig, 429 U.S. at 210 n.24 (emphasis added). 
108. See Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Pan.. & Pun. A.FF. 107, 
147-69 (1976). Fiss provides a theoretical defense of disparate-impact-type scrutiny, by argu­
ing in favor of what he calls the "group disadvantaging principle": "[A) state law or practice 
[that) aggravates . . .  the subordinate position of a specially disadvantaged group • . .  is what 
the Equal Protection Clause prohibits." Id. at 157. 
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concerns whether that rule falls more heavily on blacks rather than 
whites, men rather than women. So imagine that our vendor in 
Craig successfully challenged some gender-neutral rule on the 
grounds of its disparate- impacf (say, a rule prohibiting the sale of 
certain beverages disproportionately consumed by men). She 
would still be subject to existing gender-neutral rules lacking that 
disparate impact, as well as to a widened version of the unconstitu­
tional rule - widened so as to eliminate the disparate impact. 
So much for the Free Speech and Equal Protection Clauses of 
the Bill of Rights. The Free Exercise Clause can be handled 
quickly. As a consequence of the Court's decision in the seminal 
case of Employment Division v. Smith, 109 free exercise doctrine is 
now closely isomorphic to equal protection doctrine and roughly 
isomorphic to free speech doctrine.110 The Court in Smith held that 
Native Americans who had used peyote as part of the ceremony of 
a Native American church, and as a result were dismissed from 
their jobs for illegal drug use, could be denied state unemployment 
benefits.111 The right to religious freedom, the Court announced, 
simply protected actors from being sanctioned or coerced pursuant 
to non-neutral rules. Non-neutral rules, here, are those that explic­
itly pick out religious properties of actions - for example, that the 
It is, in theory, possible to construct an act-shielding doctrine under the Equal Protection 
Clause. Certain otherwise-proscribable actions, if performed by blacks, would be constitu­
tionally immune; blacks' freedom to perform such actions could be conceptualized as a re­
source to which they have a special claim, by virtue of distributive or reparative justice, or by 
virtue of an anti-caste principle, or whatever. But this is not what Flss argues for, or what the 
concept of disparate impact involves. See Personnel Admr. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 259-61 
(1979) (describing claimant's disparate-impact challenge to statutory provision establishing 
preference for veterans); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 232-38 (1976) (describing claim­
ants' disparate-impact challenge to various hiring practices, in particular a qualifying test, 
employed by the District of Columbia). 
109. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
110. I say "roughly" rather than perfectly isomorphic to free speech doctrine, because 
rules picking out nonexpressive act properties are, at least officially, subject to heightened 
scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause, see supra text accompanying note 73 - properly so, 
see infra text accompanying notes 354-64 - while neutral laws are not subject to heightened 
equal protection or free exercise scrutiny. I say "closely" rather than perfectly isomorphic to 
equal protection doctrine because of a special proviso that the Court deployed in Smith, and 
reaffirmed in City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997), to explain its earlier unemploy­
ment-compensation cases: '"[W]here the State has in place a system of individual exemp­
tions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of religious hardship without 
compelling reason."' Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2161 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 884). The exist­
ence of this special proviso does not materially undermine the isomorphism between free 
exercise and equal protection doctrine, for purposes of this article. Post-Smith, sanctioning 
or coercing an action under a religiously discriminatory rule will violate the Constitution 
even though sanctioning or coercing the very same action under a neutral rule that lacks the 
requisite "system of individual exemptions" will not. 
111. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. 
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action is performed for religious purposes, or by the members of a 
particular religious group. 
[Our] decisions have consistently held that the right of free exercise 
does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 
"valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the 
law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or 
proscribes). "112 
Post-Smith, the religious cast of a particular action will not, under 
the Constitution, work to exempt that action from a rule the predi­
cate of which describes actions in nonreligious terms113 - just as, 
under the Equal Protection Clause, actors are not exempt from 
race-neutral or gender-neutral laws and, under the O'Brien portion 
of First Amendment jurisprudence, speakers can generally be regu­
lated by rules picking out nonexpressive properties of their actions. 
Thus the rule-centered - rather than act-protecting - structure of 
free speech and equal protection doctrine holds true, mutatis mu­
tandis, for free exercise. 
Finally, constitutional doctrine in the area of substantive due 
process quite clearly fits the Basic Structure. Here, as elsewhere, 
constitutional challenges - whether anticipatory challenges by 
would-be actors, or retrospective challenges by actors who already 
have been sanctioned - are structured as challenges to particular 
rules. This is so natural to constitutional lawyers, scholars, and ju­
rists, that the Court without pause or comment adopted a rule­
centered approach in the seminal, post-New Deal substantive due 
process cases: Griswold v. Connecticut114 and Roe v. Wade. 115 Gris­
wold was a retrospective, individual challenge by Dr. Griswold and 
another doctor, who had been tried and convicted in state court for 
prescribing contraceptives in violation of a Connecticut criminal 
statute that prohibited " 'us[ing] any drug, medicinal article or in­
strument for the purpose of preventing contraception,' " or assisting 
others in doing so.116 Roe was an anticipatory, class-action chal­
lenge by the pseudonymous Jane Roe and others, who brought a 
declaratory and injunctive suit in federal district court against the 
Texas abortion statutes, which criminalized " 'procur[ing] an abor­
tion' " except for those " 'procured . . . by medical advice for the 
112. 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting United•States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, 
J., concurring in the judgment)); see Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2160-61 (reaffirming Smith). 
113. With the special exception noted above, see supra note 110. 
114. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
115. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
116. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480 (quoting CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §  53-32 (West 1958)). 
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purpose of saving the life of the mother.' "117 In each case, the 
Court focused on the particular statute against which it took, re­
spectively, Dr. Griswold's and Ms. Roe's claims to be . targeted. 
Specifically, the Court in each of these cases asked whether the par­
ticular statute at issue was narrowly tailored - a concept familiar 
from free speech jurisprudence.118 To quote the analysis in 
Griswold: 
The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within the zone 
of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees. 
And it concerns a law which, in forbidding the use of contraceptives 
rather than regulating their manufacture or sale, seeks to achieve its 
goals by means having a maximum destructive impact upon that rela­
tionship. Such a law cannot stand in light of the familiar principle, so 
often applied by this Court, that a "governmental purpose to control 
or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may 
not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and 
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."119 
The narrow-tailoring approach in Roe was identical: 
Where certain "fundamental rights" are involved, the Court has 
held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a 
"compelling state interest," and that legislative enactments must be 
narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake. 
Measured against these standards, [the Texas statute], in restrict­
ing legal abortions to those "procured or attempted by medical advice 
for the purpose of saving the life of the mother," sweeps too broadly. 
The statute makes no distinction between abortions performed early 
in pregnancy and those performed later, and it limits to a single rea­
son, "saving" the mother's life, the legal justification for the proce­
dure. The statute, therefore, cannot survive the constitutional attack 
made upon it here.120 
Because the Connecticut statute at stake in Griswold failed the 
Court's narrow-tailoring test, the Court overturned the sanctions of 
Dr. Griswold and his fellow physician that had been meted out pur­
suant to that statute.121 There was only a brief description of the 
particular actions that these doctors had performed;122 and it was 
surely not an entailment of the holding in Griswold that the doctors 
117. Roe, 410 U.S. at 117 n.l (quoting TEX. PENAL CoDE ANN. arts. 1192, 1196). 
118. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (citing free speech case law for narrow-tailoring analy­
sis); Roe, 410 U.S. at 155 (citing substantive due process, free speech, and other fundamental 
rights case law for narrow-tailoring analysis). 
119. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex reL Flowers, 377 U.S. 
288, 307 (1964)). 
120. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155, 164 (citations omitted). 
121. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486. 
122. See 381 U.S. at 480-81. 
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were constitutionally immune from being sanctioned, under any 
statute, for those particular actions. What if the notation Dr. 
Griswold used on his prescription form was a secret message to the 
pharmacist that constituted blackmail or extortion on an unrelated 
matter? What if the forms Griswold used had been stolen from the 
government? What if he prescribed more expensive contraceptive 
C rather than cheaper contraceptive D, as part of a price-fixing 
scheme with other doctors and the drug companies? The Court in 
Griswold did not need to confront these possibilities - it did not 
need to undertake a complete description of all the morally rele­
vant properties of Dr. Griswold's actions123 - because Dr. 
Griswold's substantive due process right was rule-centered, not act­
shielding. It protected him from being sanctioned pursuant to the 
no-contraception rule; it did not protect him from being sanctioned 
pursuant to all the rules under which his actions of prescribing con­
traceptives might fall. 
As for the decision in Roe: when the Court upheld the entry of 
anticipatory relief prohibiting any enforcement of the Texas no­
abortion statute, 124 this holding clearly did not entail that every ac­
tion within the scope of that statute was immune from coverage by 
every rule. The very point of the famous trimester analysis of Roe 
was to make clear that a state could proscribe and sanction post­
viability abortions absent a threat to the mother's life or health.125 
A future actor who procured a post-viability abortion could not be 
sanctioned by Texas pursuant to the particular overbroad rule 
targeted and invalidated in Roe, 126 but that actor could be sanc­
tioned for the very same action if Texas in the interim had re­
sponded to Roe by enacting a more narrowly tailored no-abortion 
statute limited to post-viability abortions not involving maternal life 
or health. 
The post-Roe and -Griswold substantive due process cases are 
similarly structured as challenges to particular rules rather than to 
the sanctioning or coercing of particular actions.127 I will not test 
123. See DAVID LYONS, FoRMs AND LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM 30-61 (1965) (analyzing 
concept of complete moral description of particular action). 
124. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 166-67. 
125. See 410 U.S. at 162-66. 
126. See 410 U.S. at 166 ("(T]he Texas abortion statutes, as a unit, must fall . . . .  We find it 
unnecessary to decide whether the District Court erred in withholding injunctive relief [and 
merely entering declaratory relief], for we assume the Texas prosecutorial authorities will 
give full credence to this decision that the present criminal abortion statutes of that State are 
unconstitutional."). 
127. Some exemplary and prominent cases, besides Casey, are Webster v. Reproductive 
Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (regulation of abortion); Bowers v. Hardwick, 418 U.S. 
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the reader's patience by discussing the facts and reasoning of these 
decisions here, beyond noting that the recent landmark decision in 
Casey128 was, like Roe, an anticipatory class action in which the 
Court facially invalidated a particular state law - a Pennsylvania 
statute prohibiting doctors from performing an abortion on a mar­
ried woman without receiving a signed statement of spousal consent 
from her.129 To spin out the familiar story: the holding in Casey 
protects Pennsylvania physicians from being sanctioned pursuant to 
this particular rule; but it does not entitle them to perform abor­
tions that not only violate the rule but are also wrongful under an­
other description, for example, because the physician's license 
elapsed, or because the physician failed to secure the woman's con­
sent, and so on. 
* * * 
This descriptive survey of constitutional doctrine under the rele­
vant portions of the Bill of Rights should suffice, I hope, to show 
that constitutional rights are not act-shielding, or even remotely like 
that.130 But the observant reader might complain that, by demon­
strating this negative claim, I have not yet demonstrated the posi­
tive claim that constitutional rights are rights against particular 
rules. There is logical space between having rights shield particular 
actions from all the rules under which the actions fall, and having 
rights that are targeted against particular rules. A constitutional 
right might be targeted, not against a particular rule but against 
some class of rules different from the class targeted by an act­
shielding right. For example, constitutional adjudication might be 
structured such that a constitutional right empowers the claimant to 
186 (1986) (regulation of sodomy); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) 
(family unity); and the recent assisted suicide cases, Vacco v. Quit� 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997), 
and Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct 2258 (1997). 
128. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). The Court in Casey moved from 
Roe's narrow-tailoring test for laws regulating abortion, to an "undue burden" test, princi­
pally to permit pre-viability measures aimed to protect fetal life, see 505 U.S. at 868-79, but 
this does not change the rule-centered cast of the Casey decision itself or of abortion doctrine 
more generally. 
129. See 505 U.S. at 887-98. 
130. What about the possibility of a hybrid structure, such that constitutional rights1 are 
targeted against rules, while constitutional rightsz protect innocent actions? It might be pro­
tested that, by demonstrating that constitutional rights1 exist - by showing that it can violate 
X's constitutional rights to sanction him by virtue of an action proscribable under another 
description - I have not ruled out the existence of constitutional rightSz. While a hybrid 
structure is indeed logically possible, it does not describe the case law. The closest cases we 
have to cases that recognize rightsz are as-applied challenges to rules. But as I demonstrate 
below, as-applied challenges to rules are best construed as rule-targeted; they do not involve 
a complete moral inspection of X's action, and therefore X's successful as-applied challenge 
does not confer a constitutional right2 on him. See infra text accompanying notes 140-44. 
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secure a judicial order immunizing him from being sanctioned, for 
performing a particular action, pursuant to any rule where the "pur­
pose" behind the rule (whatever precisely that means) is not a com­
pelling one.131 
Although this intermediate sort of constitutional right - one 
that neither protects a particular action from all rules, nor is 
targeted against a particular rule - is indeed a logical possibility, it 
seems morally esoteric. The act-shielding structure, at least, has 
real moral resonance. Actions are the primary object of moral as­
sessment, at least on certain plausible theories now widely held by 
moral philosophers - namely, act-consequentialist or deontologi­
cal theories.132 A particular action will, at bottom, be permissibly 
performed or not, and if our constitutional reviewing courts were 
epistemically and remedially perfect, they might well focus their ef­
forts on protecting particular actions. But constitutional courts do 
not do this, presumably because of the formal simplicity and practi­
cal advantages of focusing on particular rules. Given that they do 
not, why think that an intermediate position, with neither the moral 
resonance of rights-as-shields-for-actions, nor the countervailing 
benefits of the Basic Structure, is anything more than a logical 
possibility? 
Given that an intermediate position is both formally complex 
and morally esoteric, my descriptive efforts here will be brief: the 
intermediate position does not accurately describe our constitu­
tional practices, any more than the act-shielding structure does. 
Our very language belies it. Constitutional challenges are charac­
terized as facial or as-applied challenges to particular rules,133 not 
to classes of rules. Constitutional courts typically focus on the pred­
icate or history of one particular rule, regardless of whether the 
constitutional challenge is retrospective or prospective, or whether 
it is facial or as-applied. Sometimes, constitutional courts will con­
sider, in the same case, a challenge to two or more rules; but it is 
not a necessary feature of constitutional adjudication that this oc­
cur.134 The odd, intermediate position I am briefly considering says 
that, necessarily, recognizing X's "constitutional right" entails inval-
131. I am indebted to Michael Dorf for pressing me to recognize and discuss this 
possibility. 
132. See supra note 46. 
133. See Dorf, supra note 38, at 236. 
134. I will not try to demonstrate this exhaustively. But it is true, for example, of the 
various cases I have selected as doctrinal exemplars, see infra cases cited notes 156-61, 334·41, 
348-51, that they typically if not exclusively involve challenges to one rather than multiple 
rules, on any plausible text-based individuation criterion. 
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idating a class of rules, rather than just one rule. But constitutional 
courts typically invalidate (in some measure) merely one, particular 
rule. This implies that the Basic Structure rather than the interme­
diate position holds true. 
I should note that the general view of constitutional adjudica­
tion presented in this article (that courts repeal or amend rules, not 
individual treatments), and the arguments generally supporting this 
view, presuppose only the weaker claim that the act-shielding view 
is false (that is, that either the Basic Structure or an intermediate 
structure obtains), and not the more robust claim that the Basic 
Structure is true. The Direct Account of constitutional rights is un­
persuasive because it cannot persuasively account for the following 
feature of constitutional law, which is a feature both of the Basic 
Structure and of the intermediate structure just described: that it 
can be unconstitutional to impose a sanction or duty pursuant to 
one rule even though the very action by virtue of which the sanction 
is imposed, or that the claimant is coerced not to perform·, can be 
sanctioned or coerced pursuant to a different rule.13s 
Nonetheless, because I think the more robust claim is indeed 
correct, the view of constitutional adjudication presented here, and 
the arguments advanced to support that view, are specifically 
framed with the Basic Structure in mind. Constitutional rights are 
targeted against particular rules, not against classes of rules.136 
135. See infra Part II (criticizing Direct Account). A derivative account of the intermedi­
ate structure would construe courts as repealing or amending classes of rules rather than 
particular rules. 
136. To be sure, a judicial invalidation of one rule may have collateral consequences for 
other rules. For example, the invalidation may be stare decisis for a subsequent, judicial 
invalidation of another rule with similar content. The invalidation may even trigger duties, 
on the part of enforcement officials, to refrain from enforcing other rules. For example, the 
invalidation of one rule might make it sufficiently "clear " that a second is unconstitutional, 
such that an enforcement official would no longer possess qualified immunity from a dam­
ages action if she were to enforce the second. See generally Kent Greenawalt, Constitutional 
Decisions and the Supreme Law, 58 U. CoLO. L. REv. 145 (1987) (analyzing consequences of 
Supreme Court constitutional decisions for legislative and executive officials). Nonetheless, 
it is a mistake to conceive these collateral consequences as an invalidation of the collaterally­
affected rules - or at least to conceive them as the kind of invalidation envisioned by an 
intermediate structure. The difference between the intermediate structure and the Basic 
Structure concerns whether a particular rule is targeted by a judicial holding - whether the 
Court's analytic focus concerns the moral propriety of a particular rule; and, relatedly, 
whether the change in the duties, powers, etc. of private persons and state officials, with 
respect to a particular rule, secured by the judicial holding, can be different from the changes 
that follow from the holding with respect to other rules. But surely the answer is yes, given 
current practices. For instance, the court can enjoin officials not to enforce the particular 
rule; it need not enjoin them not to enforce a class of rules. Where such an injunction is 
entered, official enforcement of the targeted rule cru;i trigger contempt sanctions, under the 
injunction, while official enforcement of other rule� (however similar) will not 
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What do I mean by "one" particular rule? In saying this, I pre­
suppose some kind of criterion for individuating rules.137 I will not 
specify a particular criterion, beyond saying this: the (descriptively) 
correct individuation criterion is some kind of text-based criterion. 
Criminal or civil statutes as well as administrative regulations - the 
kind of rules at stake in this article - have a canonical, written 
formulation that is part of a canonical "code": the U.S. Code, or 
the Code of Federal Regulations, or a state statutory or administra­
tive code.138 The (descriptively) correct criterion, at least for such 
rules; must individuate rules along textual lines: as a single deontic 
sentence, or a single term in a deontic sentence, or a single provi­
sion made up of several sentences, or something like that. Why? 
Because the constitutional courts, in reviewing sanctions and duties, 
focus on the predicate and history of these sort of textually defined 
deontic entities. The courts will look at a code provision, or a sen­
tence in that provision, or a bunch of "related" provisions, and so 
on.139 "What, precisely, is the correct text-based individuation cri­
terion?" is a tough question; perhaps there is a different criterion 
for different constitutional clauses. I need not answer that ques­
tion, for purposes of this Part or indeed this article. My claim is 
that, whatever the precise, text-based criterion for individuating 
rules that is descriptively most accurate (or normatively most at­
tractive), the Basic Structure and not some other structure - act­
shielding or intermediate - holds true. 
Finally, I should make clear that the Basic Structure does not 
require constitutional courts to focus exclusively on the predicate or 
history of the rule pursuant to which an actor is sanctioned or co­
erced, as opposed to also considering some of the features of his 
particular action. This goes to the problem of facial versus as­
applied challenges, to which I have already alluded. In X's facial 
challenge to a rule R (whether an anticipatory challenge by which X 
seeks to free himself of a duty, or a retrospective challenge by 
which X seeks to overturn a sanction), the court's analysis does fo­
cus solely on the predicate and history of R.14o In X's as-applied 
137. See SCHAUER, supra note 58, at 62 (discussing individuation of rules); Joseph Raz, 
Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, 81 YALE LJ. 823, 825-29 (1972) (same); JosEPH RAz, 
CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM 70-92, 140-47 (1980) (same). 
138. See supra note 58 (discussing issue of canonical formulation). For common-law rules 
without a canonical formulation, the individuation criterion might not be text-based. 
139. This is true, for example, of the doctrinal exemplars, see infra cases cited notes 156-
61, 334-41, 348-51. 
140. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887-99 (1992) (prospective 
facial challenge to duty); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (retrospective 
facial challenge to indictment). 
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challenge to R, the court's analysis focuses in part on the predicate 
and history of R, but also in part on some of the features of X's own 
past or future actions. The Basic Structure js consistent with as­
applied challenges, insofar as (a) the court engages in a morally lim­
ited, rather than morally complete description of X's own actions; 
and relatedly (b) X's victory does not entail that those actions are 
free from sanction under other rules. 
As-applied challenges, as adjudicated by the Court, fit this de­
scription. To give an example: In In re R.M.J.141 the claimant attor­
ney had been sanctioned, pursuant to a Missouri rule generally 
prohibiting attorneys from advertising their services, and the 
Supreme Court then overturned his sanction on free speech 
grounds. It held that the Missouri rule violated the Free Speech 
Clause, as applied to the claimant.142 This meant that the Court 
analyzed the particular advertisements for which the claimant had 
been sanctioned: it determined that the advertisements were a 
form of "commercial speech" and, further, that the advertisements 
did not have certain properties (being false or misleading) relevant 
to the purpose behind the Missouri rule.143 Had the claimant pub­
lished a false advertisement, his sanction would have been upheld. 
What the Court did not do was perform a complete moral inspec­
tion of the claimant's advertisements; the inspection was limited to 
the properties that related, either to the liberty of speech, or to the 
particular rule that Missouri had deployed against the claimant. 
Presumably, then, he could still be sanctioned for the advertise­
ments if they were sufficiently wrong under another description -
for example, if the action of publishing the advertisements consti­
tuted an antitrust violation, theft of services,;or the breach of a stat­
ute regulating the level of wages and prices. The claimant 
attorney's challenge was as-applied but not act-shielding, and I will 
further claim that this is generally true of as-applied challenges (at 
least to sanctions and duties) throughout constitutional law.144 
141. 455 U.S. 191 (1982). 
142. See 455 U.S. at 206-07. 
143. See 455 U.S. at 204-07. 
144. The overwhelming majority of the cases in which the Court sustains as-applied chal­
lenges arise under the Free Speech Clause, at least for substantive challenges to the kinds of 
rules discussed in this article. Clear, recent examples of successful as-applied free speech 
challenges include: Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Commission v. FEC, 518 U.S. 
604 {1996); Ibanez v. Florida Department of Business & Professional Regulation, 512 U.S. 136 
{1994); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 {1990); 
Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission, 496 U.S. 91 {1990); Shapero v. 
Kentucky Bar Association, 486 U.S. 466 (1988); and United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 
{1983). See also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 n.3 (1989) (styled as as-applied chal­
lenge, given possibility of nonexpressive flag "desecration"). These are generally consistent 
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When and why reviewing courts should engage in as-applied 
analysis, as opposed to facial analysis, remains a very interesting 
constitutional question - one that the Direct and Derivative Ac­
counts will answer quite differently. We will consider this question 
below.145 My point here is that, whatever the correct answer, the 
existence of as-applied challenges is quite consistent with the Basic 
Structure. 
* * * 
The Basic Structure is our structure. It holds true of as-applied 
challenges as well as facial challenges, in anticipatory suits as well as 
retrospective suits, and across the wide terrain of the Bill of Rights 
- from free speech to equal protection to free exercise to substan­
tive due process. Perhaps morality requires this structure to 
change; but I will not pursue that issue in this article.146 For there is 
a morally tenable account of the moral content of constitutional 
rights, structured the way those rights are. That is the Derivative 
Account. Rule-targeted rights are best construed, and plausibly 
construed, as morally derivative rights. The Direct Account is a 
poor view of rule-targeted rights; the Derivative Account is a much 
with my descriptive claim that as-applied adjudication is not act-shielding, and does not in­
volve a complete moral inspection of the claimant's actions. This is also true of the few clear 
as-applied challenges that the Court has sustained in the area of substantive due process. See 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 {1965) (as-applied challenge, insofar as Court relies 
upon married status of doctors' patients); Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678 
{1977) (striking down law restricting distribution and advertisement of contraceptives, as ap­
plied to nonprescription contraceptives). 
As-applied challenges virtually never arise under the Equal Protection Clause. For the 
exception that proves the rule, see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 
432, 447-51 (1985); 473 U.S. at 476 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part) ("[T]o my knowledge, the Court has never before treated an equal protec­
tion challenge to a statute on an as-applied basis."). 
As for the Free Exercise Clause: although as-applied challenges were standard prior to 
the Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), see Hobbie v. 
Unemployment Appeals Commn., 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 
(1981); WISconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the 
isomorphism between free exercise and equal protection created by Smith implies that as­
applied challenges should become unusual here as well. In any event, there is a reading of 
the pre-Smith case law that makes it consistent with the Basic Structure - and, given the 
absence of a complete moral inspection of the religiously motivated actions at stake in Hob­
bie, Thomas, Yoder, and Sherbert, such is probably the better reading. Pre-Smith type free 
exercise rights are consistent with the Basic Structure if the successful constitutional claim of 
a religiously motivated actor against being sanctioned (or, as in Hobbie, Thomas, and Sher­
bert, being denied benefits) pursuant to neutral Rulei. leaves open the possibility that he 
might be sanctioned (or denied benefits) for the very same action pursuant to another neu­
tral rule (say, a neutral rule justified by a more compelling purpose than the purpose justify­
ing Rule1). This is not to say that an act-shielding right to religious liberty is impossible, 
simply that the pre-Smith cases probably did not create such a right. 
145. See infra text accompanying notes 414-21. 
146. The question is whether the legal institution or practice of act-shielding rights is mor­
ally preferable to the Basic Structure. See infra text accompanying note 427 (discussing this 
issue). 
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better view. These are normative, not descriptive claims, and the 
time has come to defend them. 
II. THE DIRECT ACCOUNT 
Embedded in the traditional rules governing constitutional adjudi­
cation is the principle that a person to whom a statute may constitu­
tionally be applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on the 
ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to 
others, in other situations not before the Court. A closely related 
principle is that constitutional rights are personal and may not be as­
serted vicariously. These principles rest on more than the fussiness of 
judges. They reflect the conviction that under our constitutional sys­
tem courts are not roving commissions assigned to pass judgment on 
the validity of the Nation's laws. Constitutional judgments, as Mr. 
Chief Justice Marshall recognized, are justified only out of the neces­
sity of adjudicating rights in particular cases between the litigants 
brought before the Court . . . . 147 
This is the official view of constitutional rights - the view that 
the Court officially espouses.148 This view sees constitutional rights 
as essentially "personal," in the following sense: X's constitutional 
right secures judicial protection, for X, against the application of a 
particular rule R to him. If applying rule R to X is morally un­
problematic, then X has no constitutional claim; the Constitution 
does not empower X to secure a judicial invalidation (a repeal or 
amendment) of the rights-targeted rule, merely because the rule 
does wrong to other persons within the rule's scope. In the Court's 
words: "[A ] person to whom a statute may constitutionally be ap­
plied will not be heard to challenge that statute on the ground that 
it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others."149 To 
construe the Constitution as empowering X to trigger a judicial in­
validation of rules that merely do wrong to some persons, but not to 
X himself, would make reviewing courts into mini-legislatures -
"roving commissions assigned to pass judgments on the validity of 
147. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610-11 (1973) (citations omitted). 
148. The Court has numerous times made statements similar to the above-quoted state­
ment from Broadrick, particularly in the context of explicating the overbreadth doctrine. 
See, e.g., Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 112 n.8 (1990); Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 
581 (1989) (plurality opinion); Board of Airport Commrs. v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 
569, 573 (1987); Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 501 (1985); Secretary of 
State v. Joseph H. Munson, Co., 467 U.S. 947, 955 (1984); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 
767 (1982); see also United States v. Salemo, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) ("A facial challenge to 
a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the 
challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be 
valid."). Salerno's rule, clearly, trades upon the "personal" view of constitutional rights ar­
ticulated by the Court in Broadrick and the other cases here cited. 
149. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 610. 
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the Nation's laws"150 - rather than adjudicatory bodies essentially 
concerned with the treatment of particular litigants. 
The Direct Account encapsulates and formalizes this official 
view of constitutional rights. 
Direct Account 
To say that some treatment of X (sanctioning X pursuant to a 
rule, or subjecting X to the duty that the rule announces) "vio­
lates X's constitutional rights" entails the following: the treat­
ment is directly wrong, and X has the legal right to secure 
judicial invalidation of the treatment. "Directly wrong" means 
that there is sufficient moral reason for the court to invalidate 
the treatment (overturn X's sanction, or free X from the duty), 
quite independent of any further invalidation of the rule under 
which the treatment falls. 
Is this account morally tenable? I think not. This Part considers, 
and criticizes, the possible defenses of the Direct Account. I ana­
lyze, and reject, a variety of purported explanations why moral rea­
son might obtain for a court to overturn X's own treatment, 
independent of further invalidating the rule under which that treat­
ment falls.151 For purposes of clarity and rigor, I discuss separately 
the two kinds of legal treatments that are at issue in this article: 
sanctions and duties. My strategy will be to rebut, first, the possible 
explanations why the Direct Account holds true of sanctions.152 
Then, at the end of this Part, I discuss whether moving from sanc­
tions to duties helps the Direct Account.153 
To assess the Direct Account I use the following simple and styl­
ized examples of constitutional rights. The examples are meant to 
reflect the range of substantive constitutional rights that sanctions, 
and the duties that sanctions back up, can violate.154 I draw the 
150. 413 U.S. at 611. 
151. In advancing this criticism, I do not mean to deny the plausibility of deontological or 
agent-relative moral constraints: for example, the plausible constraint upon killing one per­
son even to save five. See, e.g., SCHEFFLER, supra note 17, at 80-114 (critically discussing 
agent-relative constraints). What the Direct Account tries to advance is an agent-relative, or 
quasi-agent-relative, view of the moral content of constitutional rights: a purported moral 
reason to save the claimant, independent of what happens to anyone else. My claim is not 
the generic claim that moral views of this sort are implausible; rather, it is the specific claim 
that, given the proscribability of rights-holders' actions under other descriptions, the Direct 
Account won't fly for the constitutional rights I discuss. 
152. See infra sections II.A, B, C. 
153. See infra section II.D. 
154. With one exception: a right against vagueness. Vagueness may provide a viable 
challenge to a conduct-regulating law that is otherwise constitutional. See Kolender v. Law­
son, 461 U.S. 352, 352 (1983) (striking down, on vagueness grounds, a statute that required 
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rule in each example, more or less directly, from a major Supreme 
Court case or cases under the Bill of Rights. And the stylized facts 
are designed to highlight the Basic Structure of constitutional 
rights: that constitutional rights function as shields against particu­
lar rules, not shields around particular actions.155 
THE FLAG DESECRATION CASE: A rule provides that "no per­
son shall desecrate a flag of the United States."156 It violates 
the actor's free speech rights to be sanctioned pursuant to this 
rule. It turns out that actor was, by his very action, a batterer, 
polluter, and arsonist. 
THE RESIDENTIAL PICKETING CASE: A rule provides that "no 
person shall picket a residence or dwelling, except for persons 
loiterers to provide, upon request by a peace officer, a "credible and reliable" identification). 
But the moral import of vagueness is sufficiently distinct from, say, the moral import of a 
clear law regulating speech, or abortion, see LoN FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAw 39 {1969) 
(listing a total "failure to make rules understandable," along with a failure to publicize rules, 
retroactivity, and several others, as a failure to maintain a legal system at all), that I leave for 
another day the question whether a Direct Account of vagueness succeeds. 
155. To avoid misunderstanding, let me emphasize that the stylized facts in these exam­
ples are not drawn from particular cases. I am aware of free-speech cases where the success­
ful claimant was, in fact, a wrongdoer under another description. See cases cited supra note 
66, 85-87. I am not aware of equal protection, free exercise, or substantive due process cases 
where that was true, in part, no doubt, because of the facial character of constitutional adju­
dication in these latter areas. See supra note 144; infra notes 554-57 and accompanying text. 
Nonetheless, as I have argued at some length, the successful equal protection, free exercise, 
and substantive due process claimant, as well as the successful free speech claimant, could be 
a wrongdoer under another description. Nothing in his having a successful constitutional 
claim entails otherwise, and these stylized facts are designed to illustrate that. If you deny 
that a claimant with these particular facts would have a successful claim (on the Derivative 
Account, because the Court would amend the rule but leave the claimant's action covered by 
the amended rule, see infra text accompanying notes 414-21), simply substitute a different 
kind of wrongdoing plaintiff. Some wrongdoing plaintiff must have a successful claim, if con­
stitutional rights are not act-shielding. 
It might be objected that the Basic Structure (X's valid constitutional claim does not 
protect him from being sanctioned under a different description) is, strictly, consistent with 
the following: X's valid constitutional claim does entail that X is not {the Court predicts) 
sanctionable under a different description. This is strictly consistent with the Basic Structure 
if, when the court's prediction is proven wrong, the claimant is not protected, by judicial 
order, from the latter sanction. However, I see nothing in existing free speech, free exercise, 
equal protection, and substantive due process doctrines, as described in Part I, that would 
rule out the Basic Structure but support the latter proposition. I will not belabor matters by 
re-discussing the doctrines here. It might further be objected that, although X can have a 
valid constitutional claim and still be constitutionally sanctionable under a different descrip­
tion, this does not strictly entail that X can be a moral wrongdoer under another description. 
For example, one can imagine a regime in which X's constitutional right entails that his ac­
tion was not malum in se, but permits his action to be malum prohibitum. Again, I see abso­
lutely nothing in free speech, free exercise, equal protection, or substantive due process 
doctrines that draws this distinction, and so the stylized actors here perform actions that are 
malum in se. This assumption will be significant at certain points below. See infra text ac­
companying notes 193-97. 
156. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 {1989) {holding flag-desecration statute unconsti­
tutional under Free Speech Clause). 
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engaged in labor picketing. "157 It violates the actor's free 
speech rights to be sanctioned pursuant to this rule. It turns 
out that the actor trespassed upon the resident's property and 
used threatening language while picketing. 
THE CmLo PoRNOGRAPHY CAsE: A rule provides that "no 
person shall display a photograph of a naked child."158 It vio­
lates the actor's free speech rights to be sanctioned pursuant to 
this rule. It turns out that the actor was a child pornographer. 
THE ALcoHoL CAsEs: A rule provides that "no male [or no 
female, or no black person] between the ages of eighteen and 
twenty-one shall purchase alcohol."159 (The rule supplements 
a background prohibition on the purchase of alcohol by any 
person under eighteen.) It violates the actor's equal protection 
rights to be sanctioned pursuant to this rule. It turns out that 
the actor used a stolen credit card to purchase alcohol. 
THE ANIMAL SACRIFICE CAsE: A rule provides that "no per­
son shall kill animals for religious purposes."160 It violates the 
actor's free exercise rights to be sanctioned pursuant to this 
rule. It turns out that the actor killed an endangered animal 
protected by an endangered species statute (for example, a 
panda, cougar, or eagle) that the actor had stolen from a zoo. 
THE ABORTION CASE: A rule provides that "no person shall 
procure an abortion."161 It violates a woman's substantive due 
process rights to be sanctioned pursuant to this rule. It turns 
out that she procured an abortion by threatening to kill the 
157. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980) {holding unconstitutional, under Free 
Speech and Equal Protection Clauses, statute that prohibited residential picketing but ex­
empted labor picketing). REsIDENTIAL P1cKETING is meant to exemplify the special portion 
of free speech case law, evident in Carey and most recently in the majority opinion in R.A. V. 
v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), where the Court finds an underinclusive rule to 
violate free speech rights. 
158. See supra note 88 (citing child pornography cases). The Court, in these cases, has 
upheld rules targeted at child pornography, by virtue of their being narrower than the hypo­
thetical rule in CHILD PORNOGRAPHY. If the reader doubts that the Court would, indeed, 
find the hypothetical rule to be overbroad, then the reader can replace it with a yet broader 
rule - for example, a rule prohibiting any pictures of "unclothed" children, with unclothed 
defined prophylactically to include, e.g., the lack of clothing over torsos or thighs. 
159. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding gender-discriminatory ban on beer 
sales unconstitutional under Equal Protection Clause). 
160. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) 
(holding unconstitutional, under Free Exercise Clause, ordinance that prohibited animal kill­
ing and was targeted at Santeria religion). 
161. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding unconstitutional, under substantive 
component of Due Process Clause, statute generally prohibiting the procuring of abortions). 
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physician who performed the procedure, if he declined to do 
so. 
Any moral theory of constitutional rights, whether the Direct 
Account or some other account, will need to explain the Basic 
Structure of constitutional rights that these stylized cases are meant 
to exemplify. Sanctioning X pursuant to rule R, by virtue of some 
action that X has performed, can violate X's constitutional rights 
even if X's very action bears proscribable properties (other than 
those picked out by R) such that sanctioning X for that very action 
pursuant to a different rule is not unconstitutional. To say that X's 
sanction pursuant to R is "unconstitutional," or that it "violates X's 
constitutional rights," does not entail (1) that X's action is not con­
stitutionally proscribable under any description. But according to 
the Direct Account, to say that X's sanction is "unconstitutional," 
or that it "violates X's constitutional rights," does entail (2) that 
there exists moral reason for a court to overturn X's sanction, in­
dependent of further invalidating the rule R pursuant to which X 
has been sanctioned. The key puzzle, for the defender of the Direct 
Account, is to explain why the latter proposition holds true even 
when the first proposition does not. 
Let me clarify what it means to say that the fl.ag-desecrator's 
action in THE FLAG DESECRATION CASE turns out to have been an 
action of battery or polluting the environment, that the photo­
displayer's action in THE CmLD PORNOGRAPHY CASE turns out to 
have been pornographic, that the residential-picketer's action in 
THE RESIDENTIAL PICKETING CASE was also trespassory, and so 
on. I do not mean that the reviewing court reliably knows about 
these further, proscribable properties of the rights-holder's action. 
To assume that would be ungenerous to the Direct Account, for as 
we shall see in a moment, one possible defense of the Account is 
epistemic - a defense that trades upon the limited epistemic capac­
ities of reviewing courts.162 Rather, I simply mean that the relevant 
action truly had those additional properties. 
Relatedly, the stylized examples of constitutional rights assume 
that the actor is sanctioned under the wrong rule - the rule prohib­
iting "flag desecration," "residential picketing," "photo display," 
etc. - instead of being sanctioned pursuant to a rule prohibiting 
"battery," "trespass," "obscenity," etc. Let us place to one side the 
double jeopardy issues that might arise where the fl.ag-desecrator, 
etc., is sanctioned for the very same action pursuant to multiple 
162. See infra section II.A.2 {discussing epistemic defense of Direct Account). 
44 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 97:1 
rules, either seriatim or simultaneously.163 A so-called theory of 
constitutional rights which is, in truth, merely an addendum to 
double-jeopardy doctrine is too weak to be a satisfactory theory. 
Constitutional rights to free speech, equal protection, free exercise, 
and substantive due process function, in practice, as protection for 
rights-holders quite independent of the Double Jeopardy Clause -
that is, as protection against being sanctioned pursuant to the 
wrong rule R even if R is the sole rule that the state deploys against 
the rights-holder.164 
Can the Direct Account explain why it is unconstitutional to 
sanction, solely for "flag desecration," the fiag-desecrator who also 
was a batterer; why it is unconstitutional to sanction, solely for "res­
idential picketing," the picketer who also was a trespasser; and so 
on? Let us see. 
A. A Theory of Justified Sanctions 
One might try to defend the Direct Account by invoking a gen­
eral theory of justified sanctions - a general theory, such as an 
expressive theory, a deterrent theory, or a rehabilitative theory, 
that purports to set forth the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
a legal sanction to be morally justified, at least prim.a facie.165 This 
163. See generally MooRE, supra note 64, at 325-55 (discussing problem of deciding 
whether two different rules, pursuant to which a person is sanctioned for the very same act­
token, pick out the same or different act-types for double-jeopardy purposes). 
164. A recent case that clearly illustrates this point is Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections Com­
mission, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (striking down fine pursuant to law prohibiting distribution of 
anonymous campaign literature, as violating free speech). Other exemplary cases are: Texas 
v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (free speech); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) (free speech); 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (equal protection); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479 (1965) (substantive due process). See also WISconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (free 
exercise under pre-Smith regime). I should also note the following, reciprocal point. Where 
X's sanction pursuant to one rule violates the Free Speech, etc., Clause, and is overturned on 
constitutional grounds, sanctioning him for the very same action pursuant to a different rule 
will not constitute double jeopardy - regardless of the similarity between the invalid and 
valid rule under ordinary double jeopardy doctrine. See Montana v. Hall, 481 U.S. 400, 402 
(1987) (double jeopardy does not bar reprosecution where conviction overturned, on 
grounds other than sufficiency of the evidence, on appeal). 
165. See R.A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PuNisHMENrS 151-266 (1986) (surveying theories of 
punishment); IGoR PRIM:ORATZ, JUSTIFYING LEGAL PUNISHMENT (1990) (same); NIGEL 
WALKER, WHY PUNISH? (1991) (same). Certain justified-sanction defenses of the Direct Ac­
count, such as Hampton's expressive theory, see infra text accompanying notes 171-75, are 
clearly most persuasive in explaining why the Direct Account might hold true of criminal 
sanctions. And my rebuttal to these defenses trades upon a theory of sanctioning - retribu­
tivism - which again is most germane to criminal sanctions. See infra text accompanying 
notes 179-201. Given the frequency with which the Court strikes down criminal sanctions or 
criminal-law duties, under the Free Speech, etc., Clauses, and given the absence of any dis­
tinction between civil and criminal rules in this jurisprudence, see supra note 54, I suggest and 
henceforth assume that a would-be defense of the Direct Account which fails for criminal 
rules should be rejected. 
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is an attractive route for the defender of the Direct Account, be­
cause certain theories of justified sanctions are rule-dependent. 
Under certain theories, X's sanction is morally justified only if the 
predicate or history of the rule pursuant to which X is sanctioned 
meets certain conditions. For example, an expressive theory stipu­
lates that a sanction, to be morally justified, must express what it 
was about the actor's conduct that made it wrong.166 X must have 
been a (1) culpable (2) wrongdoer, and (3) the rule under which she 
is sanctioned must express that. An expressive theory of justified 
sanctions, or some other rule-dependent theory, seems a natural 
way for the constitutional theorist to explain why sanctioning X 
pursuant to rule R is morally problematic even though X's very ac­
tion is properly sanctioned under a different rule. The problem 
with R, the explanation goes, is just that its predicate or history fails 
to meet the moral conditions set out by the rule-dependent theory 
of justified sanctions. 
In considering whether a theory of justified sanctions, such as an 
expressive theory, can underwrite the Direct Account, we must 
keep separate two, crucially different ideas. The first idea is 
nonepistemic. The idea, here, is that the predicate or history of the 
rule pursuant to which a person is sanctioned truly matters, quite 
independent of the epistemic capacities of a constitutional review­
ing court. It truly is not a matter of nonepistemic moral indiffer­
ence whether the battering fiag-desecrator is punished for "flag 
desecration" rather than "battery." It is simply a bedrock moral 
fact that she should be sanctioned under the right kind of rule.167 
166. See generally Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. Cm. L. 
REv. 591 (1996) (analyzing expressive theories of punishment); Igor Primoratz, Punishment 
as Language, 64 PHil.. 187 (1989) (same); A.J. Skillen, How to Say Things with Walls, 55 PmL. 
509 (1980) (same). Expressive theories of law, not just sanctions, have recently become sali­
ent in legal scholarship. See Larry Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. Cm. L. 
REv. 943 (1995); Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expres­
sive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725 (1998); Cass Sunstein, On the 
Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2021 (1996). 
167. Tue nonepistemic defense of the Direct Account, and indeed virtually every other 
defense I consider in this Part, as well as the Derivative Account I defend below, presumes 
that "moral facts" exist in the following sense: moral utterances, e.g., "X's sanction is de­
served" or "X's sanction is not deserved" or "X's duty is unjust," constitute claims about the 
world that are generally true or false, as opposed to merely expressing some attitude on the 
speaker's part, such as a preference. Tue technical term for this view of morality as truth­
stating is cognitivism. Cognitivism is to be distinguished from a stronger claim, realism, which 
states that the truth-content of moral claims is independent of society's conventions. See 
DAVID BRINK, MORAL REALISM AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF Ennes 1-36 (1989) (discussing, 
and distinguishing between, cognitivism and realism). Whatever the appeal of realism, none 
of the moral arguments mooted here - neither the ones I criticize, nor the ones I advance -
presuppose it. All are consistent with some form of moral conventionalism. See Adler, supra 
note 4, at 803-04 (discussing varieties of conventionalism). 
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Even if the reviewing court is epistemically reliable168 - even if the 
court reliably knows that the flag-desecrator also was a batterer -
it should still overturn the flag-desecrator's sanction under the fiag­
desecration rule. 
The second, contrasting idea is epistemic.169 One of the central 
functions of legal institutions, specifically the institutions that enact 
and then apply conduct rules, is to identify those actions whose per­
formance is morally wrong. You, or I, or a fallible federal judge 
somewhere, cannot impose an imprisonment on X, or take away 
some of his money, merely because we believe that X performed 
wrong. Society needs to do more epistemic work - more work to 
assess the wrongfulness of his action - than that. Society does the 
epistemic work, principally, by enacting rules and then enforcing 
them. So even if it truly is a matter of nonepistemic moral indiffer­
ence whether the battering flag-desecrator is sanctioned under one 
rule or the other - even if the predicate or history of the rule do 
not figure in the morally necessary nonepistemic conditions for a 
justified sanction - the reviewing court should overturn X's sanc­
tion for "flag desecration." The epistemically reliable way to deter­
mine whether his action was wrongful, by virtue of some property 
other than flag-desecration, is just for state officials to draft and try 
an indictment against him for some other offense. 
I will consider these two, importantly distinct ideas, nonepis­
temic and epistemic, in turn. 
1. The Nonepistemic Idea 
The nonepistemic idea is that the predicate or history of the rule 
pursuant to which a person is sanctioned has true moral significance 
for the justifiability of his sanction, independent of the epistemic 
capacities of reviewing courts. It is morally improper to sanction 
him pursuant to the wrong kind of rule - there is moral reason to 
168. See Adler, supra note 4, at 771-80 {distinguishing between arguments that point to 
epistemic or other deficits of constitutional reviewing courts, and arguments that point to 
content of moral criteria that reviewing courts enforce). 
169. By "epistemic," I mean pertaining to moral knowledge: knowledge of whether X's 
sanction is morally justified. Given cognitivism about morality, this idea is coherent. See 
supra note 167 {discussing cognitivism). I draw this epistemic idea from the epistemic strain 
in the scholarly literature on authority. Whether authoritative rules create reasons for belief 
or action, see Heidi Hurd, Challenging Authority, 100 YALE L.J. 1611, 1615-20 {1991) (ex· 
plaining this distinction); infra text accompanying notes 282-88 (same), it is plausible to think 
that the rule's authority is at least partly grounded upon the moral expertise of the rule· 
formulator: her knowledge of what morality requires. See id. at 1667-77 {defending reason· 
for-belief account of legal authority, grounded upon epistemic capacities of legal institu· 
tions); JosEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 38-69 {1988) {defending reason-for-action 
account of legal authority, grounded in part upon epistemic capacities of legal institutions). 
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overturn that sanction - in the same way that it is (or may be) 
morally improper to sanction him if his action was not wrongful, or 
if his state of mind was not culpable.110 
How might this nonepistemic idea be fleshed out? One way, as 
I have already suggested, may be to defend an expressive theory of 
sanctions - the kind of theory that, most famously, Jean Hampton 
has defended.171 On Hampton's view, the essence of punishment is 
to cancel the demeaning and injurious message that crime 
communicates. 
[Punishment] is a response to a wrong that is intended to vindicate the 
value of the victim denied by the wrongdoer's action through the con­
struction of an event that not only repudiates the action's message of 
superiority over the victim but does so in a way that confirms them as 
equal by virtue of their humanity. What do I mean by "vindicating 
the value of the victim?" . . .  To vindicate the victim, a [punitive] re­
sponse must strive first to re-establish the acknowledgement of the 
victim's worth damaged by the wrongdoing, and second, to repair the 
damage done to the victim's ability to realize her value.112 
Part of what makes a proper punishment morally appropriate is 
what the punishment says: it says that the wrongdoer is not supe­
rior to the victim.173 
170. On the moral importance of wrongdoing and/or culpability in justifying sanctions, 
see generally Symposium, Harm v. Culpability: Which Should be the Organizing Principle of 
the Criminal Law, 5 J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL lssUES 1 (1994). 
171. See Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribu­
tion, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1659 (1992) [hereinafter Hampton, Correcting Harms]; Jean Hamp­
ton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRmcs 1 (Wesley 
Cragg ed., 1992); JEAN HAMPTON & JEFFRIE MURPHY, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 111-61 
(1988). Hampton terms her theory an '"expressive' theory of retribution," Hampton, Cor­
recting Harms, supra, at 1659, but I use the terms "retributivism" and "retribution" in this 
article to refer to the nonexpressive variant of that view, namely, that the morally culpable 
deserve punishment independent of what punishment expresses, with "punishment" itself 
construed not to entail some kind of expression. See Michael Moore, The Moral Worth of 
Retribution, in REsPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER AND THE EMOTIONS 179, 181 (Ferdinand 
Schoeman ed., 1987) (distinguishing between retributivist and "denunciatory," i.e., expres­
sive, theories of punishment). 
172. Hampton, Correcting Harms, supra note 171, at 1686. Hampton actually uses the 
term "retribution" in this quotation rather than "punishment" - thus the alterations - both 
because she is developing an expressive variant of retributivism, see supra note 171, and 
because she wants her theory to cover nonpunitive as well as punitive responses to wrongdo­
ing, see Correcting Harms, supra note 172, at 1685; but for the sake of a clear distinction 
between her theory and nonexpressive retributivism, I have altered the quotation and more 
generally describe Hampton as offering an expressive theory of punishment. This termino­
logical point does not affect the substantive question here, namely, whether a theory such as 
hers can underwrite the Direct Account. 
173. To be sure, a mere statement does not constitute the kind of "expression" that 
Hampton's theory warrants and demands. Rather, it warrants and demands hard treatment 
for the wrongdoer that is also expressive treatment. See id. at 1686-87 ("Re-establishment of 
the acknowledgement of the victim's worth is normally not accomplished by the mere verbal 
or written assertion of the equality of worth of wrongdoer and victim . . . .  [Rather] we are 
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In developing her expressive theory, Hampton does not, of 
course, mean to defend the Direct Account. Her theory is a theory 
of punishment, not a theory of constitutional law. But the defender 
of the Direct Account might try to employ Hampton's theory, or 
more broadly the kind of expressive theory that Hampton's epito­
mizes, for his own purposes. He might say that the rule pursuant to 
which X is sanctioned must, inter alia, pick out the wrong-making 
property of X's action. The rule must do that, because the very 
point of punishing X is to point out - to X, the victim, and the 
broader community - that X was not free to inflict that type of 
action upon a moral equal.174 This is a possible route for the de­
fender of the Direct Account, because a common failure among 
some of the rules in our stylized examples - particularly FLAG 
DESECRATION, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY, and ABORTION - is that 
these rules fail to describe (or fully describe) wrong-making proper­
ties of actions.175 Burning a flag is not wrong because it desecrates 
the flag; it is wrong because the burning batters a bystander, pol­
lutes the air, etc. Displaying a sexually explicit picture of a child is 
not wrong just because the child is unclothed; it is wrong because 
the picture is sexually explicit and exploitative. Procuring an abor­
tion, by means of a coercive threat, is not wrong because the actor 
procures an abortion; it is wrong because she procures something by 
means of a coercive threat. 
Another kind of theory of justified sanctions that the defender 
of the Direct Account might try to turn to her advantage is the kind 
of deterrent theory developed by Larry Alexander, Daniel Farrell, 
and Warren Quinn.176 Although Alexander's, Farrell's, and 
Quinn's specific theories differ in their details, the general idea be­
hind these theories is to ground the justifiability of (ex post) sanc­
tions upon the justifiability of (ex ante) deterrent threats. We are 
morally required to respond by trying to remake the world in a way that denies what the 
wrongdoer's events have attempted to establish . . . .  "). 
174. See id. at 1677 (arguing that "a wrongful action that produces moral injury and 
which merits retributive punishment is an action that has a certain kind of meaning," viz., 
that the wrongdoer is morally superior to the victim). 
175. See infra text accompanying notes 203-04 (further explicating how rules in FLAa 
DESECRATION, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY, and ABORTION underdescribe wrong-making features 
of actions). The remaining stylized rules are not morally underdescriptive in the same way, 
see infra text accompanying notes 216-17, and so the expressive defense of the Direct Ac­
count, as well as the deterrent theory discussed immediately below, is most persuasive with 
respect to FLAG DESECRATION, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY, and ABORTION. 
176. See WARREN QuINN, The Right to Threaten and the Right to Punish, in MORALITY 
AND ACTION 52 (1993); Lawrence Alexander, The Doomsday Machine: Proportionality, 
Punishment and Prevention, 63 MONIST 199 (1980); Daniel M. Farrell, The Justification of 
Deterrent Violence, 100 ETiilcs 301 (1990). 
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justified in inflicting a setback on a wrongdoer if and only if we 
justifiably threatened him with that setback, prior to the wrongdo­
ing. Farrell, for example, argues in favor of the following principle: 
When my situation is such that either (i) I enforce a conditional threat 
of retaliation that I have previously and justifiably made, thereby pro­
tecting myself from a decrease in my credibility and hence from an 
increase in my vulnerability or (ii) I do not enforce the relevant 
threat, thereby jeopardizing my credibility and hence increasing my 
vulnerability to aggression I might otherwise have deterred, I am enti­
tled to choose (i) over (ii), provided that the penalties thus threatened 
and imposed are within certain limits and are directed only at offend­
ers for offenses.177 
How might the defender of the Direct Account develop this kind of 
deterrent theory, for her own purposes? She might say something 
like this: Sanctioning X pursuant to a particular rule is justified 
only if enacting the rule - issuing that particular coercive threat to 
X and others, not to perform the type of action identified in the rule 
- was justified. For if enacting the rule was justified, then sanc­
tioning X is justified as a way to maintain the credibility of the par­
ticular deterrent threat embodied in the rule. But enacting the 
rules in cases such as FLAG DESECRATION, CmLD PORNOGRAPHY, 
and ABORTION was not justified, because these rules encompass 
plenty of harmless actions.178 We have moral reason to maintain 
the credibility of our deterrent threats against "batterers," etc., but 
we do not have moral reason to maintain the credibility of our de­
terrent threats against "flag desecrators," etc. Thus we have true, 
nonepistemic moral reason to sanction the battering flag-desecrator 
pursuant to a rule that prohibits battery rather than pursuant to a 
rule that prohibits flag-desecration, and the same is true for the 
other stylized cases. 
But the difficulty with this kind of defense of the Direct Ac­
count - a nonepistemic defense based upon a rule-dependent the­
ory of sanctioning, such as Hampton's expressive theory or the 
Alexander/Farrell/Quinn deterrent theory - is that the would-be 
defender must overcome the following, retributivist objection. As 
Michael Moore explains: 
Retributivism is the view that punishment is justified by the moral cul­
pability of those who receive it. A retributivist punishes because, and 
only because, the offender deserves it. Retributivism thus stands in 
stark contrast to utilitarian views that justify punishment of past of­
fenses by the greater good of preventing future offenses. It also con-
177. Farrell, supra note 176, at 316. 
178. See infra text accompanying notes 315-53 (discussing how rules in these cases go 
morally awry in including innocent actions within their scope). 
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trasts sharply with rehabilitative views, according to which 
punishment is justified by the reforming good it does the criminaI.179 
For the retributivist, "moral culpability" is not only a necessary con­
dition for a punitive sanction - something that an expressive the­
ory or the kind of deterrent theory discussed here does not mean to 
deny180 - but it is a sufficient condition as well.181 The actor's 
"moral culpability" is sufficient to justify punishing him, independ­
ent of any further good that punishment may secure: specifically, 
independent of the role of punishment in preventing future wrong­
doing, rehabilitating the criminal, or expressing social 
condemnation.182 
Thus, the retributivist might object as follows to the Direct Ac­
count: There is simply no nonepistemic reason to overturn the ac­
tor's own sanction, independent of further invalidating the rule 
under which it falls, in cases such as FLAG DESECRATION, CHILD 
PORNOGRAPHY, and ABORTION as well as RESIDENTIAL PICKETING 
and ANIMAL SACRIFICE. The battering flag-desecrator, etc., was a 
culpable wrongdoer, and that suffices to justify his sanction, 
whatever the predicate or history of the underlying rule. To be 
sure, there is reason to repeal or amend the flag-desecration rule, 
etc. - because some flag-desecrators, etc., are not wrongdoers 
under another description - but it remains a matter of (nonepis­
temic) moral indifference whether in FLAG DESECRATION the state 
chooses to sanction the battering flag-desecrator for "battery" or 
"flag desecration," and similarly in CHILD PORNOGRAPHY, ABOR­
TION, RESIDENTIAL PICKETING, and ANIMAL SACRIFICE. And 
although the Direct Account may hold true for ALCOHOL, that is 
not because of a general theory of sanctions, such as an expressive 
or deterrent theory. Rather, the Direct Account may hold true 
here because of quite separate considerations of equality. Sanction­
ing a black person who uses a credit card to purchase alcohol, pur­
suant to a racially discriminatory rule, is concededly wrong - but 
179. Moore, supra note 171, at 179; see also Michael S. Moore, Justifying Retributivism, 27 
ISRAEL L. REv. 15 {1993). An updated version of Moore's well-known article on The Moral 
Worth of Retribution, supra note 171, is MICHAEL MooRE, PLACING BLAME ch. 3 (1997). 
180. See, e.g., Hampton, Correcting Harms, supra note 171, at 1686 (stating that "retribu­
tion is a response to a wrong"); Farrell, supra note 176, at 316 n.9 (stating that the principle 
justifying the carrying out of deterrent threats "is meant to apply only to . . .  threats to harm 
those who do an innocent person wrong"). 
181. See Moore, supra note 171, at 181-82 ("Retributivism is a very straightforward the­
ory of punishment: We are justified in punishing because and only because offenders deserve 
it. Moral culpability {'desert') is in such a view both a sufficient as well as a necessary condi­
tion of liability to punitive sanctions." {footnote omitted)). 
182. See id. at 180-81 (distinguishing retributivism from utilitarian, "denunciatory" (i.e., 
expressive), and other theories of punishment). 
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not because retributivism is wrong. It is wrong because, whatever 
the correct theory of sanctions, imposing a legal burden upon some­
one or depriving him of a legal benefit under the description 
"black" is a serious insult and stigma.183 
How might the would-be defender of the Direct Account reply 
to the retributivist objection? First, she might try to show that re­
tributivism is wrong on the merits. This is a tall order. The debate 
between retributivist and non-retributivist theories of punishment 
has raged on for centuries, and in recent years there has been a real 
revival of interest in retributivism, among moral philosophers,184 as 
part of a general revival of non-utilitarian theorizing most famously 
exemplified by John Rawls's A Theory of Justice.185 To defeat re­
tributivism, the defender of the Direct Account would either need 
to demonstrate the truth of utilitarianism (the view that overall 
well-being is the sole criterion of moral rightness);186 or she would 
need to show that, despite the existence of principles of justice con­
straining or coexisting with the principle of maximizing overall well­
being, the retributivist principle (that a morally culpable actor de­
serves punishment) is not among the true principles of justice. 
Proving the truth of utilitarianism is obviously a daunting task.187 
And the non-utilitarian approach to defeating retributivism is little 
less daunting, given that the retributivist principle coheres with our 
concrete judgments188 at least as well as the ·principle that a 
tortfeasor has a duty to repair the losses that his tortious conduct 
183. See infra section 11.B.2 (discussing stigma theory of Equal Protection Clause). 
184. See David Dolinko, Some Thoughts about Retributivism, 101 Ennes 537, 537 (1991) 
(noting "a dramatic change in the regard in which courts and legislators hold the doctrine of 
retributivism" and the fact that "[t]his shift on the part of official legal sentiment parallels a 
shift in the views of philosophers and legal scholars"); Heidi M. Hurd, What in the World is 
Wrong?, 5 J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL IssUES 157, 157 n.1 (1994) (citing scholars who defend 
retributivism). 
185. JoHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusTICE (1971). As Moore notes: "Retributivism . . .  
joins corrective justice theories of torts, natural right theories of property, and promissory 
theories of contract as deontological alternatives to utilitarian justifications . . . .  " Moore, 
supra note 171, at 182. 
186. See SCARRE, supra note 46, at 4 (noting that utilitarian moral theories have generally 
been "welfarist, consequentialist, aggregative and maximising"). 
187. See SCARRE, supra note 46, at 152-204 (summarizing criticisms of utilitarianism). 
Probably the most famous critiques of utilitarianism, in the modem literature, are those ad­
vanced by Bernard Williams, see Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in J.J.C. 
SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 77 (1973), and, of 
course, by Rawls, see RAWLS, supra note 185, at 150-92. 
188. See Moore, supra note 171, at 183-85. For a recent explication and defense of coher­
entism in moral reasoning, specifically the Rawlsian idea of "reflective equilibrium" that 
gives place to judgments about concrete cases as well as to general principles, see NoRMAN 
DANIELS, JUSTICE AND JUSTIFICATION: REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM IN THEORY AND PRAC­
TICE 1-17 (1996). 
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occasioned,189 or that promisors are morally obliged to keep their 
promises,190 or that social and economic inequalities should work to 
the benefit of the least well-off.191 Indeed, in its jurisprudence di­
rectly addressing the content and justification of punishment, such 
as its Eighth Amendment and double jeopardy jurisprudence, the 
Supreme Court has for some time said quite consistently that re­
tributivism is a constitutionally acceptable and standard theory of 
punishment.192 
Note that the defender of the Derivative Account does not need 
to prove retributivism to be true. All she needs to say is that, 
whatever the truth of retributivism, she has a morally impeccable 
and straightforward explanation for the content of constitutional 
rights under the Free Speech, Free Exercise, Equal Protection, and 
Due Process Clauses. The moral content of a constitutional right is 
that some rule should be repealed, whether or not retributivism is 
true - for example, because the rule coerces persons not to per­
form certain types of innocent actions, such as mere fiag­
desecration. By contrast, the defender of the Direct Account needs 
to provide not only an explanation why these rules go wrong -
why they are not deterrent threats worth maintaining, or proper 
expressive mechanisms - but in addition must show that retributi­
vism is wrong on the merits. So the serious arguments for retributi­
vism undermine the moral plausibility of the Direct Account; but 
189. See JULES CoLEMAN, R:isKS AND WRONGS 303-28, 324 (1992) (describing and de­
fending "mixed conception" of corrective justice institutionalized by tort law, such that "the 
duty of wrongdoers in corrective justice is to repair the wrongful losses for which they are 
responsible"). 
190. See CHARLES FRIED, CoNTRAcr AS PROMISE 1 (1981) (arguing that "[t]he promise 
principle . . .  is the moral basis of contract law"); id. at 17 (arguing that breaching promises is 
morally wrong "[b]y virtue of the basic Kantian principles of trust and respect"). 
191. See RAWLS, supra note 185, at 83. 
192. This goes back, at least, to Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). See 428 U.S. at 
183 (" 'Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law,' but neither is it a 
forbidden objective nor one inconsistent with our respect for the dignity of men.") (opinion 
of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (citation omitted). For recent statements, see, e.g., Aus­
tin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 621 {1993) (deciding whether civil forfeiture constitutes 
"punishment" for purposes of Excessive Fines Clause) (" 'lb;A] civil sanction that cannot 
fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also 
serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to under­
stand the term.' " (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 
(1989))); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (striking down civil-commitment statute 
on due process grounds) ("A State, pursuant to its police power, may of course imprison 
convicted criminals for the purposes of deterrence and retribution."); Kansas v. Hendricks, 
117 S. Ct. 2072, 2082 {1997) (upholding civil-commitment statute for "sexually violent 
predators") (describing "retribution" and "deterrence" as twin purposes of criminal punish­
ment); and Hudson v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 488, 493 (1997) (describing factors that are 
useful in determining whether a penalty is "criminal" for double-jeopardy purposes) ("[T]he 
factors includ[e] whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retri­
bution and deterrence.' "  (citation omitted)). 
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the serious arguments against retributivism· do not undermine the 
moral plausibility of the Derivative Account. 
Another tack the defender of the Direct Account might take is 
to bracket the truth of retributivism, but then argue that the re­
tributivist principle of punishing the morally culpable does not jus­
tify the sanctions meted out in the stylized cases above. Yet why 
not? The retributivist principle, again, is that moral culpability is 
not only necessary but sufficient to justify punishment.193 I suggest 
that the actors, in all the stylized cases above, satisfy this principle. 
They are "morally culpable" because they have culpably194 commit­
ted serious wrongs:195 battery, pollution, and arson; assault and 
trespass; child pornography; fraud; the killing of a stolen and en­
dangered animal; assault with a deadly weapon. The epistemic 
point - that X's having been tried and convicted for flag-desecra­
tion, etc., fails to evidence his moral culpability, qua batterer, etc. -
should not obscure the moral fact that X committed wrong. He 
performed an action that breached some other rule and that, quite 
apart from that, ought not have been performed. (Even if, by some 
mistake, the rules against battery, etc., had temporarily been re­
pealed in the relevant jurisdictions, it was wrong of X to do what he 
did.196) In addition, the sanctions that the actors actually received 
are, I suggest, "punishment," although this is admittedly open to 
some debate.197 
Finally, the temptation to amend the retributive principle and 
insist that morally culpable actors must receive punishment for the 
right reasons should be resisted. For how would a "right reasons" 
addendum be defended, within a retributivist theory? The retribu­
tivist principle expresses (part of) what is morally fitting: it is fit-
193. See Moore, supra note 171, at 181-82. 
194. I mean to assume this in the stylized facts. 
195. It is open to debate whether the "moral culpability" sufficient to warrant punish­
ment, within a retributivist theory, entails wrongdoing, culpability, or both. See Symposium, 
Harm v. Culpability, supra note 170. Further, it is open to debate whether the retributivist's 
"wrongdoing" entails only harmful action, or whether it includes harmless wrongs as well, or 
even mere illegality. See FEINBERG, supra note 57, at 10-14 (su=arizing considerations, 
besides harmfulness, that support a criminal prohibition on certain actions); Moore, supra 
note 171, at 181 n.1 (defining moral culpability as including morally innocent actions that are 
legally prohibited). Whatever the boundaries of moral culpability, for retributivist purposes, 
our stylized actors lie within that concept's core. 
196. Only a super-shallow conventionalist would claim that X's action cannot be morally 
wrong unless prohibited by a formal legal rule. See Adler, supra note 4, at 803-04 (discussing, 
and criticizing, super-shallow conventionalism). 
197. See DUFF, supra note 165, at 151 ("Punishment . . .  must logically be imposed on an 
offender, for an offence, by a duly constituted authority, and must inflict suffering on him." 
(emphasis added)). Notably, however, Duff offers this definition of punishment in the ser­
vice of an expressive account, see id. at 267. 
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ting, the retributivist claims, that wrongdoers receive the 
punishment they deserve. A legal practice that tends to realize the 
morally fitting events or states-of-the-world identified by the re­
tributivist principle is, for the retributivist, a justified practice; a 
legal practice that tends not to realize those events or states is, for 
her, less well justified. So the practice of enforcing a rule against 
"batterers" is better justified than the practice of enforcing a rule 
against "flag desecration."198 But this is not because the retribu­
tivist wants to punish batterers "for the right reasons;" it is because 
batterers are usually wrongdoers, while flag-desecrators often are 
not. We might, perhaps, have a general theory why legislators 
should act for the "right reasons" (a theory of authority, or of legis­
lative motivation, of the kind considered below)199; but a specific 
"riglift reasons" addendum to the retributivist principle is simply ad 
hoc, just as a specific "right reasons" addendum to, say, the Rawl­
sian principle of redirecting resources to the less-well-off would be. 
Is there anything left for the defender of the Direct Account to 
say, in response to the retributivist? I suppose she might say this: 
although the sanctions meted out in our stylized cases do, indeed, 
satisfy the conditions for punishment specified by the retributive 
principle - in this important sense, no wrong has been done to the 
actors - it would still be a good idea to sanction them pursuant to 
different rules. Doing so would not only dispense the punishment 
they deserve, but additionally would express what made their ac­
tions wrong, or maintain the credibility of justified threats against 
future wrongdoers. Yet I find it hard to see how this final defense 
of the Direct Account coheres, in any way, with the moral concepts 
underlying our stylized cases, particularly FLAG DESECRATION, 
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY, and ABORTION. Surely the constitutional 
rights to free speech and abortion do not rest upon the moral claims 
of the once and future victims of wrongdoing speakers and of 
wrongdoing women who procure abortions! It is much more 
straightforward and plausible to say what, as we shall see, the De­
rivative Account says: that the constitutional rights to free speech 
and abortion typically rest upon the moral claims of otherwise­
innocent speakers and women, who fall within the scope of overly 
198. On the general distinction between the moral justifications for a practice and the 
moral justifications for a particular application of that practice, see John Rawls, 11vo Con­
cepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REv. 3, 3 (1955); SCHAUER, supra note 58, at 128-34. 
199. See infra section 11.C; infra note 278. Cf. MooRE, supra note 179, at 751 (arguing 
that "every citizen [has the right] not to have his or her behaviour regulated for the wrong 
reasons by the government," but that such right "is not basic but is the correlative of a more 
basic duty on the part of legislators to enact legislation for certain reasons but not others"). 
October 1998] Rights Against Rules 55 
broad rules such as the rules in FLAG DESECRATION, CHILD POR­
NOGRAPHY, and ABoRTION.200 
Note, finally, that a nonepistemic defense of the Direct Account 
based upon a rule-dependent theory of sanctions must overcome, 
not just retributivism, but every other rule-independent theory of 
sanctions. Retributivism is one such theory; it may not be the only 
one.201 Because I think the retributivist's objection is sufficiently 
powerful to defeat the nonepistemic defense of the Direct Account, 
I will not pursue the point here. My burden is merely to adduce 
one constitutionally satisfactory, rule-independent theory of justi­
fied sanctions - retributivism - that justifies the sanctions im­
posed in FLAG DESECRATION, ABORTION, and the rest of our 
stylized cases. By contrast, a nonepistemic defense of the Direct 
Account must demonstrate that there exists no constitutionall! sat­
isfactory, rule-independent theory sufficient to justify the sanctions 
in the stylized cases. If the defender of the Direct Account refutes 
retributivism, then she must proceed to defeat whatever other rule­
independent theories might plausibly obtain. 
2. The Epistemic Idea 
The nonepistemic defense of the Direct Account, sketched 
above, tries to show why the predicate or history of the rule pursu­
ant to which an actor is sanctioned has true moral significance for 
the justifiability of her sanction, independent of the epistemic ca­
pacities of reviewing courts. The defense tries to demonstrate why 
sufficient nonepistemic reason obtains to invalidate X's own sanc­
tion, without a further invalidation of the rule, and despite the fact 
that X has culpably committed a wrong by the very action for which 
she has been sanctioned. The epistemic defense is less ambitious. 
The idea here is that, whatever wrong X happens to have per­
formed, she has not been tried and convicted for that. Rather, she 
has been tried and convicted for breaching a rule that (in some 
way)202 does not serve as an epistemically reliable mechanism for 
identifying wrongful actions. And the right way for society to deter­
mine whether X, indeed, performed a wrong is simply to indict and 
200. See infra section IIl.A.1. 
201. For example, consider an incapacitative theory: imprisoning X, who has performed 
wrongdoing in the past, serves to incapacitate him and thereby prevent his future wrongdoing 
quite independent of the predicate or history of the particular rule pursuant to which X is 
sanctioned. See WALKER, supra note 165, at 34-41 (discussing incapacitative theory). 
202. "In some way" is meant to anticipate the different, specific ways that sanctioning X 
pursuant to a rule may fail to constitute adequate epistemic work. See infra text accompany­
ing notes 203-19 (discussing epistemiei rights and epistemiei_ rights). 
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try her for violating a rule that is not epistemically flawed in this 
way.203 
The following formulation takes an initial stab at the epistemic 
idea: 
Epistemic1 Rights: Underdescriptive Rules 
To say that X's sanction pursuant to rule R is "unconstitu­
tional," or that it violates her "constitutional rights," is to say 
that X has a legal right to have more epistemic work per­
formed (specifically, by trying her under a different rule), prior 
to imposing a sanction upon her. More epistemic work is 
needed because the rule is underdescriptive. Some (or many) 
actions falling within the description set forth by the rule's 
predicate are morally innocent; relative to that description, X's 
action was not necessarily (or probably) wrongful. 
FLAG DESECRATION, CmLD PORNOGRAPHY, and ABORTION moti­
vate this idea of "underdescriptive" rules - rules whose scope in­
cludes some or many morally innocent actions. A given action of 
"flag desecration," or "procuring an abortion," or "displaying 
photos of naked children" is not necessarily or likely wrongful. 
Thus, even if retributivism is true - even if an actor's wrongdoing 
truly suffices to justify a sanction, regardless of the predicate or his­
tory of the rule pursuant to which Xis sanctioned - society has not 
yet done enough to identify the properties of X's action that make 
it wrong. To say that X has a "constitutional right" not to be sanc­
tioned pursuant to a rule prohibiting "flag desecration," "abortion," 
or "photo display" could simply entail that her sanction is possibly 
or likely unjustified, relative to the act-description set forth by the 
predicate of the targeted rule. Even the retributivist can accept this 
construal of X's constitutional right, for even the retributivist does 
not want to sanction innocent actors. Whatever our underlying the­
ory of sanctions, we can all agree that, in cases such as FLAG DESE­
CRATION, CmLD PORNOGRAPHY, and ABORTION, we need to 
203. Indeed, nothing I say in this section is meant to deny the general proposition that 
rules have an epistemic function. See supra note 169 (discussing epistemic idea, within litera­
ture on authority). Whatever else rules do - whether that is solving coordination problems, 
or prisoners' dile=as, or coercing morally apathetic actors to do what morality requires - I 
find it compelling to think of agencies and legislatures as institutions that, among other 
things, perform the epistemic work needed to determine what morality (particularly the con­
sequentialist component of morality) requires of actors in certain domains. See RAz, supra 
note 169, at 38-69 (presenting theory of authority, grounded both on moral expertise of au­
thorities and on role of authoritative utterances in solving coordination problems and prison­
ers' dile=as). I simply do not think that the epistemic idea is an adequate account of 
constitutional rights to free speech, free exercise, equal protection, and substantive due 
process. 
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undertake more epistemic work to determine whether X's action 
was wrongful. 
We must carefully distinguish this plausible idea of epistemic1 
rights from a different idea, with which it might be confused, and 
which is not plausible at all. That is the following: 
The Implausible Epistemic Idea: Substantive Rights Based on 
Limited Evidence 
To say that X's sanction pursuant to rule R is "unconstitu­
tional," or that it violates her "constitutional rights," is to say 
that X has a legal right not to be sanctioned by virtue of the 
action she performed. The moral content of the legal right is as 
follows: there is true, moral reason not to sanction X by virtue 
of the action she performed, or so the reviewing court has de­
termined on the evidence before it. The reviewing court has 
determined that such moral reason obtains, because it has con­
cluded that X's action was not wrongful. The court has con­
cluded that X's action was not wrongful because, relative to the 
description embodied in the targeted rule, it was not wrongful. 
This latter explanation is implausible, of course, because it squarely 
contradicts the Basic Structure. If X's constitutional right were a 
legal right not to be sanctioned, under any rule, for the action she 
performed, then the flag-desecrator, etc., whose sanction was invali­
dated on First Amendment, etc., grounds could not subsequently be 
sanctioned under any rule: a rule prohibiting battery, obscenity, or 
assault with a deadly weapon. Relatedly, if constitutional rights had 
this act-shielding structure, we would want reviewing courts to en­
gage in considerably more investigation of the potentially wrong­
making features of actions, beyond the features picked out by a par­
ticular rule.204 
So let us return to the more plausible notion - that constitu­
tional rights are epistemic1 rights. An epistemic1 right is a right of 
some sanctioned X to have more epistemic work done, given that 
the rule R pursuant to which he has been sanctioned is un­
derdescriptive - given that an action is not necessarily or likely 
wrongful, merely by virtue of falling under the description set forth 
by R. The idea of epistemic1 rights is plausible because it is consis-
204. Perhaps it might be objected that the state's failure to prosecute X pursuant to a 
second rule is itself strong grounds for an inference that X's action has no further wrong­
making properties. But such an inference is unwarranted, given the structure of double­
jeopardy doctrine. See MooRE, supra note 64, at 325-55 (double jeopardy permits the se­
quential prosecution of an actor, for the very same action, pursuant to statutes picking out 
different act-types). 
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tent with the Basic Structure. Sanctioning you for "procuring an 
abortion" violates your epistemic1 rights because society has not, 
yet, reliably determined whether you did something wrong; sanc­
tioning you for "assault with a deadly weapon," by virtue of the 
very same action, does not violate your epistemic1 rights, because 
now society has reliably determined your wrongdoing. Further, as I 
have said, the explanation is quite consistent with retributivism. Its 
defender can concede that if X's action of procuring an abortion 
also was an action of assault with a deadly weapon - indeed, if in 
the past X performed a wrongful action, and no fitting punishment 
has yet been produced to match that - then her sanction might be 
(nonepistemically) justified. The very point of a constitutional 
right, the defender can say, is to require that our legal institutions 
do the epistemic work needed to determine the true properties of 
X's action or prior actions. Finally, and relatedly, the idea of an 
epistemic1 right fits nicely with the notion that legal institutions 
have different and limited roles. The limited role of the legislature 
or agency is to enact rules that, inter alia, purport to describe 
wrong-making features of actions; the limited role of a prosecutor 
and trial court, or an enforcement official and agency judge, is to 
apply these rules; and the limited role of a constitutional reviewing 
court is to determine whether these legal institutions have, yet, 
done enough epistemic work to impose a sanction upon X 2os The 
reviewing court's role is not to engage in a boundless search for 
something, sometime, that X did wrong, and so the truth of retribu­
tivism is no obstacle at all to a rule-targeted, epistemic right. 
Despite its plausibility, the idea of epistemic1 rights must be re­
jected. The problem is that, in general, there is no justiciable con­
stitutional norm against proscribing actions that are morally 
innocent, or against sanctioning persons who merely breach rules 
that proscribe morally innocent actions.206 The Constitution, as en­
forced by the courts, does not generally prohibit the imposition of a 
civil or criminal sanction upon a morally innocent actor: some Y 
whose action, which a legal rule prohibited, was morally permissible 
205. Cf. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610-11 {1973) (articulating view of consti· 
tutional courts as institutions with a limited role). Some view of this sort is surely right. See, 
e.g., Owen M. Flss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term - Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 
HAR.v. L. REv. 1, 5-17 {1979) {denying that federal courts are limited to resolving disputes, 
but arguing that their role is limited to the protection of "constitutional values"). 
206. See Larry Alexander, The Supreme Court, Dr. Jekyll, and the Due Process of Proof, 
1996 SUP. CT. REv. 191, 216 & n.76 {discussing absence of federal constitutional restrictions 
on states' definitions of crimes); Louis D. Bilionis, Process, the Constitution, and Substantive 
Criminal Law, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1269 {1998) (same). 
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or required.207 State officials do not violate Y's constitutional rights 
under the Eighth Amendment, the Due Process Clause, or any part 
of the Constitution by sanctioning him for breaching a rule that 
prohibits "the sale of filled milk," even if filled milk is a perfectly 
healthy product that was banned by mistake or because the legisla­
ture was controlled by the manufacturers of substitute products.2os 
They do not violate W's constitutional rights by sanctioning her for 
breaching a rule that prohibits opticians from "dispensing eye­
glasses without an opthamologist's prescription," even if most opti­
cians, including W herself, are perfectly competent to write eyeglass 
prescriptions.209 Relatedly, then, the Constitution does not gener­
ally provide epistemic1 rights to sanctioned persons. Z can be sanc­
tioned, without further epistemic work, pursuant to a rule 
prohibiting "the sale of filled milk" or "dispensing eyeglasses with­
out an opthamologist's prescription" - regardless of whether some 
207. Nor does it do to say that actors have a general moral obligation to obey the law, 
such that Y's action may have been morally innocent prior to its legal proscription, but 
breaching that proscription was itself morally wrong. See SCHAUER, supra note 58, at 125 
(noting possibility of moral obligation to obey the law). This argument, cogent or not, is 
hardly one that the defender of epistemiei rights can advance; rather, she must claim that 
some of the actions that legal rules proscribe are morally innocent, and that actors retain 
epistemic rights with respect to those actions even after breaching the legal rules. If so, she 
must explain why the actors in FLAG DESECRATION and the other stylized cases, but not 
other actors, have such rights. 
208. See United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (upholding, over substan­
tive due process challenge, indictment of filled milk manufacturer pursuant to statute prohib­
iting interstate shipment of filled milk); Geoffrey P. Miller, The True Story of Carolene 
Products, 1987 SUP. CT. R:Ev. 397 (detailing absence of moral reason to ban filled milk, and 
special-interest politics behind passage of statute). Although the Carolene Products opinion 
itself leaves open the possibility of some judicial scrutiny for those "garden variety" statutes 
that do not trigger heightened scrutiny, see 304 U.S. at 152-54, it is now notoriously true that 
the effective level of judicial scrutiny for such statutes is zero. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 
372 U.S. 726 (1963) (upholding, over substantive due process and equal protection challenge, 
statute prohibiting nonlawyers from engaging in business of debt adjusting, and detailing 
judicial deference absent more specific constitutional challenge). The upshot, as Professor 
LaFave notes, is that "the United States Supreme Court has all but abandoned the practice of 
invalidating criminal statutes on the basis that they bear no substantial relation to injury to 
the public." 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AuSTIN W. Scorr, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAw 
§ 2.12(b), at 211-12 (1986). 
Although the Court in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), did strike down a 
statute criminalizing mere "status" (viz., drug addiction), as violating the Eighth Amend­
ment, it has since been careful to cabin Robinson narrowly. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 
514, 533 (1967) (plurality opinion) ("Robinson • . .  brings this Court but a very small way into 
the substantive criminal law. And unless Robinson is so viewed it is difficult to see any 
limiting principle that would serve to prevent this Court from becoming . . .  the ultimate 
arbiter of the standards of criminal responsibility . . . .  "). 
209. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (upholding, over substantive due 
process challenge, statute prohibiting opticians from dispensing eyeglasses without prescrip­
tion from licensed optometrist or ophthalmologist). 
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or many actions within the scope of these rules are morally 
innocent.210 
The defender of the Direct Account might be tempted to distin­
guish FLAG DESECRATION, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY, and ABORTION 
from the case in which Z is sanctioned for "the sale of filled milk," 
or "dispensing eyeglasses without an opthamologist's prescription," 
by appealing to the concept of liberty: "The particular action X 
performed, in our stylized cases, was an action falling within some 
class of constitutional liberties. X's particular action was an action 
of speech in FLAG DESECRATION and CHILD PORNOGRAPHY, and 
an action lying within the zone of privacy in ABORTION. This is not 
true of Z: Z's particular action was not a liberty-type action. 
Therefore X, but not Z, is entitled to more epistemic work suffi­
cient to determine whether his action was wrong." But this attempt 
to salvage the idea of epistemic1 rights is misconceived, because it 
distorts the concept of liberty. 
The concept of liberty, or freedom, is forward-looking, not 
backward-looking. To say that actors should be at liberty to per­
form actions of type A - expressive actions, or actions falling 
within the zone of personal privacy - is to say that performing an 
A-type action, or not, should be at the actor's choice (absent over­
riding reason). Actors should not be coerced (absent overriding 
reason) into refraining from A-type actions, or otherwise prevented 
from choosing, themselves, whether or not to perform actions of 
that type.211 But it is only physically possible for actors to choose 
210. Creating a general epistemic1 right - a general right not to be sanctioned pursuant 
to a rule where, relative to the act-description set forth in the rule plus whatever further facts 
about the claimant's action have properly come to the court's attention, the claimant is possi­
bly or likely morally innocent - would involve a return to the broad-ranging practice of 
judicial review characteristic of the Lochner period, see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 
(1905). What if the defender of the Direct Account wants to do just that? Then he can 
plausibly argue that the claimants in CHILD PORNOGRAPHY, FLAG DESECRATION, and ABOR­
TION have had their epistemiei rights violated; but I would then reply, as to the notion of 
epistemic;z rights, that this is dilutive. See infra text accompanying notes 220-25. 
211. Consider Joel Feinberg's definition of "liberty," at the beginning of his famous trea­
tise on the criminal law, where he quite naturally ties the idea of "liberty" to choice and 
coercion: 
We can . . .  formulate the basic question of these volumes as one about the moral limits 
of individual liberty, understanding "liberty" simply as the absence of legal coercion. 
When the state creates a legal statute prohibiting its citizens from doing X on pain of 
punishment, then the citizens are no longer "at liberty" to do X The credible threat of 
punishment working directly on the citizens' motives makes X substantially less eligible 
than before for their deliberate doing . . . .  [W]hen we are prohibited from doing [X] we 
are required, under threat of penalty, to omit doing [X]. 
FEINBERG, supra note 57, at 7. One might dispute Feinberg's definitional link of liberty and 
coercion. "There are many other barriers to our actions than prohibitory rules backed by 
threats of punishment . . . .  But it would be false and misleading to say that I am not free or 
not at liberty to do [such] things." Id. at 8. Whether or not Feinberg is right, here, it is at 
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the actions that they will perform in the future; it is physically im­
possible for actors to change the actions they already did or did not 
perform, in the past.212 Therefore, any moral imperative to leave 
actors free to perform A-type actions must be a forward-looking 
imperative. For example, the freedom of speech at Time T0 means 
that actors who might speak at future times Ti. T2 • • •  ought not be 
coerced by the duty-imposing legal rules that are or will be in force, 
into remaining silent at those future times. It does not mean that an 
actor who already has spoken, at some prior times T_i. or T_2, • • •  is 
entitled to extra, epistemic work - beyond what is ordinarily re­
quired under the Eighth Amendment or the rest of the Constitution 
- to determine whether her past speech-act was wrongful under 
another description.213 
Now, it is certainly open to the defender of the Direct Account 
to submit a creative reinterpretation of the Free Speech Clause and 
the substantive component of the Due Process Clause. He might 
argue, creatively, that these clauses do not protect "liberties" in my 
forward-looking sense; rather, they protect "liberties*" in the spe­
cial, backward-looking sense appropriate to the idea of epistemiei 
rights. A liberty* is an epistemic trigger. A liberty* marks out some 
class of actions such that, if X performed an action within that class, 
and is sanctioned pursuant to an underdescriptive rule, X is spe­
cially entitled to the performance of additional epistemic work suf­
ficient to determine whether his sanction is justified. But the 
standard, and better, moral readings of the Free Speech Clause and 
the substantive component of the Due Process Clause see these 
provisions as protecting liberties, not liberties*. It is vitally impor­
tant to actors, and to their listeners, that they be free to perform 
certain expressive actions; it is vitally important to them that they 
have the free choice whether or not to perform actions lying within 
least clear that legal coercion exemplifies a restriction on liberty because legal coercion (and 
brute state force) is the exemplary way to restrict actors' future choices. 
As for the Feinbergian link between liberty and choice: I believe that this is the correct 
analysis of the concept of liberty, but ultimately this conceptual claim is less important than 
the point that the choice-based concept Feinberg delineates - and not its backward-looking 
analogue - better captures the constitutional criteria of free speech and substantive due 
process. 
212. I assert this to be true as a matter of common sense. How to cash out this truism, in 
a theory of free will and the nature of the physical world, is well beyond my ken. See, e.g., 
STORRS McCALL, A MooEL OF TiiE UNIVERSE: SPACE-TIME, PROBABILITY, AND DECISION 
1-19, 250-79 (1994) (defending branching model of universe, with open future and closed 
past, and explicating free will within this model). 
213. This raises the question why, on any account of the Free Speech Clause and the 
substantive component of the Due Process Clause, retrospective challenges to sanctions 
rather than prospective challenges to duties should be allowed. I deal with that question 
below. See infra text accompanying notes 409-13. 
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the zone of privacy.214 This is a forward-looking, not a backward­
looking, reading of the moral criteria lying behind FLAG DESECRA­
TION, CmLD PORNOGRAPHY, and .ABORTION. As between the 
standard view that the Free Speech Clause and the substantive 
component of the Due Process Clause of the Constitution protect 
liberties, and the creative view that they protect liberties*, the stan­
dard view is much better.21s 
An additional problem with the notion of epistemic1 rights, and 
the associated concept of liberties* (epistemic triggers), is that these 
ideas do little to explain the remaining stylized cases: RESIDENTIAL 
PICKETING, ANIMAL SACRIFICE, and ALcoHoL. If there is an epi­
stemic failure that occurs in these remaining cases, it does not seem 
to be the failure of underdescription. A rule prohibiting the "pick­
eting of residences, except by labor groups" is not significantly un­
derdescri pti ve: most actions of residence-picketing are 
unnecessarily disruptive and upsetting to the residents, and ought 
not be performed.216 Similarly, a rule prohibiting "the sacrifice of 
animals for religious purposes" may not be significantly un­
derdescriptive, depending on how one balances the religious needs 
of the actors against the animals' welfare. Thus, even if the First 
Amendment does underwrite liberties* rather than liberties, it is 
hard to see how the idea of epistemic1 rights explains REsIDENTIAL 
PICKETING and ANIMAL SACRIFICE. As for ALCOHOL: X's 
purchase of alcohol was not an exercise of a liberty or a liberty*, 
because the Equal Protection Clause does not protect "liberties" in 
either sense.217 So an appeal to liberties* will not explain why epi­
stemic rights are violated in that case, as opposed to the case of a Z 
214. See infra notes 317, 327-28, 343 and accompanying text (discussing standard, liberty­
protecting view of free speech and substantive due process, and citing sources). 
215. The standard view might be wrong. See infra text accompanying notes 354-57 (dis­
cussing discrimination, rather than liberty, account of free speech and substantive due pro­
cess). But the plausible alternative to the standard view is that these clauses protect liberties 
in no sense - not that they protect liberties*. 
216. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (upholding general ban on residential pick­
eting, over free speech challenge). Another, more conventional way of putting the distinc­
tion between REsIDENTIAL PICKETING and FLAG DESECRATION is to say that the first is 
underinclusive and the second overinclusive. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, The Changing Faces of 
First Amendment Neutrality: R.A.V. v. St. Paul, Rust v. Sullivan, and the Problem of 
Content-Based Underinclusion, 1992 SUP. CT. REv. 29, 29-32 (articulating puzzle of underin­
clusion, within free speech jurisprudence). Underinclusion precludes underdescription, in 
the sense demanded by epistemiei rights. Whatever the correct account of REsIDENTIAL 
PICKETING, or of the majority decision in R.A. V., it cannot be that the sanctions in these 
cases were meted out pursuant to rules that were underdescriptive. 
217. No plausible theory of the Equal Protection Clause sees it as delineating liberties in 
either sense. See infra section II.B (discussing leading theories of equal protection). 
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sanctioned for "the sale of filled milk" or "dispensing eyeglasses 
without an opthamologist's prescription." 
Given these difficulties with the notion of epistemic1 rights, the 
defender of the Direct Account might be tempted to rework the 
epistemic idea along the following lines: 
Epistemic2 Rights: Rules That Are Enacted Through an Unreli­
able Process 
To say that X's sanction pursuant to rule R is "unconstitu­
tional," or that it violates her "constitutional rights," is to say 
that X has a legal right to have more epistemic work per­
formed (specifically, by trying her under a different rule), prior 
to imposing a sanction upon her. More epistemic work is 
needed because the process by which R was formulated was 
defective in certain, constitutional ways. The legislators or ad­
ministrators who formulated R were not sufficiently informed, 
impartial, and deliberative to determine, in a reliable way, 
which actions should be legally proscribed and subject to sanc­
tions. Specifically, certain errors (false beliefs) about the 
moral relevance of speech, religion, race, or gender infected 
the process by which R was formulated. 
Note a few attractive features of this new formulation of the episte­
mic idea. First, the idea of epistemiei rights potentially explains 
REsIDENTIAL PICKETING, ANIMAL SACRIFICE, and ALCOHOL as 
well as (perhaps) FLAG DESECRATION, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY, and 
ABORTION. The rule in each case can, arguably, be taken as evi­
dence of some process defect. For example, the rules in REsmEN­
TIAL PICKETING and ANIMAL SACRIFICE are not underdescriptive 
in the sense required by epistemic1 rights, but we can plausibly say 
that they evidence a rule-formulation process infected with false be­
liefs about the moral relevance of speech and religion. An action of 
residential picketing is not made less harmful by the labor-related 
viewpoint of the picketers; an action of killing animals is not made 
more harmful by the religious cast of the actors. So we can infer 
that the legislators or administrators who formulated these rules 
made certain moral errors (within a class of errors delineated by the 
First Amendment); and we can therefore conclude that X's episte­
miei rights have been violated. The Constitution demands, we 
might say, that persons not be sanctioned pursuant to rules whose 
formulation was infected by certain error-types: at least that much 
epistemic work is morally and constitutionally required, prior to im­
posing a sanction. 
64 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 97:1 
Relatedly, the idea of epistemiez rights does not require an ap­
peal to the notion of liberties* (epistemic triggers) in order to ex­
plain why epistemic rights are violated in our stylized cases but not 
in the case of a rule prohibiting "the sale of filled milk" or "dispens­
ing eyeglasses without an opthamologist's prescription." The pro­
cess for formulating a rule can be constitutionally defective, 
independent of whether the rule includes liberties* within its scope, 
and independent of whether X's particular action was an instance of 
a liberty*. All we need is some constitutional basis for delineating a 
class of error-types - types of false beliefs, such that, if these be­
liefs infected the rule-formulation process, more epistemic work is 
morally and constitutionally required. The First Amendment, inter 
alia, proscribes legislative error about the moral relevance of 
speech218 and religion; the Equal Protection Clause proscribes leg­
islative error about the moral relevance of race and gender.219 
Thus, the idea of epistemiez rights can be used to explain ALCOHOL 
(which does not involve liberties or liberties*) as well as the re­
maining stylized cases. The promulgation of a rule prohibiting men 
between eighteen and twenty-one (or women or black persons) 
from purchasing alcohol evidences false beliefs, among legislators, 
about the moral relevance of gender (or race), and it therefore vio­
lates X's epistemiez rights to be sanctioned pursuant to this rule 
quite independent of the presence of liberties or liberties*. 
But does this epistemic tack really work? Does the idea of epi­
stemiez rights successfully underwrite the Direct Account? I think 
not. The difficulty with the idea of epistemiez rights is that it dilutes 
the moral justification for judicial review. The moral fact about 
FLAG DESECRATION, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY, .ABORTION, and the 
remainder of our stylized cases is not merely the epistemic fact that 
society needs to undertake further moral deliberation and research. 
It is not merely that more epistemic work needs to be done to de­
termine whether sanctioning a given individual under the stylized 
rule is morally justified. Rather, and more strongly, the moral fact 
about each and every one of the stylized rules is the nonepistemic 
fact that the rule-predicate should be repealed or amended. As I 
will argue at much greater length in Part III, for each stylized rule 
there is sufficient moral reason that the rule-predicate be changed, 
218. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & 
MARY L. REv. 189, 227-33 (1983) (arguing that free speech doctrine operates, in part, to 
identify laws where legislators were improperly motivated with respect to speech). 
219. See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, A.Nno1sCRIMINATION LAW AND SoCIAL EouALITY 13-56 
(1996) (analyzing process theories of equal protection). 
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in some measure. The rule in FLAG DESECRATION wrongly coerces 
otherwise-innocent speakers to refrain from expressing their views 
about the flag; the rule in ABORTION wrongly coerces some women 
not to procure abortions; the rule in CHILD PORNOGRAPHY wrongly 
coerces parents not to display pictures of their naked infants; the 
rules in ALCOHOL, ANIMAL SACRIFICE, and RESIDENTIAL PICKET­
ING wrongly discriminate on the basis of race, gender, ·religion, or 
viewpoint. A world with these rules is a world that, in some mea­
sure, is morally awry - not merely a world whose moral status de­
mands more inquiry on our part.220 
The difference between epistemic and nonepistemic grounds for 
judicial intervention is a large one; it parallels the large differences 
that moral philosophers and jurisprudes have elaborated in other 
contexts, for example, between reason for belief and reason for ac­
tion,221 between attempted and completed crime,222 and between 
risking and wronging.223 By advancing merely an epistemic claim, 
the idea of epistemiei rights makes a weaker case for constitutional 
review, under the Bill of Rights, than can and should be made. 
Although this critique is not catastrophic for the epistemic idea -
it does not prove the idea to be internally incoherent, or deeply 
confused - it does weigh against epistemiei rights and in favor of 
the Derivative Account. 
The defender of the Direct Account might respond to this point 
by saying that constitutional reviewing courts are not competent to 
determine whether morality requires a change in the predicates of 
rules. Their role is merely epistemic, not nonepistemic - to pro­
tect epistemiei rights, and nothing more. But if that were true, con­
stitutional law would look radically different. Constitutional courts 
pervasively scrutinize rule-predicates and not merely the direct his­
torical evidence (in the legislative or administrative history, or in a 
rulemaking record, or in the testimony of legislators or administra­
tor) of the beliefs that motivated rule-formulators.224 Judicial re-
220. See infra sections ID.A.1-2. 
221. See Hurd, supra note 169, at 1615-20. 
222. See Hurd, supra note 184, at 187-93 (criticizing attempted-act deontology). 
223. See Stephen R. Perry, Risk, Harm, and Responsibility, in PHn.osoPmCAL FOUNDA­
TIONS OF ToRT LAw 321 (David G. Owen ed., 1995). 
224. This is not to say that direct historical evidence is irrelevant to reviewing courts. See 
Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 228-29 (1985) (relying on direct historical evidence of 
racist motivation behind facially neutral provision of state constitution to invalidate provi­
sion). Nor is it to say that a system exclusively focused on the rulemaking record, cf. United 
States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 250-53 (2d Cir. 1977) (invalidating 
rule under Administrative Procedure Act, given agency's failure to respond adequately to 
public comments), or even on testimony by officials about their mental states, cf. Citizens to 
66 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 97:1 
view, under the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, 
and the substantive component of the Due Process Clause, is 
largely structured around moral "tests" governing the predicates of 
rules: the state must justify its rule-predicate as "narrowly tailored 
to a compelling governmental interest," or as "significantly related 
to an important governmental interest," or as non-discriminatory, 
or whatevei.225 To interpret these as tests for false beliefs that may 
have figured in a rule's enactment, which courts apply so as to pro­
tect epistemiez rights, is to get matters quite backwards. A rule­
predicate evidences the role of false beliefs in the rule's enactment 
only if moral reason obtains to change, in some measure, the rule­
predicate. For if the predicate is morally perfect, where is the evi­
dence? In short, if courts are competent to perform this "eviden­
tiary" testing of rule-predicates, then mutatis mutandis they are 
competent to perform the task required by the Derivative Account, 
and the epistemiez idea is unduly dilutive. 
B. Equality 
I have extensively discussed, and criticized, two possible de­
fenses of the Direct Account: a nonepistemic theory of justified 
sanctions, such as an expressive or deterrent theory, that counts a 
rule's predicate or history as part of the morally necessary condi­
tions for a justified sanction, independent of the epistemic capaci­
ties of reviewing courts; and an epistemic theory of justified 
sanctions, that counts a rule's predicate or history as indicating the 
need for additional moral inquiry prior to imposing a sanction. 
But these are not the only defenses available to the Direct Ac­
count. Equality is a partly separate, and morally rich, idea within 
constitutional theory. The defender of the Direct Account might 
hope to explain some, or even most types of constitutional rights, 
by employing a theory of equality. At a minimum, she should hope 
thus to explain the constitutional rights that arise in classic equal 
protection cases, here exemplified by the stylized case I call ALCO­
HOL. And, by extension, she might think that equality can under­
write the Direct Account for cases of "discrimination" that arise, 
not under the Equal Protection Clause, but under the Free Speech 
Clause (as in REsmEm1AL PICKETING, or perhaps FLAG DESECRA-
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971) (remanding, under Adminis­
trative Procedure Act, for possible testimony by administrator), is a conceptual impossibility. 
But clearly constitutional review, as now and long practiced, is not exclusively focused on 
direct historical evidence of the beliefs behind rules. 
225. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text. 
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TION and CHILD PoRNOGRAPHY),226 or the Free Exercise Clause 
(as in ANIMAL SACRIFICE),227 or even the Substantive Due Process 
Clause. 
Let us focus on ALcoHoL, for I will argue that a theory of 
equality does not underwrite the Direct Account in this classic 
equal protection scenario - and thus, a fortiori, that it does not 
explain free speech, free exercise, or other such cases that may have 
something to do with equality. My discussion cannot be compre­
hensive, for there are in fact many different theories of equality. 
Equality is an especially tricky and multifaceted moral concept.228 
Rather, I will focus on those theories of equality that have figured 
most prominently in constitutional law and constitutional scholar­
ship: (1) equality as the equal treatment of "similarly situated" per­
sons; (2) equality as the freedom from moral stigma or insult; (3) 
equality as the guarantee of a political process that is free of preju­
dice against certain groups; and (4) equality as a guarantee against 
laws that aggravate the subordinate position of a specially disadvan­
taged group. 
1. Similarly Situated Individuals 
Joseph Thssman and Jacobus tenBroek are justly famous for 
their 1949 article on the "Equal Protection of the Laws," which 
clarified and made influential the idea that equal protection re­
quires the equal treatment of "similarly situated" persons. 
The essence of [the Equal Protection Clause] can be stated with 
deceptive simplicity. The Constitution does not require that things 
different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. But 
it does require, in its concern for equality, that those who are similarly 
situated be similarly treated. The measure of the reasonableness of a 
classification is the degree of its success in treating similarly those 
similarly situated.229 
226. See Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (invalidating rule prohibiting picket­
ing near school, except peaceful labor picketing, under Equal Protection and Free Speech 
Clauses); Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. 
REv. 615, 622-24 (1991) (noting increasingly important idea of "content discrimination" 
within free speech doctrine). 
227. See supra text accompanying notes 109-13 (discussing isomorphism between current 
free exercise doctrine and equal protection doctrine). 
228. For recent philosophical treatments, see LARRY S. TEMKJN, INEQUALITY (1993); 
Dennis McKerlie, Equality, 106 ETHICS 274 (1996). For an overview of the theories that have 
figured most importantly within the literature on the Equal Protection Clause, particularly 
with respect to race and gender, see KOPPELMAN, supra note 219, at 13-114. 
229. Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 3 CAL. L. 
REv. 341, 344 (1949) (footnote omitted); see Flss, supra note 108, at 110 & n.2 (describing 
Tussman and tenBroek's "now classic article"). 
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The Supreme Court regularly articulates this theory of equality in 
its equal protection jurisprudence,230 and Kenneth Simons has car­
ried forward and refined the idea within constitutional 
scholarship.231 
Let us bracket the point that the Court does not, in fact, enforce 
a general guarantee of equal treatment for "similarly situated" indi­
viduals. It is notoriously true that the Court will uphold wildly arbi­
trary and unfair laws - laws that fail to accord equal treatment to 
similarly situated firms, or workers, or consumers - as long as the 
laws do not employ "suspect" predicates such as race and gender, 
and other special factors are not present.232 Even leaving this point 
aside, the "similarly situated" theory of equality does not help show 
why the Direct Account holds true. 
Consider the following variant of ALcoHoL: A rule prohibits 
the purchase of alcohol by women (but not men) between the ages 
of eighteen and twenty-one. For purposes of this discussion, I will 
assume that the rule is irrational: its purpose is to prevent drunk 
driving, and while all persons between eighteen and twenty-one are 
more prone to drive drunk than all persons twenty-one or over, 
women and men between eighteen and twenty-one are equally 
prone to drive drunk. A woman W is sanctioned for breaching the 
rule, and challenges her sanction on equal protection grounds. It 
turns out that W's action of purchasing alcohol also was an action of 
criminal fraud; she used a stolen credit card to execute the 
purchase. Is there sufficient moral reason for the court to overturn 
W's sanction, without further invalidating the no-alcohol rule? 
The defender of the Direct Account wants to say that W has 
been treated unequally, relative to a class of similarly situated men. 
The puzzle lies in defining the class of men to whose treatment W's 
230. See, e.g., Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2297 (1997) ("[The Equal Protection Clause] 
embodies a general rule that States must treat like cases alike but may treat unlike cases 
accordingly."); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) ("The 
Equal Protection Clause . . . is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should 
be treated alike."). 
231. See Kenneth W. Simons, Overinclusion and Underinclusion: A New Model, 36 
UCLA L. REv. 448, 456-60 (1989) [hereinafter Simons, Overinclusion and Underinclusion] 
(discussing Tussman and tenBroek's model of classificatory fit); id. at 463-518 (proposing new 
variant); see also Kenneth W. Simons, Equality as a Comparative Right, 65 B.U. L. REv. 387, 
389 (1985) (stating that equality rights are not empty, understood as comparative rights: "A 
right to equal treatment is a comparative claim to receive a particular treatment just because 
another person or class receives it"). 
232. See FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-17 (1993) (discussing 
deference to social and economic regulation under Equal Protection Clause, and citing 
cases). "Special factors" is meant to cover the unusual cases in which the Supreme Court 
invalidates statutes under the rational-basis prong of equal protection scrutiny. See supra 
note 99. 
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should be compared.233 Is it (1) men who · are similar to W in all 
moral respects, that is, men between eighteen and twenty-one who 
have purchased alcohol using stolen credit cards; or rather (2) men 
who are similar to W with respect to the purpose of the rule, that is, 
men between eighteen and twenty-one who have purchased alco­
hol? Relative to comparison class (2), W has indeed received une­
qual treatment: she has been sanctioned, while men between 
eighteen and twenty-one who purchase alcohol will not generally be 
sanctioned for doing so. But, relative to comparison class (1), W 
has not received unequal treatment: she has been sanctioned pur­
suant to the no-alcohol rule, while men between eighteen and 
twenty-one who purchase alcohol using stolen credit cards will pre­
sumably be sanctioned pursuant to the laws against fraud.234 
In short, the problem of multiple description, which bedeviled 
the Direct Account earlier on - within a theory of justified sanc­
tions - reappears within a theory of equality. For the retributivist, 
as we have seen, it is a matter of (nonepistemic) moral indifference 
whether the battering flag-desecrator is sanctioned pursuant to a 
law that prohibits "battery" or pursuant to a law that prohibits "flag 
desecration." It is a matter of moral indifference for the retribu­
tivist whether the fraudulent alcohol-purchaser is sanctioned pursu­
ant to a law that prohibits "fraud" or a law that prohibits "alcohol 
purchases by women between eighteen and twenty-one." The de­
fender of the Direct Account might hope that, by shifting ground 
from the pros and cons of retributivism to the terrain of equality, he 
can avoid the problem of multiple description. But he cannot. For 
the problem simply recurs, here, in a slightly different form. Now, 
the problem is whether the description under which some person is 
sanctioned shapes the comparison class of "similarly situated" per­
sons, for purposes of deciding whether the sanctioned person has 
received equal treatment compared to that class. 
233. Cf. Simons, Overinclusion and Underin'clusion, supra note 231, at 465 (noting that 
"an equal protection claim necessarily compares the treatment of an identifiable plaintiff's 
class with the more favorable treatment of some other identifiable class"). I would modify 
this, to say that the plaintiff compares her treatment with the treatment of some identifiable 
class. If the plaintiff is bringing a facial, anticipatory challenge to a statute, then her (known) 
relevant features are the features picked out by the statutory classification; if, however, she is 
bringing a different kind of challenge, more features of her may be known, which may place 
her within a different moral class, and we should not assume that her claim of comparative 
equality stands or falls depending upon the way others within her statutory class fare. 
234. Of course, if W were sanctioned seriatim for purchasing alcohol and then for fraud, 
her multiple punishment would be unequal treatment whatever the comparison class; but I 
have assumed that our stylized actors are sanctioned only pursuant to the invalid rule. See 
supra text accompanying notes 163-64. 
70 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 97:1 
Only a description-dependent method for defining comparison 
classes can underwrite the Direct Account. Therefore, the defender 
of the Direct Account will want to adopt the view that the class of 
men similarly situated to W is (2) the class of men between eighteen 
and twenty-one who purchased alcohol. The purpose of the no­
alcohol rule is to prevent the risk of drunk driving, a risk to which 
both male and female drinkers between eighteen and twenty-one 
are particularly prone. The purpose of the no-alcohol rule is not to 
prevent fraud, and so non-fraudulent as well as fraudulent male 
purchasers are relevantly similar to W. Or so the defender of the 
Direct Account will argue.235 But the difficulty with this view is 
that - if we were to sanction W, for the very same action of hers, 
under a different rule - the compatjson class would change. Imag­
ine that nothing in the world changes, except for the state's choice 
of rule. W has performed her action of fraudulent alcohol­
purchase, as before; men between eighteen and twenty-one who 
perform otherwise-innocent actions of alcohol-purchase are not 
sanctioned, as before; and men between eighteen and twenty-one 
who perform fraudulent actions of alcohol-purchase are sanctioned, 
as before, pursuant to the laws against fraud. Now, however, the 
state prosecutes W for fraud rather than for breaching the no­
alcohol rule. On the description-dependent view, W no longer has 
an equality complaint, for the correct comparison class is now (3) 
men who have committed fraud, that is, those similarly situated 
with respect to the anti-fraud purpose of the law pursuant to which 
W is sanctioned. But why should the state's choice of law have this 
kind of bedrock moral significance, in changing whether W herself 
has received what equality demands? Nothing in W's own re­
sources, opportunities, and welfare has changed - unless we are 
willing to make further claims about the "expressive" or "stigmatic" 
import of rule-descriptions - and nothing has changed in the re­
sources, opportunities, or welfare available to men. 
The exponent of the Derivative Account has a simple and ele­
gant answer to this puzzle. Whatever the right method for defining 
comparison classes, the no-alcohol rule should be generally invali­
dated in some way - either repealed, or extended to include men 
235. Cf Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 229, at 346 ("[W]here are we to look for the 
test of similarity of situation which determines the reasonableness of a classification? The 
inescapable answer is that we must look beyond the classification to the purpose of the 
law."). But Tussman and tenBroek are concerned here with whether the enactment of a 
classification into law satisfies equal protection, and not whether a particular application of 
that law does. See id. at 344-45 (explicitly stating that their concern is enactment, not 
application). 
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between eighteen and twenty-one as well as women. For, whatever 
the right method, enforcing the no-alcohol rule as is will lead to 
violations of equal treatment. If the right method is description­
dependent, then the rule should be repealed or amended: all 
women sanctioned pursuant to the rule - both otherwise-innocent 
women who do nothing more than purchase alcohol, and women 
who commit fraud, etc. - are treated unequally, relative to all or at 
least some men between eighteen and twenty-one who purchase al­
cohol. Conversely, if the right method is description-independent, 
then the rule should still be repealed or ainended: otherwise-inno­
cent women sanctioned pursuant to the rule are treated unequally, 
relative to those otherwise-innocent men between eighteen and 
twenty-one who purchase alcohol and WJl not be sanctioned under 
any laws. To put the point succinctly and generally: if a legislative 
classification, such as the classification � the no-alcohol rule, is in­
deed irrational relative to valid legislative purposes, then - regard­
less of the significance of the rule's purpose in defining comparison 
classes - the proponent of a Tussman/tenBroek type theory of 
equality will want to repeal or amend the rule. 
I tend to believe that the proper method for defining compari­
son classes is description-independent. To think otherwise is to con­
flate a nonexpressive theory of equality, specifically a theory that 
demands the similar treatment of morally similar persons, with an 
expressive theory of equality that focuses on the problem of stigma 
and insult. But, in any event, the defender of the Derivative Ac­
count can remain agnostic on this issue. The defender of the Direct 
Account cannot; she must either establish a puzzling and controver­
sial theory of description-dependent comparison classes, or else 
move on to a different theory of equality altogether. 
2. Stigma 
A second theory of equality, prominent within constitutional 
scholarship236 as well as the case law,237 focuses upon unfair stigma 
236. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 219, at 57-76 (surveying stigma theory within scholar­
ship on discrimination). 
237. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) ("To separate [schoolchil­
dren] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a 
feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and 
minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."). The Court, since Brown, has repeatedly in­
voked the notion of stigma in its race-discrimination case law - most recently, in seeking to 
justify strict scrutiny for affirmative action. See, e.g., Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 229 
(1995); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) ("Classifications based 
on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm. Unless they are strictly reserved for. remedial 
settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial 
hostility."). For earlier invocations, in the context of straight race discrimination, see, e.g., 
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- paradigmatically, racial stigma - as a serious form of wrong and 
unequal treatment. Paul Brest produced the classic scholarly expo­
sition of this theory in his 1977 article entitled In Defense of the 
Antidiscrimination Principle.238 
[One] rationale for the antidiscrimination principle is the prevention 
of the harms which may result from race-dependent decisions. . . . 
Decisions based on assumptions of intrinsic worth and selective indif­
ference [inter alia] inflict psychological injury by stigmatizing their 
victims as inferior.239 
The theory goes back to the Court's decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education,240 and before that to Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. 
Ferguson, in which Harlan indicted segregation as placing a "badge 
of servitude" upon blacks.241 
The theory helps explain why rules that employ "suspect" predi­
cates, such as racial predicates, are uniquely subject to judicial in­
validation under the Equal Protection Clause. It is intuitively 
plausible to think that where (1) the predicate of rule R picks out 
actors by virtue of their race (black) and (2) is morally suboptimal 
in scope (morality requires either an extension of the rule to in­
clude whites, or a repeal), which strongly evidences (3) the causal 
role of legislators' or constituents' false beliefs about the moral in­
feriority of black persons, in producing the rule, the upshot is that 
(4) a serious kind of wrong (a "stigma") is done to black persons 
who are sanctioned pursuant to the rule.242 
Note, too, how a stigma theory of equality helps the defender of 
the Direct Account. Consider a variant of ALCOHOL with a racially 
discriminatory rule that prohibits the sale of alcohol to black per­
sons between eighteen and twenty-one. A black person B is sanc­
tioned for breaching the rule, and challenges his sanction on equal 
protection grounds. It turns out that B used a stolen credit card to 
purchase the alcohol. The defender of the Direct Account has here 
a straightforward and morally compelling explanation why it is not, 
all things considered, a matter of moral indifference whether B is 
Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 485 (1992); Crawford v. Board of Education, 458 U.S. 527, 544 
(1982); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 26 (1971). 
238. Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term - Foreword: In Defense of the Antidis-
crimination Principle, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1976). 
239. Id. at 8. 
240. 347 U.S. at 493-94. 
241. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 562 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
242. It is possible that stigma ensues even where the rule's predicate is morally optimal in 
scope. But we then have an evidentiary question about the existence of prejudice in produc­
ing the rule - although that, too, may not be a necessary condition for stigma. In any event, 
the strongest case for stigma is where all of the first three conditions obtain. 
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sanctioned pursuant to a racially neutral anti-fraud rule, as opposed 
to the no-alcohol rule. B deserves, or may deserve, that sanction, 
under our general theory of sanctions; retributivism is, or may be, 
true. Thus, it is, or may be, a matter of indifference, for purposes of 
our theory of sanctions, whether B is sanctioned pursuant to the no­
alcohol rule or an anti-fraud rule. But the choice of rule is not, all 
things considered, a matter of moral indifference, because to sanc­
tion B as a "black" (regardless of her fraud) is to do her serious 
wrong. When we add our theory of equality to our theory of sanc­
tions, even the retributivist can agree that there is sufficient and 
compelling moral reason for a court to invalidate B's sanction -
and quite independent of further invalidating the no-alcohol rule. 
Thus, the Direct Account has finally gained a secure foothold 
within constitutional law. By using a stigma theory of equality, the 
defender of the Direct Account can finally explain, in a plausible 
and persuasive way, a central part of our constitutional jurispru­
dence - the jurisprudence of race discrimination. But how widely 
can she extend the stigma theory, beyond that central part? Let us 
continue cycling through the variants of ALCOHOL. The defender 
of the Direct Account might plausibly extend Brest's theory to the 
case where a rule prohibits women between eighteen and twenty­
one from purchasing alcohol, and a woman W who has breached 
the rule is sanctioned for doing so.243 But what about the case in 
which a man M is sanctioned pursuant to a rule prohibiting alcohol 
sales to men? I take this variant directly from the Court's decision 
in Craig v. Boren244 - remember that the Oklahoma statute invali­
dated in Craig prohibited the sale of low-alcohol beer to men be­
tween eighteen and twenty-one245 - and that feature of Craig is 
hardly unusual for the Supreme Court case law on gender discrimi­
nation. As one scholar has noted: "It has become notorious that in 
almost all the major sex discrimination cases decided by the 
Supreme Court, the prevailing plaintiff was a man."246 
So explaining the M variant of ALcoHoL is a serious problem · 
for the defender of Direct Account - and it cannot be resolved, I 
suggest, using the stigma theory. The enactment of a rule prohibit­
ing the sale of alcohol to men is not plausibly taken as evidence of 
the causal role that false beliefs about the moral inferiority of men 
243. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 219, at 118-27 (arguing that women are stigmatized by 
gender-discriminatory laws). 
244. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
245. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 191-92. 
246. KOPPELMAN, supra note 219, at 133. 
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played in the enactment of that rule. Just the opposite: at most it is 
plausibly taken (if morally suboptimal), just like the enactment of 
the W variant, as evidence of the causal role that false beliefs about 
the moral inferiority of women played in the enactment of the rule. 
Andrew Koppelman, a leading advocate of the extension of the 
stigma theory from race to gender, argues thus in his discussion of 
Michael M. v. Superior Court247 - a case where the law, as in 
Craig, provided more stringent treatment for men than women. 
[This case] involved a constitutional challenge to California's statu­
tory rape law, which criminalized sexual intercourse with a female 
(but not with a male) under the age of eighteen . . . .  The law's likely 
effect was "legitimating stereotypes of male aggressiveness and fe­
male vulnerability, as well as double standards of morality that tradi­
tionally have served to repress women's sexual expression."248 
Perhaps the stigma theory furnishes reason to invalidate the no­
alcohol-for-men rule - but what this theory warrants is the invali­
dation of the rule, not merely M's own treatment.249 Sanctioning M 
pursuant to the no-alcohol-for-men rule does not stigmatize him, in 
the way that sanctioning W pursuant to the no-alcohol-for-women 
rule stigmatizes her, and sanctioning B pursuant to the no-alcohol­
for-blacks rule stigmatizes B. 
So I take the stigma theory to have gained the Direct Account a 
secure, but only a small foothold within constitutional law. A 
stigma-based Direct Account explains only a portion of current 
equal protection law: the B and W variants of ALCOHOL. It does 
not explain the M variant of ALCOHOL, and it explains none of our 
remaining stylized cases, with the possible exception of ABORTION. 
"Moral inferiority" is an essential part of the stigma theory; it is 
what makes the theory powerful and persuasive.250 What consti­
tutes a moral insult to X, sufficient to justify overturning her sanc­
tion even if the rule R is not further invalidated, and even if X 
herself has performed wrong, is the belief of the legislators who 
enacted R (or their ascription of such a belief to their constituents) 
that X is a moral inferior. No rule in our remaining stylized cases, 
with the possible exception of ABORTION, evidences such a belief 
about the sanctioned Xs. 
247. 450 U.S. 464 (1981). 
248. KOPPELMAN, supra note 219, at 144-45 (quoting DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND 
GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 102 (1989)). Even if a rule can be stigmatic 
independent of prejudice in tbe rule's history, see supra note 242, it is implausible tbat a rule 
discriminating against men (in our society, today) signals tbeir inferiority. 
249. See infra text accompanying note 276 (discussing problem of marginal contribution). 
250. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (condemning race dis­
crimination because it stigmatizes blacks as inferior); Brest, supra note 238, at 8-12 (same). 
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3. Process Theories 
Our alcohol-drinking M may still have hope. A theory of equal­
ity that demands the equal treatment of "similarly situated" persons 
fails to explain why the Direct Account holds true for M, W, or B in 
ALcoHoL; a theory of equality that demands freedom from unfair 
stigma works for W and B, but not M; yet there remains the possi­
bility that a "process" theory of equality can help M. 251 That kind 
of theory has its origin in the oft-quoted footnote four of Carolene 
Products, 252 and has been given its most salient scholarly exposition 
by John Hart Ely in his book Democracy and Distrust.253 As Ely 
explains: 
In a representative democracy value determinations are to be made 
by our elected representatives, and if in fact most of us disapprove we 
can vote them out of office. Malfunction occurs when the process is 
undeserving of truth, when . . . though no one is actually denied a 
voice or a vote, representatives beholden to an effective majority are 
systematically disadvantaging some minority out of simple hostility or 
a prejudiced refusal to recognize commonalities of interest, and 
thereby denying that minority the protection afforded other groups by 
a representative system.254 
As the passage suggests, a process theory trades essentially on the 
political role of prejudice (which I would construe as false beliefs 
about the moral inferiority of the targeted group, and perhaps re­
lated types of false beliefs, for example, certain stereotypes). One 
can develop the theory in two different ways: (1) by arguing that it 
is intrinsically or instrumentally important for citizens to participate 
in the political process, and that prejudice prevents the targeted 
group from participating, or (2) by arguing that a rule that the legis­
lator enacts by virtue of some prejudice of hers tends to be morally 
amiss, because prejudice is by definition a false belief and decisions 
predicated upon false beliefs tend to be wrong. 
251. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 219, at 13-56 (surveying process theories within scholar­
ship on discrimination). 
252. See United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) ("Nor need we 
enquire [here] . . .  whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special 
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operations of those political processes ordina­
rily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more 
searching judicial inquiry."). 
253. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
(1980). 
254. Id. at 103. 
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Although Ely intends to argue for version one of the process 
theory,255 I believe that version two is the better one256 - and in 
any event it is version two that helps M in ALCOHOL. M can hardly 
say that, because women failed to participate in the process of en­
acting the no-alcohol-for-men rule, his own treatment is unfair.257 
What M can say is that, because certain prejudices about women 
figured in the enactment of the rule, the rule's formulation does not 
meet minimum moral standards of epistemic reliability. Legislators 
who believe that men are superior to, or otherwise morally distinct 
from women, are likely to miscalculate the empirical effects, and 
normative significance, of the various actions that men and women 
perform. They may wrongly believe, for example, that young men 
are typically brash, or daring, or brave, and likely to run the risk of 
driving drunk.258 A false belief about M's station, superior or not, 
may be tied up with false beliefs about his high willingness to take 
risks or do harm. M cannot complain of being stigmatized by a rule 
that discriminates against men, nor can he say necessarily that he 
has been treated unequally relative to similar actors, but M can say 
that he has been denied the minimum epistemic work to which he is 
entitled - the epistemic work of a legislature that knows, at least, 
the basic truth of the equal worth and station of men and women. 
This is, of course, just the idea of epistemi� rights that I earlier 
considered and rejected.259 The problem with the idea, as I have 
suggested, is that it dilutes the case for judicial review, relative to 
the Derivative Account. The idea of epistemi� rights is feasible 
and nondilutive only in contexts where courts have direct, historical 
evidence about the prejudices that figured in a rule's formulation; 
and further where courts are not well-placed to determine whether 
morality requires a change in the rule's predicate. That may be 
true, for example, of nonconstitutional judicial review in the admin­
istrative law context; but it is not true in the equal protection con-
255. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 219, at 39 (noting that "Ely purports to offer a constitu­
tional theory . . .  in which judicial review is concerned solely with 'what might capaciously be 
designated process writ large - with ensuring broad participation in the processes and distri­
butions of government'" (footnote omitted) (quoting ELY, supra note 253, at 87)). 
256. See infra text accompanying note 400 (describing counterintuitive consequences of 
first variant). 
257. M could say, I suppose, that the existence of prejudice against women, by preventing 
women from participating in a rule's formulation, has the instrumental effect of making the 
rule less reliable. This construal of version one of process theory is subject to the same kind 
of objection that I advance, here, against version two. It merely provides M a kind of episte­
miez right. 
258. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 202 n.14 (1976) (noting stereotype that " 'reckless' 
young men [will] drink and drive"). 
259. See supra text accompanying notes 218-25. 
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text, and Ely does not mean to claim otherwise.260 Rather, Ely 
suggests, courts should scrutinize rule-predicates as evidence of the 
prejudices that may have motivated rule-formulators. 
[T]he "special scrutiny" that is afforded suspect classifications . . .  in­
sists that the classification in issue fit the goal invoked in its defense 
more closely than any alternative classification would. There is only 
one goal the classification is likely to fit that closely, however, and that 
is the goal the legislators actually had in mind. If that goal cannot be 
invoked because it is unconstitutional, the classification will fall. 
Thus, fu,nctionally, special scrutiny, in particular its demand for an es­
sentially perfect fit, turns out to be a way of ''flushing out" unconstitu­
tional motivation . . . .  261 
But Ely's claim gets matters quite backwards. It is like saying that, 
because a tortfeasor caused harm to a victim, we have evidence that 
the tortfeasor imposed a risk on the victim.262 What matters mor­
ally about the tortfeasor - or at least what matters more - is 
harming, not risking. Similarly, what matters more about ALco­
HOL - more than the fact that prejudices against women figured in 
the enactment of the no-alcohol rule, such that more epistemic 
work about M is needed - is that nonepistemic moral reason ob­
tains to invalidate the rule and to replace it with some kind of 
gender-neutral rule. If the predicate of the no-alcohol rule is mor­
ally imperfect, which is what the Court concluded in Craig v. Bo­
ren, 263 then the predicate may evidence the role of prejudices in the 
rule's enactment; but, more importantly, it shows that the rule 
should be repealed or amended. If the predicate of the no-alcohol 
rule is morally perfect (pace Craig), then we have not yet "flushed 
out" the prejudices that Ely would have us look for. A non-dilu­
tive, predicate-based defense of the Direct Account does not exist. 
4. The Group-Disadvantaging Principle 
Finally, I consider the theory of equality Owen Fiss advanced in 
his well-known article Groups and the Equal Protection Clause.264 
260. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 253, at 146 (noting the "proof problems of a . . .  direct 
inquiry [into legislative motivation"). For a real-world example, see Craig, 429 U.S. at 199-
200 n.7 (noting that "[Oklahoma's] purpose is not apparent from the face of the statute and 
the Oklahoma Legislature does not preserve statutory history materials capable of clarifying 
the objectives served by its legislative enactments"). 
261. Ely, supra note 253, at 146 (second emphasis added). 
262. See Perry, supra note 223, at 330-39 (arguing that risk is not harm, and ought not be 
compensable as harm in tort law). 
263. See Craig, 429 U.S at 204 {holding that "the relationship between gender and traffic 
safety [is] far too tenuous to satisfy [the constitutional] requirement that the gender-based 
difference be substantially related to achievement of the statutory objective"). 
264. Fiss, supra note 108; see also KOPPELMAN, supra note 219, at 76-92, 76 (surveying 
group-disadvantage theory within scholarship on discrimination: "[T]he group-disadvantage 
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Fiss argues that the Constitution prohibits practices that aggravate 
the subordinate position of a "specially disadvantaged group," 
paradigmatically blacks.265 Blacks are a "social group"266 - a so­
cial entity with a "distinct existence apart from its members"267 -
that "has been in a position of perpetual subordination," and whose 
"political power . . . is severely circumscribed. "268 As a conse­
quence, this social group falls within the protection of the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
Some state laws or practices may just be a mistake - they make all 
groups and all persons worse off, and equally so. These do not seem 
to be the concern of a constitutional provision cast in terms of equal­
ity. Equality is a relativistic idea. The concern should be with those 
laws or practices that particularly hurt a disadvantaged group. Such 
laws might enhance the welfare of society (or the better-off classes), 
or leave it the same; what is critical, however, is that the state law or 
practice aggravates (or perpetuates?) the subordinate position of a spe­
cially disadvantaged group. This is what the Equal Protection Clause 
prohibits.269 
Fiss intends this theory to be quite distinct from the other theories 
of equality that are current within constitutional law, and that I 
have here considered: a theory of equal treatment for similarly sit­
uated individuals, a stigma theory, and a process theory. Unlike the 
equal treatment theory, which focuses upon how individuals fare 
relative to others, Fiss's theory is explicitly a non-individualistic the­
ory. His concern is with the effect of laws and practices on "spe­
cially disadvantaged" groups, not on particular individuals: "[T]he 
Equal Protection Clause should be viewed as a prohibition against 
group-disadvantaging practices, not unfair treatment. . . .  [A] claim 
of individual unfairness [should be] put to one side . . . .  "270 And, 
by contrast with the stigma and process theories, for which it is cru­
cial that laws discriminate on the basis of race or be motivated by 
theory looks beyond process and signification to the substantive social position of blacks and 
other disadvantaged groups"). 
265. See generally Flss, supra note 108, at 147-70 (explicating and defending "group­
disadvantaging principle"). 
266. Id. at 154. 
267. Id. at 148. This, along with what F!Ss calls "interdependence" ("[t]he identity and 
well-being of the members of the group and the identity and well-being of the group are 
linked," id.), are in F!Ss's view the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a 
social group. 
268. Id. at 154-55. 
269. Id. at 157 (emphasis added). 
270. Id. at 160; see id. at 123, 148 (noting, and criticizing, individualistic cast of Tussman 
and tenBroek's theory). 
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racial prejudices,2 7 1  discrimination is not central to Fiss. Part of the 
point of Fiss's article is to show that a racially neutral law that, 
nonetheless, aggravates the subordinate position of blacks, should 
be unconstitutional. 21 2 
As I have already explained, equal protection doctrine does not 
currently reflect this kind of view. A reviewing court will not invali­
date the kind of law Fiss hopes to strike down - a racially neutral 
law that has a disparate impact upon blacks, and thereby aggravates 
their subordinate position. That has been the doctrine, for better or 
worse, since Washington v. Davis.273 So the defender of the Direct 
Account cannot hope to explain the current pattern of equal pro­
tection rights using a Fissian theory. But even if doctrine were to 
change, and disparate impact were to become the touchstone for 
equal protection law, the Direct Account would not hold true. 
Let us consider, once more, the B variant of ALcoHoL, now 
using a Fissian lens. A rule prohibits "black persons between eight­
een and twenty-one" from purchasing alcohol. A black person B 
purchases alcohol using a stolen credit card, and is sanctioned pur­
suant to the rule. Are there sufficient grounds for the reviewing 
court to invalidate B 's sanction, independent of further invalidating 
the no-alcohol rule? A Fissian defense of the Direct Account runs 
into two serious difficulties, here: the first concerns the individua­
tion of legal practices, and the second concerns the problem of mar­
ginal contribution. 
Fiss would invalidate legal practices that aggravate the 
subordinate position of blacks; if sanctioning B contributes to such 
a practice, then there is Fissian reason to overturn B's sanction. 
But is the relevant legal practice: (1) enforcing the no-alcohol rule 
against those blacks whose actions are not sanctionable under other 
descriptions, or rather (2) enforcing the no-alcohol rule, period? 
This is very like the problem of defining comparison classes that I 
discussed above, in the context of the Thssman/tenBroek theory of 
equality. Sanctioning B is part of the second practice, but not the 
first. 
Fiss stresses that his criterion for individuating "social groups " is 
natural, not artificial. 
271. See ELY, supra note 253, at 145-70 (arguing for judicial focus on "suspect classifica­
tions" as evidence of unconstitutional motivation); Brest, supra note 238, at 26, 44-53 (argu­
ing that discrimination, not disparate impact, is touchstone of Equal Protection Clause). 
272. See Flss, supra note 108, at 141-46, 157-60, 170. 
273. 426 U.S. 229 (1976); see supra text accompanying notes 98-102 (discussing Court's 
rejection of disparate impact as sufficient condition for invalidating laws under Equal Protec­
tion Clause). 
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[It] strikes me as odd to build a general interpretation of the Equal 
Protection Clause . . .  on the rejection of the idea that there are natu­
ral classes, that is, groups that have an identity and existence wholly 
apart from the challenged state statute or practice. There are natural 
classes, or social groups, in American society and blacks are such a 
group.274 
Fiss continues: "[The] Equal Protection Clause [does not extend to] 
what might be considered artificial classes, those created by a classi­
fication or criterion embodied in a state practice or statute . . . .  "21s 
If this nonartificiality principle carries over to the individuation of 
group-disadvantaging practices themselves, the Direct Account will 
likely fail. A criterion that confines the relevant "practice" to (1) 
enforcing that portion of the no-alcohol rule that covers only blacks 
whose actions are not sanctionable under other rules, is nonar­
tificial in the following sense: B's sanction will not contribute to the 
relevant Fissian "practice," whether she is sanctioned pursuant to 
the no-alcohol rule or instead for fraud. By contrast, a criterion 
that individuates the Fissian practice as (2) enforcing the entire no­
alcohol rule, is artificial in the following, interesting sense: B's 
sanction will contribute to the Fissian practice if she is sanctioned 
pursuant to the no-alcohol rule, but will not contribute if she is 
sanctioned for the very same action of hers pursuant to a rule 
prohibiting fraud. 
But even if one individuates the Fissian practice along the lines 
of (2) rather than (1), the Direct Account likely fails. The problem 
here is the problem of marginal contribution.276 The relevant prac­
tice, let us assume, is (2) enforcing the no-alcohol rule. Relative to 
a world in which the no-alcohol rule is repealed, fully enforcing the 
no-alcohol rule aggravates the subordinate position of the black 
group. Only blacks are sanctioned pursuant to the rule, and only 
blacks are coerced not to purchase alcohol. But relative to a world 
in which the no-alcohol rule is fully in force, \vith the exception of 
B's sanction, fully enforcing the no-alcohol rule only marginally ag-
274. Fiss, supra note 108, at 148. 
275. Id. at 156. 
276. The idea that a particular action (here, sanctioning B) might be innocent by virtue of 
its marginal contribution to some disfavored state-of-the-world, even though a general prac­
tice of performing actions "like this" (however precisely that is defined) has bad conse­
quences, is hardly a new one. That idea is precisely what helped animate rule-utilitarianism. 
See LYONS, supra note 123, at 2-17; ScARRE, supra note 46, at 122-32. Lyons claims, fa­
mously, that act- and rule-utilitarianism are extensionally equivalent; but that does not entail 
that the enforcement of a textually entrenched rule cannot have overall consequences that 
are different from the consequences of an application. See SCHAUER, supra note 58, at 79-85 
(arguing that Lyons's proof does not apply to "rules" understood as entrenched 
generalizations). 
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gravates the subordinate position of the black group. B's sanction, 
taken alone, has only a vanishingly small effect on the social posi­
tion of the black group. (The sanction is hard on B, but as we have 
seen, Fiss's concern is for blacks as a group, not for particular black 
individuals.) Therefore the Direct Account is false: the court does 
not have sufficient reason to overturn B's sanction, independent of 
further invalidating the no-alcohol rule. After all, B is a wrongdoer 
under another description; if she is not sanctioned pursuant to the 
no-alcohol rule, she may not be sanctioned at all. The vanishing 
contribution that freeing her makes to the social position of blacks 
is not weighty enough to outweigh the demands of retributive 
justice. 
The Fissian theory may provide a reviewing court reason to re­
peal or amend the no-alcohol rule, given the cumulative contribu­
tion that sanctioning and coercing lots of black individuals has on 
the subordinate position of the black group. But it does not pro­
vide the reviewing court a reason to invalidate B's sanction, without 
more, regardless of how we individuate practices for Fissian 
purposes. 
C. Authority 
I have considered, under the rubric of a theory of justified sanc­
tions, and the rubric of a theory of equality, a wide range of possi­
ble defenses of the Direct Account. A justified-sanction defense 
might be nonepistemic or epistemic. As for the first, I considered 
several plausible rule-dependent theories of sanctioning (specifi­
cally, expressive and deterrent theories); as for the second, I consid­
ered several plausible theories of epistemic rights (what I called 
epistemic1 rights and epistemiez rights). And under the rubric of 
equality, I analyzed seriatim the four specific theories most visible 
within constitutional scholarship and doctrine: (1) a Tussman/ 
tenBroek theory of equal treatment, (2) a stigma theory, (3) a pro­
cess theory, and (4) a group-disadvantaging theory. I have argued 
that none of these defenses underwrites the Direct Account for any 
of our stylized cases, with the following exception: the stigma the­
ory explains the B and W variants (but not the M variant) of ALco­
HOL. This is a modest harvest, indeed, for the Direct Account. 
Are there further moral arguments that the defender of the Di­
rect Account might advance? If it is true in our stylized cases (leav­
ing aside the B and W variants of ALcoHoL) that X's sanction is 
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(prima facie )277 justified under a nonepistemic theory of sanctions; 
that constitutionally sufficient epistemic work has been done to de­
termine that; and that X has no equality claim sufficient to warrant 
overturning her sanction independent of further invalidating the 
rule R under which it falls, then it is hard to see what further argu­
ments (more or less connected to the moral criteria at stake in our 
stylized cases) remain for our defender. I see only one real possibil­
ity, and I will briefly consider that here.21s 
That possibility is a theory of authority. By "authority" I mean 
what the term means within contemporary jurisprudence: a rule 
has "authority" if the enactment of that rule, in some way, provides 
the actors and/or state officials subject to the rule additional reason 
(in particular, additional moral reason) to do what the rule autho­
rizes or requires.279 "Reason" here is meant to encompass both 
277. I say "prima facie" to leave open the possibility that the sanction might be, all things 
considered, unjustified, say because it violates an equality norm. 
278. What about a defense of the Direct Account based on legislative motivation? The 
idea of illegitimate legislative motivation, or purpose, has long been popular within constitu­
tional scholarship. See Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of 
Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REv. 95; John Hart Ely, Legislative and 
Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 19 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970); Symposium, Leg­
islative Motivation, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 925 (1978). For a recent, important addition to 
this scholarship, see Pildes, supra note 166, at 761 (arguing that constitutional rights "are 
ways to channel the kind of reasons and justifications government can act on in different 
domains"). Note however that the idea of illegitimate legislative motivation is ambiguous 
and, without further elaboration, unhelpful. To say that the legislator's motivation is "illegiti­
mate" is to say that it is, somehow, morally problematic - but how? 
I see four cogent ways to cash out the illegitimate-motivation idea within the Direct Ac­
count. One might say that the rule-formulator's mental state (motivation, etc.) in formulat­
ing rule R has: (1) direct moral import, in rendering X's otherwise-innocent treatment 
pursuant to R wrongful; or (2) epistemic import, in requiring that society do more work to 
determine the propriety of that treatment; or (3) import for authority, in depriving R of au­
thority; or (4) import for culpability, in making the rule-formulator culpable for the wrong 
done to X. But I have considered, or will consider, each of the first three possibilities: the 
first maps onto the stigma theory, the second onto the idea of epistemiei rights, and the third 
onto the notion of authority. As for the fourth: absent some independent explanation why 
X's treatment is wrong, the rule-formulator's culpability does not explain why we should 
overturn it. At best it explains why we should punish the rule-formulator. 
279. See Hurd, supra note 169, at 1615-20 (discussing "theoretical authority," "influential 
authority," and "practical authority"). Each of these represents a different way that an utter­
ance might, arguably, change the moral reasons bearing upon the actor who receives the 
utterance. The utterance of a "theoretical" authority provides the actor with a first-order 
reason for belief; the utterance of an "influential" authority provides the actor with a first­
order reason for action; the utterance of a "practical" authority provides the actor with a 
second-order reason for action. We should note a fourth possibility: that an utterance might 
provide the actor a second-order reason for belief. 
Each of these fotlr possibilities is indeed represented in the literature on authority. See id. 
at 1667-77 (arguing that authority consists of first-order reasons for belief); Michael S. 
Moore, Authority, Law, and Razian Reasons, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 827, 871 (1989) (first-order 
reasons for action); RAz, supra note 169, at 23-69 (second-order reasons for action); Donald 
H. Regan, Authority and Value: Reflections on Raz's Morality of Freedom, 62 S. CAL. L. 
REv. 995, 1001-18 (1989) (second-order reasons for belief). For other recent work on author­
ity, see Larry Alexander, Law and Exclusionary Reasons, PHIL. TOPICS, Spring 1990, at 5; 
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reasons for belief and reasons for action - a distinction whose im­
port will soon become apparent. 
Authority, in this sense, is fundamental to law and legal systems. 
It is, obviously, a fundamental moral question whether and how the 
enactment of legal rules changes moral requirements. Is there a 
moral obligation to obey the law? We will need a theory of author­
ity to answer that. Further, the concept of authority may have con­
ceptual significance in delineating the very concept of law. One can 
plausibly say that a given deontic proposition - such as "No vehi­
cles may be driven in the park," or "All adult males must deliver a 
sacrifice for the Sun God" - only exists as a legal rule if, at a mini­
mum, a sufficient number of actors, or at least state officials, take 
the proposition to be authoritative, claim to do so, or are instructed 
to do so by other rules.280 Relatedly, what it means to be sanc­
tioned "pursuant to" a particular legal rule R is plausibly something 
like this: it means that state officials impose a sanction upon you, 
by virtue of the moral reasons that these officials take or claim R's 
enactment to create. 
The following idea might therefore seem tempting to the de-
fender of the Direct Account: 
Constitutional Rights as Authority-Rights 
If X has been sanctioned pursuant to a rule R that truly lacks 
authority, for her281 - if the enactment of the rule R does not 
create fresh moral reason for X to do what the rule requires, 
and does not create fresh moral reason for state officials to 
sanction X when she breaches the rule - then there is suffi­
cient moral reason to overturn X's sanction, independent of 
further invalidating R. For to say that state officials have sanc­
tioned X "pursuant to" R means that these officials have taken 
or claimed R to be authoritative, with respect to X; and by hy­
pothesis R is not authoritative in this way. 
LESLIE GREEN, THE AUTIIORITY OF THE STATE (1988); Stephen R. Perry, Second-Order 
Reasons, Uncertainty and Legal Theory, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 913 (1989); and SCHAUER, supra 
note 58, at 128-34. 
280. See SCHAUER, supra note 58, at 126 ("[T]o say that a rule exists within some deci­
sional environment is . . .  to say that the decision-makers in that environment . . .  treat the 
rule as relevant to the decisions they are called upon to make."). Arguably, a legal rule can 
exist where state officials do not take or claim it as authoritative, but are simply instructed to 
do so, e.g., a conduct rule that is legally valid and enforceable under applicable rules gov­
erning the enactment and enforcement of conduct-rules, but that state officials and actors are 
now ignoring. 
281. I say "for her" because authority may be piecemeal. See Moore, supra note 279, at 
833-37 (discussing piecemeal cast of authority, within Razian account, for citizens if not state 
officials). 
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But this idea, tempting as it might seem, is flat wrong. I will as­
sume, for the sake of argument, that the rules in our stylized cases 
lack true authority, for some or even all of the actors or state offi­
cials subject to these rules. Even so, the Direct Account does not 
obtain. Why not? Because the premise that rule R lacks authority, 
with respect to X and the officials who sanction X pursuant to R -
the officials who, let us assume, incorrectly talce or claim the rule to 
provide fresh reason for sanctioning X - does not in fact warrant 
the conclusion that there is sufficient moral reason to overturn X's 
own sanction, independent of further invalidating the rule under 
which the sanction falls. 
Let us back up a moment. Why might a legal rule R possess true 
authority? How might R's enactment change the moral reasons 
bearing upon the actors and/or state officials subject to R? This is a 
question of much currency and controversy among legal theorists. 
One view of authority - the revisionist view - sees legal authority 
as merely epistemic.282 On this view, the enactment of a legally au­
thoritative rule merely changes the reasons for belief that actors and 
state officials subject to the rule possess. Because the rule­
formulator is epistemically reliable, her enactment of R constitutes 
a fresh reason for those actors to believe that the actions identified 
by R are wrongful, and for state officials to believe that those ac­
tions are sanctionable. As Heidi Hurd explains: 
One in a position to give good advice concerning how another 
ought to act in certain circumstances possesses theoretical authority, 
at least over some range of deontic propositions. The utterances of a 
theoretical authority provide reasons for belief, not reasons for ac­
tions. They function, that is, evidentially. When a theoretical author­
ity makes a claim concerning right action, its utterance provides a 
reason to think that there are other reasons (besides the sheer fact 
that the authority has spoken) to act as recommended. The prescrip­
tions of such a theoretieal authority are thus heuristic guides to de­
tecting the existence and determining the probable truth of 
antecedently existing reasons for action.283 
Hurd argues that legal authority does this, and no more: an author­
itative legal rule, issued by a sufficiently reliable legislator, simply 
evidences preexisting moral requirements.284 
282. This is a little tricky. Someone who believes that authority entails reasons for action, 
as does Raz, might nonetheless believe that an authoritative utterance changes the subject's 
reasons for action by virtue of the authority's epistemic capacities - as does Raz. See supra 
note 169 (discussing epistemic strain in Raz). But Raz does not believe that authority is 
merely epistemic, in the sense of merely changing the subject's reasons for belief. Hurd does. 
283. Hurd, supra note 169, at 1615. 
284. See id. at 1667-77. 
October 1998] Rights Against Rules 85 
Assume Hurd is correct. Then to say that the flag-desecration 
rule, etc., lacks "authority" for X is simply to say that, for the par­
ticular action of flag-desecration X performed, the fact that this ac­
tion fell under the flag-desecration rule created no reason for X to 
believe the action wrong, and now creates no reason for state offi­
cials to believe the action sanctionable. In short, all the Hurdian 
can say, in defense of the Direct Account, is that we ought to per­
form more epistemic work to determine whether X should be sanc­
tioned. On the Hurdian view, authoritative legal . rules function 
only to facilitate our moral inquiry; thus the claim that the flag­
desecration rule, etc., lacks authority with respect to X's sanction 
can only entail that we must inquire further into the wrongfulness 
of X's action. 
So a Hurdian authority-right must be some kind of epistemic 
right. But which X's have this epistemic right as a constitutional 
matter? Surely not every X for whom a rule lacks authority. Again, 
if Y is sanctioned pursuant to a rule R that prohibits "the sale of 
filled milk" (enacted by legislators who have been "captured" by 
competing manufacturers), and Y is a nutritionist who appreciates 
the true benefits of filled milk, then this rule likely lacks Hurdian 
authority for Y.285 But sanctioning Y doesn't violate his constitu­
tional rights.286 Thus the Hurdian defender of the Direct Account 
must identify either some constitutionally special propertx of X's 
action that works as an epistemic trigger, or some constitutionally 
special error-type that infects the process of formulating rules, and 
deprives them of authority. In short, a Hurdian authority-right will 
be very much like what I earlier called an · epistemic1 right or an 
epistemiez right. I have already discussed why these types of episte­
mic rights do not underwrite the Direct Account, and I will not be­
labor the discussion here. 
What if Hurd is wrong? Hurd's epistemic view of legal author­
ity is, as I have said, revisionist. By contrast, on the traditional 
view, legal authority is more than epistemic. It involves reasons for 
action, and not just reasons for belief. For the traditionalist, the 
enactment of a truly authoritative rule actually changes - indeed, 
displaces287 - what morality requires of the actors and/or state offi-
285. Cf. RAz, supra note 169, at 100 (noting that "[t]he authority of the state may be 
greater over some individuals than over others . . . .  [One person] may prefer to decide for 
himself, and be willing to invest the time and effort it takes to enable himself to decide 
wisely"). It is hard to see how a Hurdian could disagree with this claim. 
286. See supra text accompanying notes 206-10. 
287. "Displaces" entails second-order reasons for action, while "changes" merely entails 
first-order ones. See supra note 279. 
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cials subject to the rule, rather than merely evidencing preexisting 
moral requirements. As Hurd explains, summarizing the traditional 
view: 
One who utters a command certainly purports to give another a new 
reason for action. The mother who instructs her son to take his um­
brella intends her son to take the very fact that she has issued such a 
command as itself a reason for using an umbrella. If the mother is 
asked by her son why he must carry the despised object, the mother 
can well be expected to invoke the time-honored reason, "Because I 
told you to," and to anticipate that this very fact will be a reason 
above and beyond the ones that the child antecedently had to take his 
umbrella. [Indeed] the "Because I told you to" purports to give more 
than just a new reason for action . . . .  Rather [it] purports to give the 
son, by itself, a normatively sufficient reason to take his umbrella: it 
implicitly claims . . .  to bar action on his part in accordance with the 
reasons that he previously possessed not to take his umbrella.288 
This traditional view of authority might seem to give comfort to the 
defender of the Direct Account, for then the claim that the fiag­
desecration rule, etc., lacks "authority" for X does not reduce to the 
epistemic claim that we need to do more epistemic work about X 
Rather, and more robustly, the traditionalist can say that the fiag­
desecration rule, etc., has failed to perform the morally transforma­
tive function - for X and the state officials sanctioning her - that 
truly authoritative rules perform. 
But so what? If the rule was not traditionally authoritative, then 
it did not provide X moral reason to refrain from performing her 
action. But this does not mean that X lacked any moral reason 
whatsoever to refrain from performing that action. If the action was 
also an action of battery, etc., then X had moral reason not to per­
form it because (1) the action was morally wrong, quite independ­
ent of falling under any legal rule; · and further (2) the action 
presumably violated another authoritative rule, viz., the rule against 
battery, etc. The traditional theory of authority is not a theory of 
the necessary conditions for moral wrongdoing; no one believes 
that, unless an action is illegal, it is not immoral.289 Rather, the 
traditional theory identifies a sufficient condition for moral wrong­
doing: violating an authoritative legal rule. So, whether or not the 
rules in our stylized examples possessed traditional authority, X's 
actions were morally wrong - and that is doubly true if they vio­
lated authoritative rules picking out "battery," etc. 
288. Hurd, supra note 169, at 1618. 
289. See Adler, supra note 4, at 803-04 (criticizing super-shallow moral conventionalism). 
As Joel Feinberg puts it: "One can wrongfully kill whether or not there is a criminal law of 
homicide." FEINBERG, supra note 57, at 20. 
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As for the decision by state officials to sanction X: if retributiv­
ism is true, then these officials had sufficient moral reason to sane.,. 
tion X, quite independent of whether the rule they took as 
authoritative possessed traditional authority, or satisfied other "ex­
pressive" or deterrent conditions. (If retributivism is true then 
these officials (1) had sufficient reason to sanction X, independent 
of her action falling under any rule, and further (2) sufficient reason 
to sanction X, by virtue of her breaching a rule that was authorita­
tive, albeit a rule different from the one actually applied by the offi­
cials.) The traditional theory of authority does not displace theories 
of sanctioning, just as it does not displace theories of moral wrong­
doing. It is, again, not a theory of the necessary conditions for state 
officials to impose a sanction, but a theory of the sufficient condi­
tions. The traditional theory says that, if the state enacts an author­
itative decision rule, state officials have sufficient reason to sanction 
actions violating the rule. It does not say that, absent such a rule, 
state officials have no such reason. 
D. Duties Rather than Sanctions? 
This Part has considered, at some length, whether the Direct 
Account holds true for sanctions: whether moral reason might ob­
tain for a court to overturn X's sanction pursuant to a rule R, in­
dependent of further invalidating the rule, and despite the fact that 
the action by virtue of which X has received that sanction is (or 
might be) proscribable under a different description. I have fo­
cused specifically upon sanctions, rather than discussing sanctions 
and duties together, because of the analytic clarity that a focused 
discussion brings; and, as between sanctions and duties, I have fo­
cused on sanctions, rather than duties, because (under Supreme 
Court doctrine) it is paradigmatically the imposition of a sanction 
upon X that gives her a justiciable, constitutional complaint. No 
one doubts that, where X has performed an action in breach of a 
rule R, and has been prosecuted, convicted, and sanctioned for that 
breach, the prerequisites for constitutional adjudication will be sat­
isfied: X will have "standing" to challenge the sanction, her claim 
will be "ripe" and not "moot," and the judicial decision will not be 
merely advisory.29° By contrast, at least in the past, the jus­
ticiability of a constitutional challenge by some X to a legal duty 
290. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JurusDICTION Ch. 2 {2d ed. 1994) (surveying 
justiciability requirements); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 86-94, 92 (1947) 
{dismissing as nonjusticiable a pre-enforcement free speech challenge to the Hatch Act, but 
permitting a challenge where the claimant had already been charged with a violation of the 
Act and a proposed sanction had been entered; "[t]his [post-enforcement] proceeding so lim-
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that she has not yet breached has been open to question.291 Does 
the duty imposed by R truly constitute a setback for X? Does it 
truly coerce her? Does she truly intend to perform actions that 
breach R and, if so, is there a realistic chance that she will be prose­
cuted and sanctioned for doing so? These kinds of questions, at 
least in the past, gave the Supreme Court some pause in permitting 
prospective constitutional challenges to duties; and although such 
justiciability concerns have over the last half century largely faded 
from view, there are signs that they may, yet again, become impor­
tant.292 These concerns make good sense within the Direct Ac­
count, because on that account the purpose of constitutional 
adjudication is to relieve X of an improper legal setback to her. If 
X's duty is, in truth, no real setback at all, then on the Direct Ac­
count judicial intervention is unwarranted. 
Thus my focus, in this Part, upon sanctions rather than duties. 
But, as we have seen, the sanction-focused Direct Account fails to 
measure up. It fails to explain why the paradigmatic setback to X 
- a sanction - should be invalidated in most of our stylized cases. 
This failure might prompt the advocate of the Direct Account to 
reconfigure her defense of that view. She might claim that duties, 
even more than sanctions, should be seen as the central treatment­
types that constitutional claimants are entitled to challenge. For ex­
ample, where a would-be :flag-desecrator X brings a prospective 
challenge to a rule that stipulates "no person shall desecrate a flag 
of the United States," perhaps the Direct Account successfully ex­
plains why moral reason obtains for a court to free X from that 
duty, independent of further invalidating the :flag-desecration rule? 
Or perhaps not. A duty-focused reconfiguration of the Direct 
Account poses a number of serious difficulties. The first concerns 
the overall simplicity and coherence of such an account. The Deriv­
ative Account provides a simple and unified theory of judicial re­
view: a constitutional challenge by X to R, whether a prospective 
or a retrospective challenge, is simply an occasion for judicial repeal 
or amendment of R. By contrast, even if the Direct Account suc­
ceeds in showing that X's prospective challenge to R concerns the 
moral propriety of X's own duty, the problem remains that (as I 
ited meets the requirements of defined rights and a defined threat to interfere with a posses· 
sor of the menaced rights by a penalty for an act done in violation of the claimed restraint"). 
291. See Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 86-91. 
292. See infra text accompanying notes 588-97 (discussing justiciability of duties, particu· 
larly the ripeness of preenforcement constitutional challenges to conduct-regulating and 
other rules). 
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have argued at length) X's retrospective challenge to her sanction 
under R cannot be equally "personal." What, then, is the function, 
within a duty-focused Direct Account, of a retrospective constitu­
tional challenge? X's retrospective challenge to his sanction must 
be an occasion for judicial repeal or amendment of rule R or, at 
best, for judicial invalidation of X's duty (not merely his sanction). 
So we are left with a complex, hybrid account where challenges to 
certain legal setbacks (duties) concern the moral propriety of those 
particular setbacks, but challenges to other setbacks (sanctions) do 
not. 
A second and even more serious problem is this: refocusing the 
Direct Account on duties rather than sanctions does not eliminate 
the problem of multiple description that our stylized cases are 
meant to exemplify, and that bedeviled the sanction-focused ac­
count. The problem was that the particular action, which X per­
formed in breach of R and by virtue of which he was sanctioned, 
might be wrongful under another description. X's action of flag­
desecration might also be an action of pollution, arson, or battery, 
and yet his sanction pursuant to the flag-desecration rule would 
nonetheless violate the First Amendment. None of the defenses of 
the Direct Account that I explored could make sense of this crucial 
feature of constitutional rights. Now, it is tempting to think that the 
problem of multiple description disappears when we tum from 
sanctions to duties - the flag.:.desecration rule prohibits X, pro­
spectively, from performing a class of actions, some of which may 
prove harmless - but this temptation should be avoided. Imagine 
two actors, X1 and X2• X1 is a violent anarchist, who seeks to fo­
ment disorder by burning stolen flags, or by burning them in prox­
imity to bystanders; X1 's actions of flag-desecration are, virtually 
always, wrongful under other descriptions. X21 by contrast, is a pac­
ifi.st war-protester, who eschews physical violence and takes great 
care to ensure that his actions of flag-desecration are innocent of 
nonexpressive wrong. Morality might well require that X21 but not 
Xz, be freed from the duty that the flag-desecration rule imposes 
upon these actors. The mix of actions that X2 would perform, but 
for the existence of a legal rule prohibiting flag-desecration, is dif­
ferent from the mix that X1 would perform; and the morality of 
subjecting each actor to the no-flag-desecration duty should, it 
seems, depend in part upon this personal mix. 
Th.is poses a dilemma for the defender of the Direct Account. 
Either she insists (1) that the constitutionality of X's duty under 
rule R does not depend at all upon the personal mix of actions that 
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X would perform, but for R; or she says (2) that the constitutional­
ity of X's duty under R does depend in part upon X's personal mix. 
The first alternative is unattractive, because the defender must then 
confront the problem of explaining why, as a moral matter, both X1 
and X2 have a moral right to be freed from their respective duties 
pursuant to R, independent of their respective personal mixes. This 
is the precise analogue of the problem that, in the case of sanctions, 
the Direct Account was unable to resolve. The second alternative 
is unattractive because it forces a dramatic revision of existing con­
stitutional practice: in practice, adjudication of prospective consti­
tutional challenges does not involve a judicial inspection of the 
claimant's personal act-mix.293 
Finally, a duty-focused Direct Account runs into serious difficul­
ties with cases such as RESIDENTIAL PICKETING, ANIMAL SACRI­
FICE, and the M variant of .ALcoHOL,294 where - quite apart from 
this issue of multiple description - there is no apparent moral rea­
son to overturn the claimant's own duty.295 Consider RESIDENTIAL 
PICKETING: a rule provides that "no person shall picket a residence 
or dwelling, except for persons engaged in labor picketing." X, a 
nonlabor picketer, challenges his own duty pursuant to this rule. 
Assume that the actions X would perform, but for the rule, are not 
wrongful under other descriptions; freed from the rule, X would 
simply engage in otherwise-innocent actions of residential picket­
ing. Even so, it is hard to see why it would violate X's moral rights 
to subject him to the no-picketing rule, given that - as the Court 
has held - the constitutional problem in RESIDENTIAL PICKETING 
could be cured by a broader rule without the exemption for labor 
picketing. 296 
Can X say that he has been treated unequally, relative to labor 
picketers, and that this is why his own moral rights are violated by 
the narrower but not broader no-picketing rule? This equal treat­
ment rationale might explain the M variant of .ALCOHOL, which in­
volves the Equal Protection Clause, but it is less responsive to the 
moral concerns underlying the First Amendment, and therefore less 
293. See supra Part I (discussing morally limited, rather than morally complete, nature of 
judicial inquiry in constitutional cases). 
294. In the B and W variants of ALcoHoL, a stigma argument works for duties, as it does 
for sanctions. See supra section 11.B.2. 
295. Specifically, there is no apparent nonepistemic moral reason. An epistemic account 
is available, for duties as for sanctions, but - as I have already discussed - the epistemic 
account is dilutive. See supra text accompanying notes 220-25; supra section 11.B.3. 
296. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (upholding law generally barring residen­
tial picketing); infra text accompanying notes 370-83 (discussing rules that violate Discrimi­
nation Schema, such that these rules can be cured by broadening their scope). 
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persuasive for a case such as RESIDENTIAL PICKETING or ANIMAL 
SACRIFICE.297 Further, an equal treatment rationale for why the 
duties imposed in RESIDENTIAL PICKETING, ANIMAL SACRIFICE 
and ALCOHOL are morally problematic leads us back. to the prob­
lem of personal mix. Take, for example, a nineteen-year-old male 
M who is obliged not to purchase alcohol pursuant to a gender­
discriminatory rule. Whether he is in fact treated unequally com­
pared to others will depend on how the comparison class of 
"others" is defined - as we have already seen.298 If the relevant 
"others" are defined as M's moral equivalents in all respects (not 
just relative to the purposes of the rule), then the contours of that 
comparison class will, in turn, depend upon M's personal mix. And 
we are then back to the dilemma sketched out above: either judi­
cial review prescinds from the prospective challenger's personal mix 
(leaving the Direct Account on shaky ground) or it does not (forc­
ing a dramatic revision of existing constitutional practice). 
In short: for reasons of overall coherence and simplicity, and 
because of problems internal to a duty-focused Direct Account, 
reconfiguring the Direct Account around duties rather than sanc­
tions does not look to be a promising strategy for salvaging it. 
III. THE DERIVATIVE ACCOUNT 
The Direct Account makes robust moral demands on the con­
tent of constitutional rights. It claims that having a constitutional 
right entails the existence of sufficient moral reason for a court to 
overturn the rights-holder's duty or sanction, independent of fur­
ther invalidating the legal rule that imposes this duty upon the 
rights-holder, as well as others, and authorizes state officials to 
sanction her, as well as others. But cashing out this claim has 
proved morally tricky. It has proved tricky to show how moral rea­
son of this robust sort could obtain, at least for the substantive 
rights against conduct-regulating rules that now have currency 
within constitutional law: rights to free speech, free exercise, equal 
protection, and substantive due process. In Part II, I considered a 
variety of moral theories that might support the Direct Account: 
nonepistemic and epistemic theories of sanctioning; theories of 
equality; and theories of authority. These theories failed, singly and 
collectively, to do the requisite moral work. 
297. I take the antidiscrimination component of the First Amendment to be concerned 
with morally irrelevant properties, such as viewpoint or religious status, and not with equal 
treatment. See infra section III.A.2 (defending Discrimination Schema). 
298. See supra text accompanying notes 233-35. 
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It is time to defend a different view of constitutional rights: the 
Derivative Account. On that account, constitutional rights are 
morally derivative. To say that sanctioning X pursuant to rule R, or 
subjecting her to the duty that R imposes, is "unconstitutional" or 
"violates X's constitutional rights" is simply to say this: there is suf­
ficient moral reason to invalidate that rule. The Derivative Ac­
count conceptualizes judicial review as a legal institution whose 
function is the invalidation of rules, not merely the invalidation of 
the particular sanctions or duties of the rights-holders who happen 
to initiate the judicial process. By "invalidation," I mean a judicial 
utterance roughly equivalent in legal import to a legislative re­
peal. 299 A repeal is an utterance, by the rule-formulator (agency or 
legislature), that generally rescinds the legal force of the rule. It 
frees all actors from the legal duty that the enactment of the rule 
created, and deprives all state officials of the legal power to sanc­
tion actors pursuant to the rule. The Direct Account trades on a 
traditional, purist view of the powers of reviewing courts, that sees 
a court as empowered merely to rescind the duty of X and the 
power of state officials to sanction her. By contrast, the Derivative 
Account insists that - in order to make moral sense of constitu­
tional rights - reviewing courts must be understood to have rule­
repealing powers roughly equivalent to the repealing powers of 
agencies and legislatures, and to be exercising those broad powers 
whenever courts credit claims of "constitutional right" or hold the 
treatment of rights-holders to be "unconstitutional." 
Let me articulate the Derivative Account as clearly as possible: 
The Derivative Account 
To say that some rule R "violates X's constitutional rights" en­
tails the following: there is sufficient moral reason to change 
R's predicate in some measure, and X has the legal power to 
secure some kind of judicial invalidation of R. To say, more 
specifically, that a treatment of X (being sanctioned pursuant 
to a rule R, or subjecting X to the duty that R announces) "vio­
lates X's constitutional rights" entails the following: there is 
299. "Roughly" is meant to signal certain technical differences between judicial invalida­
tion and legislative repeals, such as these: a judicial invalidation might be a partial invalida­
tion or an extension rather than a facial invalidation, see infra text accompanying notes 414-
21; a judicial invalidation might leave open the possibility that a rule's authoritative inter­
preter can revive it through a narrowing construction, see infra text accompanying notes 416-
17; and a subsequent judicial overruling of the invalidation decision might "revive" the invali­
dated statute, see William Michael Treanor & Gene B. Sperling, Prospective Overruling and 
the Revival of "Unconstitutional" Statutes, 93 CoLUM. L. REv. 1902 (1993). But judicial inval­
idation is, crucially, like a legislative repeal in having general scope, rather than being con­
fined to a particular claimant. 
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sufficient moral reason to change R's predicate in some mea­
sure, and X has the legal power to secure some kind of judicial 
invalidation of R, including the invalidation of X's own 
treatment. 
93 
By a "rule," again, I mean a conduct-regulating, sanction-backed 
rule that has a canonical, written formulation and that becomes au­
thoritative through enactment by a legislature or agency. I assume 
that rules are individuated in some kind of text-based way.3oo That 
is, an "individual" rule is some textually-defined portion of the en­
tire corpus of canonically formulated rules - a single deontic sen­
tence, a single term in a deontic sentence, or a single provision 
made up of several sentences. How precisely to individuate rules is 
a technical problem that may depend in part on your precise con­
ception of free speech, equal protection, free exercise, and the 
other moral criteria referenced by the Bill of Rights. My defense of 
the Derivative Account is agnostic within the family of text-based 
individuation criteria, and is meant to be consistent with all of 
them. 
The Derivative Account says the following of a (textually indi­
'\<iduated) rule: there is sufficient moral reason301 to change in some 
measure the predicate of the rule. By this I mean the following: 
There is sufficient moral reason either (1) to narrow the scope of 
the rule R, that is, to exclude from the rule's coverage some class of 
actions now included within the rule, thereby freeing all actors from 
the duty not to perform that class of actions (except where covered 
by another rule) and disentitling all state officials from sanctioning 
actions within that class (except where covered by another rule); or 
(2) to broaden the scope of the rule, that is, to include within the 
rule's coverage some class of actions not now covered; or (3) to 
partly narrow and partly broaden the scope of the rule; or even 
perhaps ( 4) to replace the rule's predicate with a different but coex-
300. See supra text accompanying notes 137-39 (discussing individuation). 
301. I emphasize again that "moral reason" is meant to encompass both consequentialist 
and deontological accounts. To say that "moral reason" obtains to change R's predicate 
means either that this change is required by a deontological norm, or that it improves the 
world under applicable consequentialist criteria and is deontologically permissible. Whether 
the criteria set forth in the Bill of Rights are wholly consequentialist, partly consequentialist, 
or wholly deontological, cf. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of 
Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987) (chronicling rise of "balancing" methodology in constitu­
tional adjudication), the Derivative Account is morally straightforward. The deontologist 
will say that moral reason obtains to overturn a duty-imposing rule backed by sanctions, 
because that kind of threat violates a deontological constraint; the consequentialist will say 
that the threat causes or constitutes a worsening of the world. 
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tensive description of actions.302 The Derivative Account does not, 
necessarily, envision that reviewing courts will secure the particular 
change in the predicate of the rule R that morality supports. Con­
sider, for example, our stylized case ABORTION, where a rule pro­
hibits any person from "procuring an abortion." One variant of the 
Derivative Account might stipulate that the reviewing court should 
"facially" invalidate the no-abortion rule: it should issue a legal ut­
terance whose import is to preclude the enforcement of the rule 
against anyone. Another variant of the Derivative Account might 
stipulate that the reviewing court should "partially" invalidate the 
no-abortion rule: it should specify some proper subset of the ac­
tions covered by the rule - for example, abortions of non-viable 
fetuses - against which the rule may not be enforced. What vari­
ant of the Derivative Account is correct is a matter for further dis­
cussion and debate, which I will pursue as needed below.303 
My defense of the Derivative Account will proceed in two 
stages. The main attraction of the Derivative Account is that it is 
morally straightforward; it is straightforward that moral reason can 
obtain to change, in some measure, the predicate of a rule. Section 
A defends this claim, and in particular demonstrates how the moral 
criteria set forth in the Bill of Rights - criteria such as free speech, 
free exercise, equal protection, and substantive due process - can 
straightforwardly be understood as criteria by which to measure the 
predicates of rules. The Court's current free speech, free exercise, 
equal protection, and substantive due process case law can be ex­
plained, in a simple and straightforward way, by the Derivative Ac­
count. We will have no difficulty accounting for the various stylized 
cases that are meant to exemplify this case law - ABORTION, 
CmLD PORNOGRAPHY, FLAG DESECRATION, and so on - and that 
proved so difficult for the Direct Account to explain. 
Section B addresses the various issues left open by the moral 
arguments provided in section A. To say that rules can go morally 
awry is one thing; to say that a particular body should invalidate 
rules, by virtue of their being awry, is quite another. Do courts 
truly have the power to invalidate rules? How is this notion of their 
302. This is the kind of replacement that a stigma theorist might, perhaps, demand. 
Again, I take the most powerful account of "stigma" to be where a rule's predicate that is 
suboptimal in scope evidences the role of false beliefs in its production; but I leave open the 
possibility of a predicate being stigmatic even though its scope is morally optimal {and thus 
this predicate is properly replaced with a nonsynonymous, but coextensive predicate). See 
RICHARD L. KnuraAM, THEORIES OF TRUTii: A CRITICAL lNTRoDUCTION 3-14 {1995) {dis· 
tinguishing between the extensional equivalence of two terms, their necessary extensional 
equivalence, and their synonymity). 
303. See infra section III.A.3. 
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role consistent with the concept of a "constitutional right" or the 
concept of adjudication? In what way do the legal utterances that 
issue from reviewing courts, and that often appear to be directed 
merely at particular litigants, function to repeal or amend rules? 
The critic of my view of constitutional rights might concede my 
moral point (that the moral criteria referenced in the Bill of Rights 
can be understood as criteria by which to measure the predicates of 
rules), but nonetheless raise further, institutional objections to the 
Derivative Account. I rebut these further objections in section B. 
A. Rules that Go Awry: The Moral Foundations of Judicial 
Review 
Rules can go morally awry in multiple ways. A rule might exac­
erbate distributive injustice, by having a disproportionate impact 
upon persons who already receive far less than distributive justice 
requires.304 It might produce certain unwanted states of affairs: for 
example, the state of affairs where citizens who have a particular, 
contestable viewpoint on a matter of public import are heard in dis­
proportionate numbers, and "drown out" the opposition;30s or the 
state of affairs where members of different religious groups are en­
gaged in civil strife, which distracts and even destabilizes the pol­
ity .306 A rule might violate the requirements of equality - not by 
exacerbating distributive injustice as above, but rather by producing 
differential treatment for actors whose actions are morally 
identical.3°7 
All of these are possible - even constitutionally plausible -
explanations of how rules go morally awry. But, in fact, constitu­
tional law needs none of them. There are two basic moral schemas 
304. Cf. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CoNSTITUTION 338-46 (1993) (arguing that 
Equal Protection Clause embodies an anti-caste principle); Fiss, supra note 108, at 157 (argu­
ing that Equal Protection Clause prohibits laws that aggravate the subordinate position of a 
disadvantaged group). 
305. See Stone, supra note 218, at 217 (noting that a "possible explanation for the 
content-based/content-neutral distinction [within free speech doctrine] derives from the fact 
that content-based restrictions, by their very nature, restrict the communication of only some 
messages and thus affect public debate in a content-differential manner"). I do not deny that 
content-based laws which go morally awry in biasing debate are properly invalidated; but I 
do deny that content-based laws are properly invalidated solely by virtue of their predictably 
biasing debate. 
306. See Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL IssUES 
313, 317 (1996) (arguing that Religion Clauses have the "negative goal" of minimizing reli­
gious conflict, and the "affirmative goal" of "creat[ing] a regime in which people of funda­
mentally different views about religion can live together in a peaceful and self-governing 
society"). 
307. See Tusmman & tenBroek, supra note 229, at 344 (arguing that the Equal Protection 
Clause requires "that those who are similarly situated be similarly treated"). 
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- two different ways in which moral reason obtains to change the 
predicate of rules - that together suffice to explain the entire 
range of existing constitutional rights under the Free Speech 
Clause, Free Exercise Clause, Equal Protection Clause and the sub­
stantive component of the Due Process Clause, at least with respect 
to the central case of conduct-regulating rules backed by sanctions. 
These two schemas are the Liberty Schema and the Discrimination 
Schema. The Liberty Schema explains, in a crisp way, cases such as 
FLAG DESECRATION, ABORTION, and CHILD PORNOGRAPHY that 
together exemplify most (although not all)308 of the Court's free 
speech case law, and all of its substantive due process case law. The 
Discrimination Schema explains, in a crisp way, cases such as REsI­
DENTIAL PICKETING, ALCOHOL, and ANIMAL SACRIFICE that to­
gether exemplify the remainder of the free speech case law, and all 
of the Court's equal protection and free exercise case law. 
In saying that these two schemas, the Liberty Schema and Dis­
crimination Schema, suffice to explain the Court's free speech, etc., 
case law, I mean simply this: virtually all the cases in which the 
Court has recognized claims of constitutional right under the free 
speech, etc., clauses can be explained as cases in which the underly­
ing rules fit the pattern of moral invalidity set forth by either the 
Liberty Schema, the Discrimination Schema, or perhaps both.309 
Further, as we shall see, the schemas are grounded upon plausible 
and standard theories - articulated both by the Court and by con­
stitutional scholars - about the right way to understand the moral 
criteria of free speech, etc. What I do not mean to say that is all 
constitutional doctrine or dicta, under the free speech, etc., clauses, 
are consistent with the Derivative Account. At a minimum, the 
standard and oft-articulated doctrine that constitutional rights are 
"personal" rights, in the sense elaborated by the Direct Account, 
will have to be abandoned.310 Clearly - and indeed this is what 
animates my article - the Derivative Account is in part revision­
ary. It revises the standard view of constitutional rights, and 
whatever doctrine or dicta depend upon it. But the Derivative Ac­
count does not require revising our understanding of the moral cri­
teria underlying constitutional law, or counting as misconceived 
those cases in which the Court has in fact honored rights-claims. 
308. The free speech decisions that are not explained by the Liberty Schema - the deci­
sions exemplified by REsIDENTIAL PICKETING - are in part what motivate the Discrimina­
tion Schema. 
309. On "both," see infra note 369. 
310. See supra note 148 (citing cases). 
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What if you are not convinced that the Liberty Schema and the 
Discrimination Schema, together, adequately cohere with the moral 
criteria of free speech, free exercise, equal protection, and substan­
tive due process, and with the case law by which the Court has 
fleshed out these criteria? Or, what if you are convinced of this but 
further believe that the case law should be substantially over­
hauled? Then you may well want to develop some other schema or 
schemas for morally invalid rules: a distributive-justice schema, a 
balanced-debate schema, or whatever. You will flesh out the Deriv­
ative Account in a way that is, in its details, significantly different 
from my account. What you will not want to do is return to the 
Direct Account, unless you think that Part II's criticisms of that 
Account were ineffective. To accept those criticisms, but disagree 
with my two schemas, is not to reject the basic argument of this 
article: that constitutional adjudication essentially involves the in­
validation of rules. For if you accept those criticisms, then you com­
mit yourself to developing one or more schemas that explain how 
rules go morally awry, and cohere with plausible theories of the 
underlying moral criteria and (depending on your analytic project) 
with the constitutional case law as well.311 
This section makes a two-stage argument. I demonstrate first, in 
sections III.A.1 and III.A.2, that rules can go morally awry - spe­
cifically, by violating the Liberty or Discrimination Schema. Moral 
reason can obtain to change, in some measure, the predicate of 
rules; this is true for each of the rules in our stylized cases. Then, in 
section ill.A.3, I return to the puzzle with which we began the arti­
cle, and which the facts of our stylized cases are meant to exemplify: 
How can it violate X's constitutional rights to sanction or coerce 
her pursuant to rule R, even though the very same action for which 
she is sanctioned, or which she is coerced not to perform, is prop­
erly sanctioned or coerced under another rule? I resolve this puzzle 
and explain all of the stylized cases, as follows: X's action can fall 
outside R', where R' is the judicial revision of rule R'' which the 
court issues after concluding that R breaches a constitutional rule­
validity schema. The Direct Account proved unable to explain any 
of the stylized cases (except the B and W variants of ALcoHoL), 
311. My analytic project is to show, not just that the Derivative Account is constitution­
ally better, but that it is a better account of current practices. Thus, I develop and argue for 
two rule-validity schemas that fit with and, together, fully explain the existing case law. I 
further believe that the schemas are justifiable in the light of constitutional criteria, quite 
apart from the case law - that will be evident in the presentation - but do not mean to 
claim that no other schemas are. 
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but the Derivative Account explains each and every one of them in 
a plausible way. 
One final preliminary point. I should emphasize that the notion 
of moral reason obtaining to change the predicate of rules - the 
notion I will flesh out in a moment, using the Liberty Schema and 
the Discrimination Schema - does not presuppose a particular 
normative theory of authority. Let me distinguish between (1) the 
nonmoral or "social" fact that state officials do take enacted legal 
rules in the U.S. legal system as authoritative, sanctioning actions 
that fall within these rules' scope by virtue of the rules' enactment; 
and (2) the moral fact that state officials ought to take enacted legal 
rules as authoritative, either because legal rules by their enactment 
create reasons for belief, or because legal rules by their enactment 
create reasons for action.312 The Derivative Account presupposes 
(1) or something like it, but not (2), and is therefore neutral be­
tween the various normative theories of authority that explain why 
and to what extent (2) obtains. When, for example, the State of 
Texas has in force a legal rule prohibiting "procur[ing] an abortion" 
- the rule that was challenged in Roe v. Wade,313 and that ABOR­
TION stylizes - it is true as a matter of nonmoral fact that some 
Texan officials will prosecute women and doctors pursuant to this 
rule, whether or not these officials have moral reason to do so apart 
from, or together with, the rule's enactment.314 Some women and 
doctors, anticipating their prosecution, will refrain from performing 
abortions that, all things considered, they ought to be at liberty to 
perform. Thus, moral reason obtains to invalidate Texas's rule in 
some measure (that is, moral reason obtains for a legal body, per­
haps a court, to issue a legal utterance the Texan officials will take 
to deprive the invalidated rule of its authority), quite apart from the 
normative authority that the rule may truly have or lack. The idea 
of legal rules going morally awry, which grounds the Derivative Ac­
count, assumes that the enactment of legal rules changes the behav­
ior of actors and state officials, to conform with the description of 
prohibited or required actions set forth by rule-predicates. 
312. See GREEN, supra note 279, at 60 (distinguishing between de facto authority and 
legitimate authority); RAz, supra note 169, at 46 (same). 
313. 410 U.S. 113, 117-18 (1973). 
314. It is itself a general if not universal legal rule, at least within the federal system, that 
" 'adjudication of the constitutionality of [statutes is] beyond the jurisdiction of administra· 
tive agencies.' " Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 215 (1994) (quoting Johnson 
v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 368 (1974)). This sort of basic rule limits the extent to which en· 
forcement officials are (legally) permitted to inquire into the moral authority of the rules 
they enforce. 
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Whether this change should morally occur, or indeed why precisely 
it does occur as a nonmoral fact, are matters that I need not 
address. 
1. The Liberty Schema 
One way that rules can go morally awry is by violating liberties. 
Consider the case with which we began the article, and which I have 
stylized as FLAG DESECRATION: Texas v. Johnson, where a flag­
burner was sanctioned for violating a rule that provided, " 'A per­
son commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly desecrates 
. . .  a state or national flag.' "315 This rule includes within its scope 
some otherwise-innocent speech-acts - speech-acts that are not 
harmful or wrongful apart from what they say. The rule includes, 
for example, the particular action of a flag-desecrator Y who spits 
upon and bums his own pollutant-free flag, within the confines of 
his own property, with no persons next to him but lots of offended 
onlookers. Y's action is not an action of battery, trespass, pollution, 
arson or destroying government property; it is simply an action of 
speech, and not harmful or wrongful beyond that. 
But speech is one kind of constitutionally protected liberty.316 
To say this just means - on a standard and plausible account of 
"liberty" and, specifically, "free speech" - that there is sufficient, 
indeed strong moral reason that actors be left free to perform 
otherwise-innocent speech-acts,317 excepting only speech-acts 
315. 491 U.S. 397, 400 n.1 (1989) (quoting Tux. PENAL ConE ANN. §  42.09 (West 1989)). 
316. See U.S. CoNST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law . . .  abridging the freedom of 
speech" (emphasis added)). 
317. See FEINBERG, supra note 57, at 7-9 (defining liberty as absence of legal coercion; 
stating that "[l]iberty should be the norm; coercion always needs some special justification"; 
and noting possibility of moral reasons that sometimes override liberty and justify coercion). 
The Liberty Schema I will present does not entail Feinberg's robust claim that liberties are 
only infringed by coercion - merely that coercion is one way of infringing them. The focus 
of this article just is duty-conferring rules backed by sanctions; my analysis, and the Liberty 
Schema, is agnostic on whether (pace Feinberg) other sorts of laws, e.g., laws denying bene­
fits, can infringe liberties. 
Nor does the Liberty Schema entail Feinberg's robust claim that every type of action is a 
"liberty" (in the sense of demanding some overriding reason to be coerced). See DwoRKIN, 
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 1, at 266-72 (arguing against general right to liberty). 
Rather, the Liberty Schema entails the existence of certain act-types, such as speech-acts (or, 
more finely, political-speech-acts, or speech-acts-that-are-not-obscene, etc.), delineated by 
the liberty-protecting provisions of the Constitution, such that coercing actors not to perform 
these is morally and constitutionally impermissible, absent overriding reason. 
And the standard explication of the First Amendment "free speech" clause - unlike, for 
example, the current doctrinal explication of the "free exercise" clause, see Employment Div. 
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) - does indeed construe the "free speech" clause as liberty­
protecting, in this sense. It is seen, standardly, to be important that persons have the liberty 
to speak (or, more finely, that they have the liberty to perform certain types of speech-acts) 
- whether because of the intrinsic benefits for the speaker, or the instrumental benefits of 
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within a so-called "low-value" category (such as obscene speech, 
libel, incitement, or fighting words )318 and, to some extent, except­
ing speech-acts within the category of "commercial speech."319 As 
the Court stated in Texas v. Johnson: "If there is a bedrock princi­
ple underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may 
not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds 
the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."320 Therefore, by virtue of 
the moral concept of "free speech" set forth in the First Amend­
ment, there is sufficient moral reason to change the scope of the 
:flag:desecration rule. For by keeping the rule fully in force, in its 
current form, otherwise-innocent actors within the scope of the rule 
- Y, and similar actors - are coerced not to speak. In particular, 
there is sufficient moral reason to narrow the rule, so as to exclude 
otherwise-innocent actions of :flag-desecration; and likely there is 
sufficient moral reason to invalidate the rule entirely, because any 
actions of :flag-desecration that are harmful or wrongful because of 
their nonexpressive properties will fall within the scope of the in­
dependent rules against "battery," "arson" and so forth. A similar 
analysis works readily for the rule in CHILD PORNOGRAPHY: some 
actions of photo-display are neither obscene nor nonexpressively 
harmful or wrongful, for example, the action of a loving parent who 
places a photo of a naked infant in a family album, and displays the 
album to family members and close friends. 
The idea I am articulating here - that free speech rights are 
violated by rules that include within their scope otherwise-innocent 
speech-acts - should be familiar to anyone acquainted \vith the 
Court's free speech jurisprudence. This idea is reflected, again and 
again, in the various free speech doctrines that require laws regulat-
speech in facilitating knowledge and democracy. For a survey and synthesis of standard "free 
speech" theory, see Thomas Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 
YALE LJ. 877, 878 (1963) (defending free speech as necessary inter alia "(1) as assuring 
individual self-fulfillment, (2) as a means of attaining the truth, [and] (3) as a method of 
securing participation by the members of the society in social, including political, decision­
making"); see also FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH! A PHILOSOPHICAL INoUIRY 15-72 
(1982) (surveying, to some extent critically, the view that free speech serves truth, democ­
racy, individual well-being, and individual autonomy). 
318. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992) (identifying main low­
value categories); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 
502 U.S. 105, 127 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (same). The term "low 
value" should be used advisedly, since the properties that bring speech-acts within some of 
these categories might make those actions worthless, rather than merely overriding their 
worth. See infra note 329 (distinguishing between canceling and overriding properties). 
319. See Central Hudson Gas & Blee. Corp. v. Public Serv. Commn., 447 U.S. 557, 563-64 
(1980) (setting out intermediate test for laws regulating commercial speech). 
320. 491 U.S. at 414. 
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ing speech to be more or less "narrowly tailored."321 For example, 
under the strict scrutiny component of free speech doctrine (which 
is generally triggered by rules that pick out expressive properties of 
actions and that are "content based"), the State must show that the 
" 'regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and 
that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. ' "322 Under the "time, 
place or manner" component of free speech doctrine (which is gen­
erally triggered by rules that pick out expressive properties of ac­
tions and that are "content neutral"), a law must be "justified 
without reference to the content of the regulated speech, [must be] 
narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and 
[must] leave open ample alternative channels for communication of 
the information."323 Under the "expressive conduct" component of 
free speech doctrine (which is generally triggered by rules that pick 
out nonexpressive properties of actions), a law must "further[ ]  an 
important or substantial governmental interest; [must be] unrelated 
to the suppression of free expression; [and] the incidental restric­
tion on alleged First Amendment freedoms [must be] no greater 
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. "324 Finally, under 
the "commercial speech" component of free speech doctrine (which 
is triggered by rules that pick out actions under the description of 
communicating a commercial message, e.g., as an "advertisement" 
or an action of "so�citation"), the " 'asserted governmental interest 
[must be] substantial [and] the regulation [must] directly advance[ ]  
the governmental interest asserted [and be no] more extensive than 
is necessary to serve that interest. ' "325 
Let me formalize, and make more rigorous, the idea that I take 
to be embodied in these various "narrow tailoring" doctrines un­
derlying the free speech case law. A rule that includes speech-acts 
or other types of liberties within its scope must be narrowly tailored 
to a sufficiently important interest: that is, the rule-predicate must 
pick out some property of action such that, for the speech-acts or 
other liberties within the rule's scope, those encompassed liberties 
321. See Monaghan, supra note 44, at 37-38 (noting centrality of "least restrictive alterna­
tive" concept to First Amendment doctrine); Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amend­
ment, 78 YALE LJ. 464 (1969) (same, but criticizing concept). 
322. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (emphasis added) (quoting Perry Educ. 
Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)). 
323. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (emphasis 
added). 
324. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (emphasis added). 
325. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 482 (1995) (emphasis added) (quoting 
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Commn., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)). 
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are connected to some harm or wrong sufficient to warrant prohib· 
iting (or requiring) their performance. This is one schema or pat· 
tern for how rules might go morally awry; I will call it the Liberty 
Schema. 
The Liberty Schema 
A duty-imposing rule should be changed in scope (in particu­
lar, it should be narrowed, or invalidated entirely), if the duty 
includes within its current scope some subclass of "liberties" 
such that, all things considered, there is not sufficient reason to 
prohibit (or require) the performance of this subclass, under 
current law. "Liberties" are that class of actions, defined by 
the aggregate of liberty-protecting provisions in the Bill of 
Rights (free speech, substantive due process, . . .  ), such that 
actors should be left free by government to perform actions 
within this class, absent sufficient reason.326 
Note a number of features of this schema designed to maximize its 
applicability. First, the schema leaves open why, precisely, a given 
type of action is understood to fall within the class of constitutional 
"liberties." It might be because the freedom to perform that type 
of action is important for the actor's own well-being (as on the fa­
miliar view that restricting X's freedom to speak violates her "au­
tonomy");321 or it might be because the freedom to perform that 
type of action is important for the well-being of others (as on the 
familiar view that restricting X's freedom to speak deprives others 
of important information).328 The schema also leaves open how, 
326. Note that this definition is, strictly speaking, consistent both with the highly coarse­
grained view of act individuation that I use in my analysis - for example, in speaking of "the 
very same" action being an action of speech and of battery, trespass, and arson - and with 
finer-grained views. See MooRE, supra note 64, at 366-74 (discussing more or less coarse­
grained views). A constitutional "liberty" delineates a complicated type of action. If an ac­
tor's performance of some instance of that type of action would violate a rule, then the rule 
includes liberties within its scope, whether one prefers to say that (1) the very same action of 
his would be an action of liberty, and an action of the kind identified in the rule-predicate; or 
(2) the very same bodily movement that would be the performance of the liberty, also would 
be the performance of the action identified in the rule-predicate. Because I see little to be 
gained, for purposes of my analysis, in (2), I stick to (1). 
327. For well-known statements of this sort of view, see C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the 
First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REv. 964 (1978); and David A.J. 
Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 
123 U. PA. L. REv. 45 (1974). 
328. Alexander Meiklejohn's famous defense of free speech, which points to the central­
ity of political debate to democratic government, falls partly in this category - insofar as, 
within a Meiklejohnian theory, the moral importance of X's political statement lies (partly) 
in the information it brings X's interlocutors. See ALExANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL 
FREEDOM 24-28 (1960); see also RAz, supra note 169, at 245-63 (arguing that political liber­
ties, such as liberty of speech, are often grounded in collective interests, and not merely in the 
interest of the actor). 
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precisely, the class of "liberties" is defined. For example, one might 
define the speech portion of this class as (1) all speech-acts, or (2) 
all speech-acts except obscenity, incitement, libel, and "fighting 
words," or even (3) all speech-acts except obscenity, incitement, li­
bel, and "fighting words," and except speech-acts that are harmful 
or wrongful because of nonexpressive properties. The choice be­
tween these alternatives depends upon whether you think the act­
properties enumerated in definitions two and three merely override 
the value of speech, or cancel it entirely.329 Whatever the precise 
definition of the speech portion of the liberty-class, there is reason 
to invalidate, in some measure, the rules in FLAG DESECRATION 
and CHILD PORNOGRAPHY. 
The Liberty Schema further leaves open what "sufficient rea­
son" means - what kinds of considerations are morally sufficient 
for government to prohibit (or require) the performance of liber­
ties. At a minimum, government can prohibit liberties and other 
actions if they seriously harm others: the subclass of speech-acts 
comprised by speech-acts-that-also-constitute-battery or speech­
acts-that-also-constitute-arson are surely proscribable (at least 
under a non-discriminatory rule, a point we will return to below). 
But liberties and other actions may additionally, perhaps, be pro­
hibited if they constitute some kind of harmless wrong: say, the 
wrong of defacing the graves of the dead.33° Finally, there may be 
sufficient reason to prohibit a harmless and innocent subclass of lib­
erties, under some rule R, if R also includes within its scope harmful 
or wrongful actions and there is no feasible way, given the epistemic 
limitations of state officials and actors, to exclude the subclass of 
harmless and innocent liberties without also excluding some of the 
proscribable actions.331 This is why the Liberty Schema asks 
whether sufficient reason obtains to proscribe the subclass of liber­
ties within a rule's scope, under current law. I recognize that, for a 
given subclass, the moral reasons to prohibit that subclass may de­
pend upon, and be changed by, the shape of current law insofar as it 
covers other types of actions. One example is the one I just gave: 
329. See RAz, supra note 54, at 27 (noting that "[t]he notion of one reason overriding 
another should be carefully distinguished from that of a reason being canceled by a canceling 
condition"). 
330. See FEINBERG, supra note 57, at 10-14 {distinguishing between harm and harmless 
wrong). 
331. See Alexander, supra note 7, at 552 (noting that " 'conduct unbecoming an officer' is 
a phrase sufficiently vague to cover and deter speech . . .  [b]ut the government's . . .  interest 
in deterring all conduct on the unprotected side of that line may justify a law that chills , 
protected speech" (footnote omitted)). 
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where the epistemic limitations of actors and officials in identifying 
certain harmful or wrongful actions may justify a rule that picks out 
both these actions and certain liberties as well.332 Another example 
is where the subclass of liberties produces only a marginal harm, 
but is part of a larger class of actions that together produce much 
harm; prohibiting the subclass may be justifiable only as part of a 
general prohibition on the larger class.333 
I do not intend my Liberty Schema to resolve any of these inter­
esting issues - the kind of issues that constitutional and moral the­
orists hotly debate. Rather, my intention is simply to articulate one 
straightforward way in which morality might require changing the 
scope of a rule. Whatever the theorist's specific view about the role 
of liberties in benefitting the actors versus benefitting others; about 
the kinds of actions that are indeed protected liberties; and about 
the kinds of considerations that justify prohibiting (or requiring) 
the performance of liberties, the theorist should be able to agree 
that the Liberty Schema can explain how rules go morally awry. 
Further, and somewhat less fundamentally, I wish to suggest 
that the Liberty Schema in fact maps onto a good bit of the consti­
tutional case law. First, I suggest that most (although not all) of the 
decisions in which the Court has found violations of the right to free 
speech fit the Liberty Schema. Most (although not all) of these 
cases involved rules that included within their scope some subclass 
of constitutionally protected speech-acts such that sufficient reason 
did not obtain to prohibit (or require) the performance of this sub­
class. This is true, I suggest, whether or not the Court explicitly 
invoked a "narrow tailoring" doctrine; it is true whether the claim­
ant raised a retrospective challenge to a sanction, or a prospective 
challenge to a duty; it is true whether the rule at stake picked out 
expressive or nonexpressive properties of actions; it is true for cases 
involving all the different categories of speech, such as core speech, 
commercial speech, and "low-value" speech; and it is true both for 
so-called "facial" challenges under the First Amendment, and for 
so-called "as-applied" challenges. Consider some illustrative exam-
332. See also Adler, supra note 4, at 775 n.52 (noting that the moral propriety of rules 
may depend upon epistemic and other deficits of state institutions). 
333. It has become a truism within the literature on authority that the moral reasons 
against performing a particular action may depend upon whether other actions are prohib· 
ited. See GREEN, supra note 279, at 89-157 (discussing possible role of law in solving coordi­
nation problems and prisoners' dilemmas). For a possible example, within free speech case 
law, see Rubin v. Coors, 514 U.S. 476, 488-89 (1995) (invalidating ban on the disclosure of 
alcohol content by beer labels, notwithstanding government's argument that ban prevented 
"strength wars" in beer market, because no such ban existed for beer advertisements or for 
wine and spirit labels). 
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pies, drawn from the current case law, to supplement the FLAG 
DESECRATION and CHILD PORNOGRAPHY examples. 
Boos v. Barry:334 a prospective challenge to a rule that the 
Court analyzed as content-based;335 the rule prohibited the dis­
play of signs, within 500 feet of a foreign government's em­
bassy, that bring that government into disrepute. 
Ladue v. Gilleo:336 a prospective challenge to a rule that the 
Court analyzed as content-neutral; the rule prohibited the dis­
play of residential signs. 
United States v. Eichman:337 a retrospective challenge to a rule 
picking out nonexpressive properties of actions; the rule, 
passed by the federal government subsequent to Texas v. John­
son, prohibited the action of mutilating flags, independent of 
whether the mutilation was expressive.338 
Rubin v. Coors:339 a prospective challenge to a rule regulating 
commercial speech; the rule prohibited the disclosure of alco­
hol content on beer labels. 
Houston v. Hill:340 a prospective challenge to a rule that im­
perfectly described a category of "low-value" speech-acts, in 
334. 485 U.S. 312 (1988). 
335. See Boos, 485 U.S. at 318-21 (discussing difference between content-based and 
content-neutral laws). This article will not attempt to analyze that distinction or take a posi­
tion on its cogency. The distinction is a distinction within the broader category of laws that 
pick out expressive properties of actions. 
336. 512 U.S. 43 (1994). 
337. 496 U.S. 310 (1990). Technically, the statute in Eichman made it unlawful to " 'muti­
late[ ], deface[ ], physically defile[ ], burn[ ], maintain[ ] on the floor or ground, or trample[ ] 
upon any flag of the United States.' " Eichman, 496 U.S. at 314 (quoting Flag Protection Act 
of 1989, 18 U.S.C. § 700(a)(l) (1994)). For simplicity, and without lack of generality, I de­
scribe and discuss Eichman as concerning a statute prohibiting flag mutilation. 
338. Cf. 496 U.S. at 315, 318 (noting that the challenged rule "proscribes conduct (other 
than disposal) that damages or mistreats a flag, without regard to the actor's motive, his 
intended message, or the likely effects of his conduct on onlookers" but applying strict scru­
tiny because the rule "cannot be 'justified without reference to the content of the regulated 
speech' " (quoting Boos, 485 U.S. at 320)). These two inquiries - (1) whether a rule picks 
out expressive properties of actions, and (2) whether a rule can be adequately justified in­
dependent of the expressive properties of actions within its scope - should be kept distinct. 
A rule may survive (1) but fail (2), as indeed was true of the rule in Eichman. The Liberty 
Schema makes good sense of this. To say that speech is a liberty means that persons should 
be free to speak, absent sufficient reason; it further and relatedly means that, in general, what 
they say is not a sufficient reason for restricting this liberty. A rule may restrict speech by 
picking out expressive act-properties (as in Texas v. Johnson) or nonexpressive properties (as 
in Eichman); in either event, the problem of finding sufficient reason will come into play. 
339. 514 U.S. 476 (1995). 
340. 482 U.S. 451 (1987). 
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this case the category of fighting words; the rule prohibited in­
terrupting a police officer in the performance of his duties. 
In re R.M.J.:341 a retrospective, as-applied case: the Court in­
validated a rule prohibiting lawyer advertising, as applied to 
the claimant's advertisements. 
For each one of these illustrative rules, one can readily show how 
the rule goes awry under the Liberty Schema. This is trivial in Boos 
and Ladue: some actions of displaying signs are independently 
harmful (for example, displaying a sign laced with poisonous evapo­
rate); some actions of displaying signs fall within a "low-value" cat­
egory (for example, displaying a sign with an obscene picture); but 
most are neither. A liberty analysis works readily for Eichman 
(some actions of flag-mutilation are both expressive and harmless 
apart from the disrespect they communicate), as well as for Coors 
and Houston. 
Finally, my interpretation of In re R.M.J., the as-applied case, is 
as follows: This decision invalidated the no-advertising rule with 
respect to the class of actions bearing the features specified by the 
Court in its analysis of the claimant's advertisements, viz., truthful 
and non-misleading advertisements.342 In short, on the Derivative 
Account, so-called "as-applied" decisions are simply partial invali­
dations. The no-advertising rule ran afoul of the Liberty Schema, 
by including truthful, non-misleading, and otherwise innocent ad­
vertisements within its scope. The Court partly invalidated the rule, 
so as to cure the rule's moral flaw. I will discuss the partial vs. facial 
invalidation issue at greater length below, in section III.A.3. The 
Derivative Account can readily accommodate partial invalidations; 
what it cannot accommodate is a true "as-applied" invalidation -
that is, a judicial decision to overturn X's sanction or duty in­
dependent of further invalidating rule R. So-called "as-applied" de­
cisions must be interpreted, within the Derivative Account, as 
partial invalidations. The In re R.M.J. example is meant to show 
the plausibility of this interpretation. 
In sum, the Liberty Schema explains much of the free speech 
case law. It also explains the entirety of the substantive due process 
case law. Substantive due process cases, like free speech cases, are 
standardly defended on the grounds that the Due Process Clause 
delineates a class of liberties in the sense of my schema: a class of 
actions that persons ought to be free to perform (at a minimum, 
341. 455 U.S. 191 {1982). 
342. See In re RM.I., 455 U.S. at 205·07. 
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free from government coercion) absent overriding reason.343 This 
is the class of actions falling within what the Court, in Griswold, 
called the "zone of privacy."344 The Court in Casey reaffirmed the 
status of such actions as constitutional liberties, albeit without using 
the term "privacy": 
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relat­
ing to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child 
rearing, and education. Our cases recognize "the right of the individ­
ual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental in­
trusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the 
decision whether to bear or beget a child." . . .  These matters, involv­
ing the most intimate and personal choices a person may make fu a 
lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central 
to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.345 
Here, as with free speech, the specifics of the class of liberties de­
marcated by Griswold, and reaffirmed by Casey, are open to debate 
- as are the specific moral grounds for counting the exercise of a 
liberty more important than (some range of) conflicting considera­
tions. In particular, we might say that the constitutional liberty of 
abortion would obtain even in a world of gender equality; or we 
might say, in line with some recent scholarship on the abortion 
right, that it now obtains by virtue of the existence of gender ine­
quality.346 Similarly, we might disagree about whether measures 
short of prohibiting abortion - for example, waiting periods and 
informed-consent provisions - count as infringing the liberty of 
abortion or not.347 
·Bracketing these disagreements, it is quite straightforward to 
explicate the Due Process Clause as liberty-protecting, and to inter­
pret the cases in which the Court has sustained substantive due pro-
343. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 lIAR.v. L. REv. 737, 742-54 (1989) 
(summarizing, but criticizing, standard view and citing literature). 
344. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). 
345. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (emphasis and citation omit­
ted) (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)). 
346. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 304, at 279 ("The argument for an abortion right built on 
principles of sex equality is thus straightforward. Restrictions on abortion burden only 
women and are therefore impermissible unless persuasively justified in gender-neutral 
terms . . . .  [I]n our world [adequate justifications] are not [available] in light of the fact that 
the burden of bodily use, properly understood, is imposed only on women, [and] could not be 
enacted in the absence of unacceptable stereotypes about women's appropriate role . . . .  "). 
Sunstein states: "[M]ovements in the direction of sexual equality - before, during, and after 
conception, including after birth - unquestionably weaken the case for an abortion right." 
Id. at 280. 
347. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 881-87 (upholding requirement of informed consent and 24-
hour waiting period). 
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cess claims as cases where the underlying rules violated the Liberty 
Schema. To give the leading examples: 
Roe v. Wade:348 the basis for ABORTION; an anticipatory chal­
lenge to a rule that prohibited procuring an abortion. 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey:349 an anticipatory challenge to a 
rule that prohibited doctors from performing an abortion with­
out obtaining spousal consent. 
Griswold v. Connecticut:350 a retrospective challenge by doc­
tors to a rule that prohibited using contraceptives or assisting 
others in doing so. 
And to give a case in which, many believe, the Court should have 
sustained the constitutional challenge: 
Bowers v. Hardwick:351 a prospective challenge to a rule 
prohibiting sodomy. 
For each of these cases, one can readily say: the rule includes, 
within its scope, some subclass of liberties (where the Due Process 
Clause liberties are understood to include actions by physicians of 
prescribing contraceptives or performing abortions )352 such that for 
this subclass, sufficient reason does not obtain, at least under cur­
rent law, to prohibit them. And the doctrinal formulations that the 
Court has used in its substantive due process case law - not only 
the "narrow tailoring" doctrine invoked in the early cases, but also 
the "undue burden" standard invoked more recently in Casey353 -
can readily be understood as fleshing out the Liberty Schema. 
* * * 
My interpretive claims about the free speech and substantive 
due process case law are, to be sure, open to debate. In particular, 
one might argue that the central concept for free speech is discrimi­
nation, not liberty. After all, the Court surely does moot the prob­
lem of content- and viewpoint-discrimination in its cases;354 and as 
348. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
349. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
350. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
351. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
352. See infra text accompanying notes 559-73 (discussing jus terti1). 
353. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 869-80. The shift to this standard seems largely meant to 
signal the acceptability of fetal life as a moral reason for pre-viability abortion requirements 
that are not too burdensome. Thus it signals a change in the Court's assessment of the moral 
reasons pro and con pre-viability abortion regulation, but not in the status of abortion as a 
liberty. 
354. See Williams, supra note 226, at 622-24. 
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we shall see below, there are some free speech decisions that can 
only be explained on a Discrimination Schema. For the discrimina­
tion theorist, the Free Speech Clause is centrally concerned with 
rules that set forth a morally irrelevant property - the property 
that the actor is speaking - rather than rules that include innocent 
speech-acts within their scope.355 This theorist will interpret the 
pervasive "narrow tailoring" doctrines within free speech law as 
testing whether "discrimination" - understood broadly, to mean 
the enactment of rules targeting speech356 - is justified, not as test­
ing whether sufficient reason obtains to prohibit the speech-acts 
within a rule's scope. Thus, the discrimination theorist will not 
want to recognize free speech claims against rules that pick out 
nonexpressive properties of actions: for example, the rule in Eich­
man, or, to use the clearer and classic example of Marsh v. Ala­
bama,351 a rule that prohibits "trespass" and is applied to the 
trespassory actions of protesters, religious proselytizers, and other 
speakers within the boundaries of a company town. And it will be a 
matter of indifference, for the discrimination theorist, whether a 
rule prohibiting some kind of speech is reworked by invalidating 
the rule, or instead by extending the prohibition to cover some 
larger category of actions that is defined in nonexpressive terms and 
that includes all of the actions within the scope of the original, 
speech-targeted rule. For example, the discrimination theorist will 
be satisfied if a rule prohibiting "political demonstrations within 
355. See infra text accompanying notes 385-89 (discussing centrality of morally irrelevant 
properties to Discrimination Schema). 
356. This broad construal would be needed to make sense of the cases in which the Court 
strikes down "content-neutral" laws regulating speech, see, e.g., Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 
(1994). The discrimination theorist who wants to explain these cases will say that the poten­
tially irrelevant property she is concerned with is the actor's property of speaking, and thus 
that a speech-targeted, content-neutral, but unjustified rule counts as "discriminatory" for 
her. 
Alternately, she may think the cases striking down content-neutral laws are wrongly de­
cided. Cf. Larry Alexander, Trouble on Track Two: Incidental Regulations of Speech and 
Free Speech Theory, 44 HASTINGS LJ. 921, 923 (1993) (arguing that courts should not strike 
down "track two" laws under the Free Speech Clause - laws "concerned with the noncom­
municative impact of speech" - including laws picking out both nonexpressive and expres­
sive properties). 
357. 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (overturning trespass conviction of Jehovah's Witness who dis­
tributed religious literature within "company town"). Admittedly, the Court in recent years 
has not struck down laws picking out nonexpressive properties, on free speech grounds, see 
Michael Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HAR.v. L. REv. 1175, 1200-11 
(1996) (surveying case law), but the test for such laws remains an intermediate-scrutiny test, 
see Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293-99 (1984), and if the 
Liberty Schema truly reflects part of the content of "free speech," this test should not be a 
dead letter. Cf. Lee v. International Socy. for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. 830 (1992) 
(per curiam) (invalidating ban on distribution of literature in airport terminals, despite al­
leged risks of congestion posed by distribution). 
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public parks" is broadened to prohibit "all activities that produce a 
noise level above sixty decibels within public parks," even though 
political demonstrations, stump speeches, and so forth cannot feasi­
bly take place at a noise level below sixty decibels. 
I believe it is a mistake to view the Free Speech Clause as fo­
cused solely on discrimination. Standard moral accounts of free 
speech point to the benefits, for the actor X or her audience, of X's 
being free to engage in speech.358 The concept of discrimination 
does not exhaust such accounts: the would-be protester, stump 
speaker, or proselytizer is no less coerced by an applicable rule 
prohibiting trespass or noisemaking than by a speech-targeted rule. 
And, relatedly, it would not be a matter of indifference, within the 
standard accounts, for government to restrict speech that has low­
level nonexpressive effects (producing noise, damaging the grass in 
the public parks, or intruding onto private property) by stringently 
regulating all activities with those effects.359 Finally, the reason that 
rules picking out more serious nonexpressive act-properties - such 
as arson, battery, or pollution - do not violate First Amendment 
rights is simply that those harms are sufficiently serious to justify 
restricting speech-acts that produce them, particularly since it is 
(normally)360 feasible for speakers to say what they want to in a less 
harmful manner. 
The best argument for reducing the Free Speech Clause to an 
antidiscrimination principle, and for dispensing with a separate lib­
erty principle here, is that judicial attempts to protect the liberty of 
speech are self-defeating. The argument might be expressed as fol­
lows: The Liberty Schema entails judicial balancing of the nonex­
pressive harms and wrongs that speech-acts cause against the value 
of speech; yet this sort of balancing is the very kind of governmen-
358. See sources cited supra notes 317, 327-28. 
359. See, e.g., Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & Pun. AFF. 
204, 222 (1972) {"The Millian Principle [that speech ought not be prohibited by virtue of 
harms that flow from the expressive properties of speech-acts] is obviously incapable of ac­
counting for all of the cases that strike us as infringements of freedom of expression. On the 
basis of this principle alone we could raise no objection against a government that banned all 
parades and demonstrations (they interfere with traffic), outlawed posters and handbills (too 
messy), banned public meetings of more than ten people (likely to be unruly), and restricted 
newspaper publication to one page per week (to save trees). Yet such policies surely strike 
us as intolerable."). 
360. See Clark, 468 U.S. at 293 (stating that "time, place, or manner" restrictions on ex­
pression are valid if, inter alia, they leave open "ample alternative channels for communica­
tion"); 468 U.S. at 298 (stating that the "time, place, or manner" test is little different from 
the test under United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), for the "regulation of expressive 
conduct," i.e., for laws picking out nonexpressive act-properties). 
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tal valuation of speech that the First Amendment prohibits.361 But 
if it violates the First Amendment for courts to distinguish between 
the serious nonexpressive wrongs and harms that justify prohibiting 
speech, and the less serious nonexpressive wrongs and harms that 
do not, then a fortiori it should violate the First Amendment for 
courts to distinguish between different categories of expression, say, 
between obscene and non-obscene speech,362 or between recklessly 
false and non-recklessly false statements about public figures,363 or 
between misleading and non-misleading advertisements.364 The im­
plication of this argument against the Liberty Schema is that courts 
should automatically strike down any law picking out expressive 
act-properties. Unless that implication is correct - and I do not 
believe it is - a Liberty Schema for speech is not self-defeating. 
What about a discrimination account of the abortion case law? 
One might argue that legislators are typically confused or mistaken 
about the moral relevance of the act-property "abortion" (for ex­
ample, because legislators are motivated by religious views about 
abortion, which ought not figure in its regulation365); that courts 
invalidate no-abortion laws only by virtue of their greater compe­
tence to determine the moral relevance of this act-property; and 
therefore that a rule must target abortion in order to trigger the 
Due Process Clause. On this account, a rule requiring all abortions 
to be performed in hospitals rather than clinics might be unconstitu­
tional; but a rule requiring all medical procedures to be performed 
in hospitals rather than clinics would not be unconstitutional, even 
as applied to the medical procedure of aborting a fetus.366 Indeed, 
given the distinct moral features of abortion - the involvement of 
a fetus - a liberty account of the abortion right may be problem-
361. See Alexander, supra note 356, at 932 (claiming that "the value of speech cannot be 
balanced against the government's track two interests in any way that is principled and that 
respects the very freedom of thought that the First Amendment itself protects"). There is 
also a standard critical line that disputes the special role of speech, as opposed to nonexpres­
sive conduct, in self-fulfillment, see Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amend­
ment Problems, 47 lNo. LJ. 1 (1971), but this critique leaves untouched the argument for a 
constitutional liberty, at least, of political speech. 
362.' See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
363. See New York Tlllles v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
364. See Central Hudson Gas & Blee. Corp. v. Public Serv. Commn., 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
365. Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT .ABORTION, 
EUTHANASIA, AND lNoIVIDUAL FREEDOM 10-29 (1993) (arguing that opposition to abortion 
is plausibly grounded not in "derivative" view that fetus has rights and interests, but in "de­
tached" view that life is sacred). 
366. See Dorf, supra note 357, at 1219-33 (discussing incidental burdens on right to 
privacy). 
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atic.367 But a general reduction of substantive due process case law 
from liberty to discrimination is neither doctrinally required (by 
contrast with the parallel reduction for free exercise) nor morally 
warranted. The idea of a zone of "privacy" - at a minimum, of 
self-regarding choices such that the freedom to make these is nor­
mally constitutive of autonomy (self-authorship) and fundamental 
to well-being - is morally plausible, indeed compelling.368 
Liberty, not just discrimination, is central to free speech and 
substantive due process jurisprudence.369 But even if I am incorrect 
in advancing this claim, my error does not undermine the Deriva­
tive Account or the project of interpreting the constitutional case 
law within it. If the Liberty Schema is misplaced, then the right 
response is to reinterpret ABORTION, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY, FLAG 
DESECRATION, and the jurisprudence these stylized cases exem­
plify, within a second schema for how rules go morally awry. The 
best objections to a libertarian reading of free speech and substan­
tive due process are objections that simply propel us forward - to 
a different, but equally derivative and rule-centered understanding 
of the moral content of constitutional rights. I call this the Discrim­
ination Schema. 
2. The Discrimination Schema 
My claim has been that the Liberty Schema lays bare the moral 
content of constitutional rights in the large portion of the free 
speech case law epitomized by the stylized cases, FLAG DESECRA­
TION and CHILD PORNOGRAPHY, and in the entirety of the substan­
tive due process case law, as epitomized by ABORTION. But what of 
367. Cf. SUNSTEIN, supra note 304, at 272 (claiming that "those who stress 'liberty' [in 
defending the abortion right] seem to have no way to respond to those who believe that 
abortion involves the death of a human being"). 
368. On self-regarding choices, see DONALD VANDEVEER, PATERNALISTIC 
lNrERVENTION: THE MORAL BOUNDS OF BENEVOLENCE 58·63 (1986). On autonomy as self­
authorship, and the connection between autonomy and well-being, see RAz, supra note 169, 
at 369-99. I include the "self-regarding" proviso here to make the notion of a distinct zone of 
privacy maximally plausible; whether that proviso is truly needed is a separate question, see 
LAURENCE TRIBE, AMErucAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 1302-14 (2d ed. 1988), which I leave 
open by saying that "at a minimum" self-regarding choices fall within the zone. 
369. In saying this, I do not mean to ignore the possibility that the Liberty and Discrimi­
nation schema might overlap. A rule might go awry both because (1) the rule includes liber­
ties 'vithin its scope without sufficient reason, and (2) the rule is discriminatory (in a sense to 
be made more precise below). Indeed, this may be true of most rules that give rise to suc­
cessful free speech or abortion claims. But the moral difficulties with such doubly problem­
atic rules will not be exhausted by their discriminatory cast; and extending their prohibitory 
scope will not (normally) be a moral cure. For a case that clearly illuminates this point, see 
Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 51-59 (1994) (invalidating rule prohibiting residential signs, but 
not under "discrimination" rationale, because such rationale would leave open possibility of 
curing rule by broadening it). 
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the remaining stylized cases: ALcoHoL, ANIMAL SACRIFICE, and 
RESIDENTIAL PICKETING? ALCOHOL is drawn directly from the 
Court's decision in Craig v. Boren,31o and exemplifies the current 
structure of equal protection doctrine: it is close to a necessary con­
dition for a successful equal protection claim that the rule-predicate 
employ a "suspect" act-property (such as race or gender) or, failing 
that, employ an act-property that is deliberately selected by the leg­
islature to match the scope of a "suspect" property.371 ANIMAL 
SACRIFICE is drawn directly from the Court's decision in Church of 
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 372 and exemplifies 
the current structure of free exercise doctrine, which is now isomor­
phic to equal protection doctrine.373 Unless and until the Court 
reverses its holding in the watershed Smith case,374 it will be a nec­
essary condition for a successful free exercise challenge that the 
rule-predicate pick out actions by virtue of their religious cast, or, 
failing that, be designed to fall along religious lines. As the Court 
explained in Smith: 
[T]he right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obli­
gation to comply with a "valid and neutral law of general applicability 
on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his 
religion prescribes (or proscribes). "375 
370. 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding gender-discriminatory ban on alcohol sales unconstitu-
tional under Equal Protection Clause). · 
371. See supra text accompanying notes 98-108 (discussing current structure of equal pro­
tection doctrine). 
372. 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (holding unconstitutional, under Free Exercise Clause, ordi­
nance that prohibited animal killing and was targeted at Santeria religion). 
373. See supra text accompanying notes 109-13 (discussing current structure of free exer­
cise doctrine). 
374. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. 
Ct. 2157, 2160-61 (1997) (reaffirming Smith). 
375. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) 
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)). I note, again, the special proviso for neutral laws 
that allow for individualized exemptions. See supra note 110. The existence of this proviso 
does not suffice to bring free exercise jurisprudence within the Liberty Schema. If religiously 
motivated actions were constitutional "liberties" in the sense I've defined, i.e., a type of ac­
tion that persons must be constitutionally free to perform absent sufficient reason, then a 
neutral law with no allowance for individualized exemptions could readily encompass and 
constitutionally infringe such liberties. 
Why not argue that Smith is wrongly decided, and that the Free Exercise Clause creates 
"liberties," no less so than the Free Speech Clause and the substantive component of the Due 
Process Clause? See Laycock, supra note 306, at 313 ("Religious liberty is first and foremost 
a guarantee of liberty."). Smith may indeed be wrongly decided, but my basic claim here is 
that the Liberty Schema and the Discrimination Schema make sense of the Supreme Court's 
jurisprudence on free speech, free exercise, equal protection, and substantive due process, 
and fit with plausible construals of the underlying moral criteria. That claim does not depend 
upon Smith's being wrong, and so I will not argue that it is. 
Of course, if Smith were overruled, my claim would remain true; we would, then, simply 
swap the Discrimination Schema for the Liberty Schema as the basic schema for free 
exercise. 
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As for RESIDENTIAL PICKETING, that is drawn directly from the 
Court's decision in Carey v. Brown,376 and illustrates an important 
strand of the free speech case law: cases where the unconstitutional 
rule prohibits actions bearing a conjunction of two or more proper­
ties (such as residential picketing plus non-labor speech), even 
though a broader rule formed by deleting one of these properties 
would not be unconstitutional. The Mosley case377 and the majority 
opinion in R.A. V. provide further examples of this puzzling, but sig­
nificant part of First Amendment jurisprudence.378 
The Liberty Schema cannot account for ALCOHOL, ANIMAL 
SACRIFICE, or RESIDENTIAL PICKETING. In order to subsume the 
rules in these stylized cases under the Liberty Schema, we would 
need to identify appropriate subclasses of liberties that the rules 
encompassed without sufficient reason. But what subclasses would 
those be? The Equal Protection Clause is not standardly defended 
as delineating liberties - it protects blacks, women, and men from 
discriminatory rules; it does not protect actions by blacks, by 
women, or by men379 - and in any event the puzzle would remain 
that a rule prohibiting the purchase of alcohol by blacks (or women 
or men) between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one can be cured 
by extending the prohibition to all persons in that age group.3s0 If 
the initial rule went awry by including within its scope actions that, 
absent sufficient reason, persons should be free to perform, then 
extension would not (normally)381 constitute a moral improvement. 
Given the structural isomorphism between equal protection and 
free exercise, the same points can be made about free exercise 
376. 447 U.S. 455 {1980) {holding unconstitutional, under Free Speech and Equal Protec­
tion Clauses, statute that prohibited residential picketing but exempted labor picketing). 
377. See Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 {1972) (striking down, under Free Speech 
and Equal Protection Clauses, rule prohibiting picketing near school except peaceful labor 
picketing). 
378. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391-96 (1992) (striking down ordinance 
prohibiting hate speech, as content- and viewpoint-discriminatory, despite assumption that 
ordinance had been narrowed to cover only "fighting words"). See generally Kagan, supra 
note 216, at 32-45, 39 (surveying this portion of free speech case law, viz., "content-based 
underinclusion": "the question [in such cases] is whether the government may voluntarily 
promote or protect some (but not all) speech on the basis of content, when none of the 
speech, considered in and of itself, has a constitutional claim to promotion or protection"). 
379. See supra section II.B (surveying theories of equal protection). 
380. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 n.24 {1976). See generally Candace Kovacic, 
Remedying Underinclusive Statutes, 33 WAYNE L. REv. 39, 40-46 {1986) (noting and discuss­
ing proposition that rules violating equal protection, or equality guarantees of statutory law 
or state constitutional law, can be cured through nullification or extension). 
381. I say "normally" to leave open the unusual scenario where broadening a rule that 
violates the Liberty Schema has the effect of strengthening the moral reasons for prohibiting 
the liberties that fall within the rule's scope, and thereby tips the moral balance in favor of 
their prohibition. See supra text accompanying note 333 (noting this possibility). 
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rights. In Smith, the Court decisively rejected the proposition that 
the Free Exercise Clause delineates a class of liberties in the sense 
required by the Liberty Schema; relatedly, it is clear post-Smith that 
a rule prohibiting "the killing of animals for religious purposes" 
could be cured by replacing it with a prohibition against "the killing 
of animals for any purposes, except by a licensed producer of food." 
Finally, what makes a case like REsmENTIAL PICKETING puzzling, 
for free speech purposes, is that this case is structurally distinct 
from FLAG DESECRATION and CmLD PORNOGRAPHY, and structur­
ally similar to .ALCOHOL and ANIMAL SACRIFICE.382 There is suffi­
cient reason to justify prohibiting the class of speech acts, 
"picketing a residence''; indeed, the Court determined precisely 
that in Frisby v. Schultz, where it upheld a general prohibition on 
residential picketing over First Amendment challenge.383 But if this 
is true, then it should also (normally) be true that no First Amend­
ment liberties are violated by prohibiting any proper subclass of the 
Frisby class, particularly the subclass "picketing a residence by non­
labor speakers." 
I suggest that ALCOHOL, ANIMAL SACRIFICE, and RESIDENTIAL 
PICKETING should instead be explained by the following schema. 
The Discrimination Schema 
A rule the predicate of which contains some "morally irrele­
vant" property I of actions - that is, the rule expressly sets 
forth property I in delineating the actions that persons are 
obliged not to perform (or to perform), and that state officials 
are authorized to sanction - may have the wrong predicate. 
There may be sufficient reason, all things considered, to nar­
row the rule, or to extend it, or even to replace the predicate 
with a different but coextensive act-description. If so, constitu­
tional reviewing courts should invalidate the rule. "Morally ir­
relevant" properties are properties such that (1) some moral 
criterion in the Bill of Rights is best understood to stand for 
the proposition that (2) an action's having that property does 
382. It is this puzzle that, in part, explains the flurry of scholarly reactions to the R.A. V. 
decision. See Akhil Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 
106 HAR.v. L. REv. 124 (1992); Kagan, supra note 216; Elena Kagan, Regulation of Hate 
Speech and Pornography after R.A.V., 60 U. Cm. L. REv. 873 (1993); Symposium, Hate 
Speech after R.A.V.: More Conflict Between Free Speech and Equality?, 18 WM. MITCHELL 
L. REv. 889 (1991); Laurence Tribe, The Mystery of Motive, Private and Public: Some Notes 
Inspired by the Problems of Hate Crime and Animal Sacrifice, 1993 SUP. CT. REv. 1. 
383. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988). 
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not, at least in a certain way, increase the moral case for sanc­
tioning or prohibiting it.384 
Note a few points about this schema. First, and most importantly, I 
intend it to provide a unified account of the equal protection case 
law, the (post-Smith) free exercise case law, and the free speech 
case law epitomized by REsmENTIAL PICKETING. The basic idea is 
that an actor's race, his or her gender, his or her religion, and the 
viewpoint he or she expresses, is "morally irrelevant," at least in a 
certain way. Black persons and women are not moral inferiors to 
white men, and white men are not moral superiors to black persons 
and women. For none is it the case that, by virtue of his or her race 
or gender, his or her well-being counts for less or more. (Thus for 
none is it the case that his or her actions are the actions of a moral 
inferior or superior, and therefore more or less properly coerced or 
sanctioned.) The "moral irrelevance" of race and gender in this 
fundamental sense - what Dworkin calls the moral right to "equal 
concern and respect"385 - has been a central theme in scholarship 
about the Equal Protection Clause.386 My suggestion is that we 
might plausibly develop similar notions of "moral irrelevance" for 
the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses. At the very minimum, 
these clauses mean that the actions of a religiously-motivated actor 
are not morally worse, qua his religious motivation, and similarly 
that the actions of an actor expressing viewpoint V rather than W 
are not morally worse, qua his expression of V. Anyone who 
384. This schema could be broadened to include facially neutral rules that are motivated 
by a discriminatory purpose, see Personnel Admr. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271-80 {1979) 
(stating that such rules trigger heightened equal protection scrutiny) - for example, by un­
derstanding "discriminatory purpose" as the intention of legislators, in enacting the neutral 
rule, to match the extension of some rule having irrelevant property I in its predicate. For 
simplicity, however, I will not broaden the schema in this way. 
385. See DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 1, at 272-78, 273 ("[Govern­
ment] must not distribute goods or opportunities unequally on the ground that some citizens 
are entitled to more because they are worthy of more concern."). 
386. Besides Dworkin, see, e.g., Brest, supra note 238, at 6 {"Race-dependent decisions 
are irrational insofar as they reflect the assumption that members of one race are less worthy 
than other people."); ELY, supra note 253, at 82 (stating that the Equal Protection Clause 
"preclude[s] a refusal to represent [minorities], the denial to minorities of what Professor 
Dworkin has called 'equal concern and respect' " (footnote omitted)); Fiss, supra note 108, at 
155 ("Blacks are what might be called a specially disadvantaged group, and I would view the 
Equal Protection Clause as a protection for such groups."); KOPPELMAN, supra note 219, at 9 
("Stigmatized social status and the concomitant withholding of respect are . . .  the central evil 
the [antidiscrimination] project seek to remedy . . • .  "); SUNSTEIN, supra note 304, at 338-46 
{arguing that the Equal Protection Clause incorporates anti-caste principle). Obviously, 
these authors develop specific theories of equal protection doctrine that are quite diverse -
and indeed some develop theories focused upon race discrimination, rather than gender dis­
crimination, see ELY, supra, at 164-70 - but the point remains that the moral equality of 
group Z (races or genders or other groups) is an animating principle behind each author's 
defense of an equal-protection doctrine protecting group Z. 
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adopts a more robust construal of the clauses - for example, as 
delineating "liberties" in the sense sketched out by the Liberty 
Schema, as protecting us from religious strife, or as guaranteeing a 
vie\vpoint-balanced public debate - can surely agree to this mini­
mum claim. 
Note, however, that the Discrimination Schema is quite careful 
not to define precisely what "moral irrelevance" means. For exam­
ple, it is indisputable that race and gender are "morally irrelevant," 
in the sense of not constituting persons as inferior or superior, and 
further that moral irrelevance in this foundational sense is part of 
the best understanding of the equal protection guarantee set forth 
in the Fourteenth Amendment. Whether race and gender are also 
"morally irrelevant" in the further sense that (1) these characteris­
tics are never correlated with proscribable characteristics,387 (2) ra­
cist and sexist preferences have no weight, within a utilitarian 
calculus,388 or (3) the needs and capacities of men and women are 
no different, are matters for debate. Relatedly, the schema does 
not say that race or gender are "morally irrelevant" in the sense of 
never being properly set forth by a rule. That is clearly not the case 
for gender, in the Court's view; the Court has upheld gender­
discriminatory laws.389 Someone who wants wrongful gender­
discriminatory rules to be invalidated, by constitutional reviewing 
courts, is not committed to the claim that rules should never dis­
criminate by gender. All he is committed to is some, more founda­
tional, sense of "moral irrelevance" such that the rightness or 
wrongness of gender discrimination is an appropriate issue for con­
stitutional courts to consider. 
Finally, the schema is careful not to specify exactly why suffi­
cient reason obtains to change the predicate of some rule setting 
forth an irrelevant property L Most simply: if a rule prohibits ac­
tions with properties I & W, and I neither serves in any way to 
make actions worse, nor correlates in any way with wrong-making 
properties, then there is presumably sufficient moral reason to nar­
row or extend the rule (with the moral choice of narrowing vs. ex-
387. See Brest, supra note 238, at 6 (claiming possible statistical correlation between race 
and legitimate bases for government regulation). 
388. See ScARRE, supra note 46, at 162-66 (arguing that a debased preference, 
paradigmatically a preference to harm someone whom the holder takes not to be equally 
human, is not constitutive of happiness and therefore does not count within a utilitarian 
calculus). 
389. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding draft registration of 
men but not women); Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding gender­
discriminatory statutory rape law); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (upholding 
gender-discriminatory provision of Social Security Act). 
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tending depending on the wrongfulness of W alone). But the 
schema also leaves open the possibility that a rule-predicate setting 
forth I should be changed even if I is correlated with wrong-making 
properties. The Court in Craig v. Boren apparently did just this, 
striking down Oklahoma's law prohibiting the sale of low-alcohol 
beer to men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one, even 
though Oklahoma's statistics suggested that men were significantly 
more likely to drink and drive than women.39° One might explain 
Craig by appealing to the notion of stigma, or to the exemplary 
effects of gender-discrimination; one might say that, even though 
gender is a good proxy for Oklahoma, the Oklahoma law would 
serve as an (unfortunate) example that would encourage unjustified 
discrimination by other actors. The conditions under which the 
state properly relies upon race, gender, religion, or viewpoint as the 
basis for regulating actions is a matter for substantive debate within 
the jurisprudence of equality, religion, and speech. I mean the Dis­
crimination Schema to anticipate, not to resolve such debates. 
How else might cases like ALcoHOL, ANIMAL SACRIFICE, and 
RESIDENTIAL PICKETING be explained, within the Derivative Ac­
count, if not by appeal to the Discrimination Schema? One alterna­
tive is to describe particular, unwanted outcomes, one or another of 
which the rules in these cases allegedly produce; these rules stigma­
tize women or blacks, exacerbate the distributive injustice already 
suffered by low-status groups, skew public debate, ignite religious 
strife, and so on, or so the outcome theorist might argue.391 The 
difficulty here is as follows: unless the outcome theorist can pro­
duce outcomes that are essentially connected to a rule's using par­
ticular, "suspect" predicates such as race, gender, religion, or 
viewpoint, she has not satisfactorily explained the case law. Stigma 
is this kind of outcome, but only works for ALcoHOL. The further 
outcomes I have listed - and others that plausibly fit the moral 
concepts of equal protection, free speech, and free exercise - are 
not essentially connected to particular rule-predicates. A race­
neutral law can have a disproportionate impact on blacks;392 a 
390. See Simons, supra note 231, at 479 n.107 (discussing Craig) ("In the state's view, 
statistics indicated that 2% of the males posed the harm [drunk driving], but only 0.18% of 
the females. If the statistics were valid {and there were some serious problems with them) 
they indicated a ten fold geometric differential harm . . . .  "). 
391. See supra text accompanying notes 304-07 (noting possible outcomes, to ground pos­
sible rule-validity schema within constitutional law). 
392. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (upholding race-neutral qualifying 
exam, which had disproportionate impact upon blacks); Personnel Admr. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 
256 (1979) (upholding gender-neutral civil service preference for veterans, which had dispro­
portionate impact upon women). 
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viewpoint-neutral law can have a disproportionate impact on speak­
ers with a particular viewpoint;393 a neutral law that burdens one 
group's religious practices might well be perceived by that group as 
unfair.394 
The reader might object that the case law is crazy; any decent 
rule-invalidity schema, she might claim, will identify certain impor­
tant types of actions (liberties) that persons should be free to per­
form, or certain bad outcomes that there is strong moral reason to 
avoid, but not certain types of descriptions under which rules 
wrongly regulate actions. Yet I fail to see the craziness. A given 
rule-invalidity schema must, at a minimum, be one that courts are 
epistemically and otherwise competent to enforce.395 Further, it 
must be tied to the moral criteria set forth in the Bill of Rights. So 
we can argue about which liberties are thus tied (liberty of con­
tract? liberty of religion?), and which act-properties are thus tied 
(viewpoint? religion? race?).  But it is not crazy to think that the 
Bill of Rights, besides protecting certain liberties or safeguarding 
against certain outcomes, also stands for certain moral propositions: 
the propositions that particular natural or conventional properties 
of actors and actions do, or do not, have moral relevance, in various 
ways. To recur to Dworkin: the Equal Protection Clause might 
guarantee, not equal treatment, but equal concern and respect.396 
It might require, not that blacks and whites be treated equally well, 
but that governmental decisions not be grounded upon the proposi-
Similarly, a race-neutral law can lead to the unequal treatment of blacks and whites, 
within a Tus=anltenBroek type theory. Imagine that the law is both irrational, relative to 
valid purposes, and has a disparate impact upon blacks. 
393. A plausible example is United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (upholding pro­
hibition on destruction of draft cards), which presumably had a disproportionate impact upon 
anti-war speech. The outcome theorist might respond that courts are epistemically poorly 
suited to determine whether neutral laws skew debate; but unless they are epistemically well­
placed to distinguish between speech-targeted laws that do and do not skew debate (which 
seems implausible, given the initial premise) this outcome theory turns out to be both exten­
sionally equivalent to my Discrimination Schema, and a cruder explanation of the jurispru­
dence. Consider a case such as R.A. V.; it is very hard to believe that an imbalance in the 
class of viewpoints expressed by speakers of "fighting words" is a constitutionally problem­
atic outcome as such. Rather, a morally suboptimal rule that picks out a viewpoint-based 
subclass of "fighting words" is unconstitutional because its predicate employs the morally 
irrelevant property of viewpoint. (How could such a rule be morally suboptimal? If, for 
example, the utterance of fighting words is truly harmful, extending the rule to include all 
speakers of fighting words would presumably constitute a moral improvement). 
394. A plausible example is Smith itself. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 
890 (1990) (upholding sanctions against Native Americans who used peyote for sacramental 
purposes). 
395. See Adler, supra note 4, at 771-80 (arguing that epistemic and other institutional 
defects are grounds to limit judicial enforcement of constitutional criteria). 
396. See DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 1, at 227 (distinguishing be­
tween these two versions of "equality"). 
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tion that blacks and whites are morally different simply by virtue of 
their race. Unless the concept of discrimination is constitutionally 
crazy, my schema and the case law are not. The concept of a rule or 
decision being discriminatory just is the concept of the decision hav­
ing a particular unwarranted basis, grounds, or predicate, rather 
than having a particular unwarranted outcome.397 
A rule must produce some kind of unwarranted outcome to sat­
isfy the Discrimination Schema; there must be sufficient reason to 
change the predicate of the rule in some measure. But my schema 
is not tied to particular outcomes; it is tied, in a way that fits the 
case law, to a rule's use of "irrelevant" predicates such that, in the 
end, the rule somehow goes awry. The account is perched, as it 
were, between outcome theories and process theories of discrimina­
tion.398 Outcome theories are problematic, for the reasons I have 
just adduced. Process theories are even worse. At best the process 
theorist might try to defend the Direct A�count, as against the De­
rivative Account. But this is morally dilutive, for reasons I have 
already explained. And once she moves to the framework of the 
Derivative Account - once she concedes that reviewing courts are 
essentially concerned with the repeal or amendment of rules, not 
the treatment of particular litigants - the process theory becomes 
even weaker. A rule such that (a) false beliefs figured in the enact­
ment of the rule, but (b) the rule-predicate turns out, coinciden­
tally, to be morally perfect, is not a rule that reviewing courts 
should repeal or amend. It is a rule that courts should affirm, inso­
far as courts can reliably determine the rule's perfection! False leg­
islative beliefs should matter to reviewing courts just insofar as 
these beliefs lead legislatures to enact flawed outcomes, or partly 
constitute flawed outcomes (as in the case of stigma), or evidence 
flawed outcomes. They do not matter as such. 
The only way around this is to argue that process is intrinsically 
valuable for groups, and that false beliefs about these groups hin­
ders their political participation. This is one of the variants of pro­
cess theory, which I briefly mentioned above.399 But this sort of 
participation-enhancing process theory has the deeply counterintui­
tive consequence that, if blacks and whites in a segregated society 
397. See Brest, supra note 238, at 1 {"By the 'antidiscrimination principle' I mean the 
general principle disfavoring classifications and other decisions and practices that depend on 
the race (or ethnic origin) of the parties affected."). 
398. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 219, at 16 (distinguishing between these two types of 
theories). 
399. See supra text accompanying notes 251-55. 
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share prejudices against blacks, and together participate in the pro­
cess of enacting a racially discriminatory law that, morally, ought to 
be changed, no violation of the Equal Protection Clause has en­
sued. A racially discriminatory rule can be morally wrong, and con­
stitutionally awry, independent of black participation.4oo 
3. Rights for Wrongdoers 
Let us now return to the puzzle that my stylized cases are meant 
to exemplify, and that the Direct Account proved unable to resolve: 
How can it violate X's constitutional rights to sanction him for per­
forming a particular action A, or to coerce him not to perform that 
action, pursuant to rule R, even if that very action is wrongful and 
thus properly sanctioned or coerced pursuant to a different rule? 
An initial point bears mention here. Nothing in the Derivative 
Account itself entails that the only persons who can secure the judi­
cial invalidation of sanction-backed, duty-conferring rules are per­
sons who secure the invalidation of their own sanctions or duties. 
To say that some rule R "violates X's constitutional rights," within 
the Derivative Account, simply means that (a) the rule R fails a 
constitutional rule-validity schema (such as the Liberty Schema, the 
Discrimination Schema, or some other); such that (b) the court 
properly invalidates R, by issuing a revised rule R' (either a narrow­
ing amendment, or a wholesale repeal, or even an extension401), at 
the instance of X X might, in theory, be just a concerned citizen.402 
Or X might be a victim of wrongdoers, who hopes to broaden the 
scope of R. 403 Or X might be an actor sanctioned pursuant to R, 
which the Court partly invalidates, but without invalidating the por-
400. More precisely, this objection is problematic for an intrinsic-process theory that pur­
ports to be an exclusive theory of constitutional antidiscrimination norms. What about devel­
oping such a theory as a supplement to my Discrimination Schema, along the following lines: 
a morally optimal rule, such that prejudices among the rule-formulators hindered (intrinsi­
cally valuable) participation by disfavored groups in the rule-formulation process, is uncon­
stitutional and should be invalidated? Whatever the independent merits of this 
supplementary theory, it is not a particularly good account of the case law insofar as that 
relies upon judicial assessment of rule-predicates rather than direct historical evidence of the 
beliefs that figured in the formulation of rules - for if a rule-predicate is morally optimal, 
the fact that it contains a morally irrelevant property I is little evidence of a prejudiced rule­
formulation process. 
401. See Kovacic, supra note 380, at 40-46 (noting that courts frequently remedy benefit­
conferring rules that violate equal protection by extending their coverage). 
402. But see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (rejecting, on standing 
grounds, challenge to administrative regulation despite statutory provision authorizing "any 
person" to bring suit). 
403. But see Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973) (holding that mother has no 
standing to seek broader scope of criminal prohibition against nonpayment of child support). 
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tion of the rule applicable to X 404 These possibilities are not ruled 
out by the logic of the Derivative Account, itself. They may, to 
some extent, be ruled out by the standing component of Article III 
of the Constitution405 - but this standing requirement is extrinsic 
to the Derivative Account, in the sense that a personal setback to X 
himself is, on the Derivative Account, no precondition for X's 
power to secure the judicial invalidation of a constitutionally invalid 
rule. 
I believe, in truth, that Article III does not require X to secure 
an improvement in her own legal position (that is, judicial relief 
from a sanction or duty) for a court to invalidate rule R at X's in­
stance.406 Whatever else standing requires, it does not require that. 
But I will not attempt to defend this view of standing, for the Deriv­
ative Account is, strictly, agnostic on the issue407 - and, in any 
event, all of the constitutional cases in which the Court has invali­
dated sanction-backed, duty-conferring rules have been cases where 
the claimant's own legal position was improved.408 This is the sce­
nario that our stylized cases are meant to exemplify - the scenario 
in which X's sanction or duty pursuant to rule R violates her consti­
tutional rights. On the Derivative Account, to say that means not 
merely that (a) the rule R fails a constitutional rule-validity schema 
(such as the Liberty Schema, the Discrimination Schema, or some 
other); and that (b) the court properly invalidates R, by issuing a 
revised rule R' (either a narrowing amendment, or a wholesale re­
peal, or even an extension), at the instance of X; but that further ( c) 
X's treatment (her sanction or duty) is not authorized by R'. Why 
does (c) occur, in our stylized cases? 
404. Cf. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Assn., 486 U.S. 466, 472-80 {1988) {holding that rule 
regulating direct-mail solicitation by lawyers violated commercial-speech test, and then sepa­
rately considering whether claimant's own letter was "particularly overreaching," viz., 
whether that letter fell outside the properly-invalidated portion of the rule). 
405. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-52 {1984) (setting forth and explaining 
black-letter standing doctrine under Article III). 
406. I say that, in part, because otherwise judicial nullification rather than extension of 
benefit-conferring rules also would violate Article III. See Kovacic, supra note 380, at 40-46 
(noting that nullification sometimes chosen as remedy for benefit-conferring rules). But see 
Dorf, supra note 38, at 294 {claiming that "any constitutional challenge to a statute . . .  is as­
applied in the sense that adjudication in federal court . . .  requires that the statute be applied 
to the litigant to create a case or controversy"). 
407. This is not to say that the truth of the Derivative Account has no implications for 
standing doctrine. It is rather to say that standing limitations must be defended on grounds 
other than the nature of constitutional rights. This very fact - the fact that standing is ex­
trinsic to the Derivative Account, by contrast with the Direct Account - has very important 
implications. I discuss those implications a bit more below. See infra text accompanying 
notes 573-86. 
408. I know of no counterexample. See infra note 426 and accompanying text. 
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Take FLAG DESECRATION as an example. A rule R provides 
that "no person shall desecrate a flag of the United States." X 
bums a flag, and in the course of doing so batters a bystander, com­
mits arson, and pollutes the environment. She is sanctioned pursu­
ant to R, and brings suit challenging the rule and, specifically, her 
sanction. Rule R is unconstitutional: it violates the Liberty 
Schema. So on the Derivative Account the reviewing court should 
repeal, narrow, or perhaps even extend R: it should issue a revision 
R'. But what is R'? And why doesn't it authorize X's sanction? 
Consider these possibilities: 
- R' might be a retroactive and prospective repeal of R. If so, 
X's sanction is not authorized by R' (which has zero scope), 
and the court overturns X's sanction as part of its replacement 
of R with R'. FLAG DESECRATION is explained by the Deriva­
tive Account. 
- R' might be a prospective-only repeal of R. If so, X's sanc­
tion is authorized by R' - R' is identical to R for past actions 
such as X's - and the court does not overturn X's sanction as 
part of its replacement of R with R'. FLAG DESECRATION is 
not explained by the Derivative Account. 
- R' might be a retroactive and prospective amendment of R, 
to the following effect: "No person shall desecrate a flag of the 
United States, if in the course of doing so she commits trespass, 
battery, arson, or pollution." If so, X's sanction is authorized 
by R', and the court does not overturn that sanction as part of 
its replacement of R with R'. FLAG DESECRATION is not ex­
plained by the Derivative Account. 
In short, to explain the stylized cases, we need a view about R' -
that is, a remedial view. We need a view about the kind of revisions 
to an unconstitutional rule that a reviewing court should promul­
gate, once the court has determined that the rule fails a rule-validity 
schema. 
A remedial view will have two components. One component, as 
the above examples suggest, is temporal. We need to decide 
whether the amendment, extension, or repeal of R should be solely 
prospective, retrospective as well as prospective, solely retrospec­
tive, or perhaps some esoteric combination (for example, prospec­
tive in general, retrospective for X as a incentive payment). This 
temporal structure might be the same across rule-validity schema; 
or it might vary from schema to schema. I noted earlier that the 
concept of liberty, and therewith the Liberty Schema, is essentially 
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forward-looking.409 A rule violates the Liberty Schema by coercing 
feture actors not to perform some subclass of liberties such that, all 
things considered, the actors should be free to perform these. This 
cuts in favor of a prospective-only view of R', at least for the Lib­
erty Schema. On the other hand, an incentive argument may suffi­
ciently explain why, for some X who is sanctioned pursuant to a 
rule that (solely) fails the Liberty Schema, X's own sanction should 
be overturned (and not just X's prospective duty, along with every­
one else's).410 
It is well beyond the scope of this article to develop a specific 
theory of the temporal structure of judicial remedies in constitu­
tional cases. It is plausible - although I will not develop or defend 
a firm position on this - that the correct theory makes remedies at 
least retroactive to the constitutional litigant. No less an authority 
than Ronald Dworkin has sketched out the pragmatic grounds for 
adjudicative retroactivity. 
[I]f the pragmatist judge thinks the matter through, he will . . .  reject 
[the] technique of "prospective-only" rulemaking, except in very spe­
cial circumstances. For he will realize that if this technique became 
popular, people who might benefit from new, forward-looking rules 
would lose their incentive to bring to court novel cases in which these 
new rules might be announced for the future. People litigate such 
cases {which is both risky and expensive) only because they believe 
that if they succeed in persuading some judge that a new rule [for our 
purposes, a new ruling that a statute, etc., is unconstitutional] would 
be in the public interest, that new rule will be applied retrospectively 
in their own favor.411 
Further, the Discrimination Schema - in my view a central part of 
constitutional law, along with the Liberty Schema - is not essen­
tially prospective. The pattern of sanctions produced by a law 
prohibiting "the purchase of alcohol by men between eighteen and 
twenty-one" or "the sacrifice of animals for religious purposes," or 
"residential picketing by non-labor groups" is morally suboptimal. 
Such a pattern obtains because state officials have followed a deci­
sion rule that overweights the moral relevance of gender, religion, 
or speech. And the same can be said about the pattern of sanctions 
produced by ABORTION, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY, and FLAG DESE­
CRATION, to the extent the rules here are seen to fail both the Lib-
409. See supra text accompanying notes 211-13. 
410. See Jill E. F!Sch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 
HARv. L. REv. 1055, 1083 & n.172 (1997) (noting incentive argument for retroactivity of 
judicial remedies). 
411. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 156 (1986). 
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erty Schema and the Discrimination Schema.412 Finally (although 
this doctrinal point may well rest, in part, upon a robust view of 
adjudication inconsistent with the Derivative Account) it is now 
Supreme Court doctrine for both criminal and civil cases that the 
federal courts cannot announce legal rights nonretroactively.413 For 
all these reasons, it is likely or at least plausible that the remedies in 
our stylized cases will be retroactive; there will be no temporal bar 
to overturning X's sanction, assuming his action A falls outside the 
predicate of R'. 
But will it? The second component of the remedial view is pred­
icative: a view about the appropriate judicial revision to the predi­
cate of R. 414 The possibilities, here, are myriad but the two most 
salient alternatives are as follows. First, the court might facially in­
validate R: it might issue an utterance which renders R a nullity 
(within the proper temporal range).415 This could be a permanent 
nullification of R. More plausibly, though, the court's facial invali­
dation of R will leave open the possibility that the body responsible 
for issuing authoritative interpretations of R (be it an agency or a 
state supreme court) can cure R's constitutional defects, and revive 
its legal authority, through a narrowing interpretation.416 Second, 
the court might optimally revise R. The court might promulgate 
what it takes to be the morally optimal revision to R, whether that 
be a facial invalidation, a partial invalidation, an extension, a partial 
invalidation plus a partial extension, or a predicate-change without 
a scope change - subject again perhaps to subsequent re-revision 
by R's authoritative interpreter.417 
412. See supra note 369 (discussing possibility of double violation). 
413. See FISch, supra note 410, at 1059-63 (summarizing doctrine). 
414. The classic discussion of this remedial issue remains Robert Stem, Separability and 
Separability Clauses in the Supreme Court, 51 HARv. L. REv. 76, 82-106 (1937). 
415. See Dorf, supra note 38, at 251-81 (discussing Court's actual use of facial invalidation 
in various contexts, including free speech, privacy, and equal protection). 
416. See Fallon, supra note 83, at 854-55 ("All that the Supreme Court says when it holds 
a state statute overbroad, and all that it could say, is that the statute as authoritatively con­
strued by the state courts prior to the Supreme Court's judgment is too sweeping to be en­
forced through the imposition of civil or criminal penalties. Following the Court's decision, it 
remains within the discretion of state authorities to seek limiting constructions of the affected 
statute in state court actions for declaratory judgments."). This proviso is irrelevant where 
the federal court is, itself, the body responsible for authoritatively construing the statute, see 
id. at 853 n.3, although it is seriously questionable whether - given the Court's decision in 
Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) - that is ever the case. 
See, e.g., Dan Kahan, ls Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARv. L. REv. 469 
(1996) (arguing for Chevron deference to Department of Justice with respect to federal crimi­
nal statutes). 
417. I stress that this is a salient possibility - the purest alternative to a facial­
invalidation view. Obviously, there are intermediate possibilities between facial invalidation 
and optimal revision, for example, that a court should either (1) prom.ulgate a standard type 
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The moral considerations in favor of the facial-invalidation view 
go to the epistemic benefits of specialization. Society is made bet­
ter off, morally, by having different legal bodies specialize in differ­
ent types of moral questions. 418 Plausibly, then, federal 
constitutional courts should only be legally responsible for deciding 
whether a rule fails some rule-validity schema grounded in the Bill 
of Rights; while legislatures, agencies, and other bodies responsible 
for enacting or authoritatively interpreting rules should have the 
task of choosing between alternative rules, all of which satisfy the 
constitutional rule-validity schema.419 For example, the advocate of 
this view will say, it is not the proper judicial role to decide whether 
the rule in .ALcoHoL ("no black person between eighteen and 
twenty-one may purchase alcohol") should be extended to "no per­
son between eighteen and twenty-one may purchase alcohol," or 
repealed (leaving intact a background prohibition on alcohol­
purchase by all persons under eighteen). Both of these alternatives 
satisfy the Discrimination Schema and Liberty Schema, as does the 
alternative of repealing both the rule and the background prohibi­
tion; only one of these three is morally optimal, but that is not a 
constitutional question. Rather, the court should facially invalidate 
the racially discriminatory no-alcohol rule, leaving the choice be­
tween the various racially neutral alternatives to the legislature or 
agency. A constitutional reviewing court has no reliable basis to 
make this latter choice - or so the advocate of facial invalidation 
will argue. 
The moral considerations in favor of the optimal-revision view 
go to the moral losses that ensue from facial invalidation of rules.420 
of narrowing amendment to R, if such amendment cures R; or (2) failing that, facially invali· 
date R only if that is a moral improvement over R. Something like this intermediate possibil­
ity seems, in fact, to map onto current remedial practices within the free speech case law. 
The Court frequently relies here on facial invalidation, see infra note 425, but it does not do 
so universally, see id. (citing partial invalidations), and the requirement of "substantial" over­
breadth, see Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615-16 (1973), might be understood to 
map onto (2). See also Note, The Firsi Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REv. 
844, 882-911 (1970) (arguing for facial invalidation of substantially overbroad rules, except 
where there exists a clear, per se category within free speech doctrine such that a judicial 
narrowing of the rule to exempt that category cures the rule). 
418. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 169, 282-86 (discussing epistemic basis for legal 
authority). 
419. For a recent and exemplary expression of this kind of view, see Reno v. ACLU, 117 
S. Ct. 2329, 2350-51 (1997) (facially rather than partly invalidating law restricting speech on 
internet, and arguing that to do otherwise would amount to an "invasion of the legislative 
domain," absent a "clear line" for redrafting the statute evident from its text or legislative 
history). 
420. See, e.g., Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, 472 U.S. 491, 501-07 (1985) (stating that 
partial, rather than facial invalidation is normally the proper judicial response to an unconsti­
tutional statute); Stem, supra note 414, at 101 ("[In remedying unconstitutional statutes] the 
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Facially invalidating the rule in ALcoHOL would leave persons be­
tween eighteen and twenty-one free to purchase alcohol; facially 
invalidating the rule in R.EsIDENTIAL PICKETING would leave 
householders at the mercy of picketers; facially invalidating the rule 
in CHILD PORNOGRAPHY would leave child pornographers free to 
exploit children; facially invalidating the rule in ABORTION would 
leave viable fetuses unprotected. These considerations are particu­
larly pressing where the morally optimal revision of an unconstitu­
tional rule is, or seems to be, a relatively small revision relative to 
the set of actions covered by the rule. For example, the morally 
optimal revision of a rule that picks out nonexpressive properties of 
actions, but violates the Liberty Schema by encompassing speech­
acts, is normally to exclude speech from the rule rather than to re­
peal the rule entirely. No one wants to get rid of the trespass 
laws,421 not even those who want proselytizers and political protes­
ters to be free to trespass. 
It is, again, beyond the scope of this article to choose among the 
facial-invalidation view, the optimal-revision view, and something 
in between. The issue merits an article on its own. Among other 
difficulties, I should note that the appropriate view may well de- -
pend on the constitutional clause or rule-validity schema at stake;422 
on the strategic incentives of actors who can secure facial, as op­
posed to partial invalidations of rules;423 and on the existence of a 
statutory or regulatory severability clause for R (guiding its revision 
in the event R is held unconstitutional).424 Let me merely suggest 
here that the facial-invalidation view is plausibly the correct one for 
a substantial portion of the rules that reviewing courts review. 
(This suggestion, like my temporal suggestion, is borne out by the 
Court's actual practices: many, perhaps even most of the cases in 
which the Court has sustained claims of constitutional right, against 
conduct-regulating rules, have been facial invalidations rather than 
Court should look to the policy sought to be effectuated by the statute and decide whether 
that policy will be more nearly attained by partial application or by complete nullification of 
the law."). 
421. See Alexander, supra note 7, at 552. 
422. See supra note 144 (discussing Court's reliance on as-applied challenges within free 
speech, but not equal protection case law). 
423. Cf. JERRY MAsHAw, GREED, CHAos AND GoVERNANCE 177 (1997) (noting, in 
administrative-law context, that parties may use preenforcement review to thwart necessary 
rulemaking, given the cheapness of preenforcement litigation as opposed to compliance). 
424. See Stem, supra note 414, at 100-01. For recent discussions of severability clauses, 
see Mark Movsesian, Severability in Statutes and Contracts, 30 GA. L. REv. 41 (1995); John 
Copeland Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L. REv. 203 (1993); Adrian Vermeule, Saving 
Constructions, 85 GEo. LJ. 1945 (1997). 
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partial invalidations.425 And the Court has never, to my knowl­
edge, extended a conduct-regulating rule.426) To the extent that the 
facial-invalidation view holds good, we have a simple explanation of 
the stylized cases. These rules go morally awry, breaching constitu­
tional rule-validity schema. The reviewing court's legal role is to 
repeal (facially invalidate) a rule that does so, rather than changing 
the rule's predicate to what the court takes to be morally optimal. 
In particular, it is not the court's legal role to decide whether the 
optimal cure of R encompasses X's particular action A. Therefore, 
X has the legal right to trigger the complete repeal of rule R and 
therewith the invalidation of his own sanction, quite independent of 
whether X's action happens to be wrongful under another 
description. 
425. To check the frequency of facial invalidation, I identified and examined the cases 
during the 10 Terms from 1987-88 to 1996-97 in which the Court invalidated conduct-regulat­
ing rules against private parties, under the Free Speech Clause (leaving aside vagueness), 
Free Exercise Clause, Equal Protection Clause, and the substantive component of the Due 
Process Clause. I identified 23 such cases. Fourteen, a majority, are best categorized as facial 
invalidations (i.e., cases where the Court invalidated an entire provision or sentence, an en­
tire textually-defined portion thereof, or some other block of canonical text). See Reno v. 
' ACLU, 117 S. Ct 2329 (1997); Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 
U.S. 727 (1996); 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996); Mcintyre v. Ohio Elec­
tions Comm., 514 U.S. 334 (1995); Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994); Church of the Lukumi 
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833 (1992); Lee v. International Socy. for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. 830 (1992); 
R.A.V. v. City of St Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the 
N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 
(1990); Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989); Riley v. National Fedn. of 
the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988). 
Nine, a minority, are best categorized as partial invalidations. See Colorado Republican 
Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 
476 (1995); Ibanez v. Florida Dept. of Bus. & Profl. Regulation, 512 U.S. 136 (1994); Eden· 
field v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410 
(1993); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disci· 
plinary Commn., 496 U.S. 91 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Shapero v. Ken· 
tucky Bar Assn., 486 U.S. 466 (1988). Notably, all nine are free-speech cases. 
Obviously, this is a small sample, and (even within this sample) categorizing judicial hold· 
ings as facial versus partial invalidations involves some judgment, but the results still suggest 
that many, perhaps even most of the Court's constitutional decisions sustaining rights-claims 
against conduct-regulating rules are facial invalidations. I should stress that my definition of 
"facial" invalidation, here - invalidating an entire rule, on some kind of text-based individu· 
ation criterion - is considerably broader than the special definition appropriate for the no· 
tion of "facial" invalidation within the context of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty and 
other legislature-centered arguments for judicial restraint. See Adler, supra note 4, at 794 
n.104. 
426. See Kovacic, supra note 380, at 42. Cf. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 543 
(1942) (holding unconstitutional a state statute providing for sterilization of habitual 
criminals, under Equal Protection Clause, and remanding for state supreme court to decide 
whether to cure unconstitutionality by extension or invalidation of statute); People v. 
Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567 (N.Y. 1984) (holding unconstitutional state rape and sodomy statutes 
exempting married persons and women, under Equal Protection Clause, and curing unconsti· 
tutionality by extension). 
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Is this appeal to judicial role question-begging? No and yes. 
No, in the following sense. In this article, I have discussed various 
possible legal practices - various specific conceptions of the legal 
practice of judicial review. One possible practice is act-shielding: 
constitutional courts determine whether particular actions should 
be protected by legal shields and, if so, issue shielding orders. An­
other possible practice is rule-centered: constitutional courts deter­
mine whether particular rules should be invalidated and, if so, issue 
invalidation orders. The facial-invalidation practice is a specific 
variant of this latter, rule-centered view; the optimal-revision prac­
tice is another. As between these various possible practices, we can 
decide which one is morally optimal. Would a world in which 
courts follow Practice1 be better or worse, morally, than a world in 
which they follow Practicei? I assume there are good arguments in 
favor of the rule-centered practice, since that is, in fact, ours; I fur­
ther suggest that there are good arguments in favor of the facial­
invalidation version of a rule-centered practice. 
Let us assume these arguments are right. The facial-invalidation 
practice is morally optimal, as between the various review-practices. 
The Supreme Court, or some other body which possesses legal 
power to define the practice of judicial review, promulgates this 
one. It still remains an open moral question why a particular judge, 
faced with a particular litigant, should adhere to this legally binding 
(and, by hypothesis, morally optimal) practice.427 This is just the 
problem of legal authority, in another guise. What if the particular 
judge is a moral expert, and knows that about himself, and further 
knows that X has done wrong, and finally knows that upholding X's 
particular sanction is more important morally than invalidating the 
particular rule R at stake, even though in general a (retrospective) 
facial-invalidation practice is morally optimal? Nothing in my 
moral arguments for the optimality of promulgating this practice 
guarantees that each and every participant in the practice in fact 
has conclusive, moral reason to adhere to it. How to generate 
moral reasons at the participant-level, from moral reasons at the 
practice-level, remains one of the deepest and most difficult ques­
tions of jurisprudence. I will not try to answer that question. What 
427. See SCHAUER, supra note 58, at 128-34, 129 (discussing "asymmetry of authority": 
the existence of "a (good moral) reason for imposing" a rule does not, or may not, entail the 
existence of "a (good moral) reason for obeying" it); Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, The 
Deceptive Nature of Rules, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 1191 (1994) (discussing "asymmetry of author­
ity" and concomitant use of "deception" by rule-formulator); see also Rawls, supra note 198, 
at 3 (distinguishing between moral justification for a general practice, and moral justification 
for a particular application of the practice). 
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can be said is that, if our expert judge upholds X's sanction despite 
the official promulgation of a retrospective, facial-invalidation prac­
tice, the judge has acted illegally. He may have acted morally, but 
(if the facial-invalidation practice, by its terms, contains no moral 
escape clause) the judge has not honored X's legal rights. 
In short: I cannot show, and will not suggest, that particular 
judges, faced with particular litigants, always have conclusive moral 
reason to honor the litigant's legal rights. What I might show, and 
will suggest, is that it is plausibly morally best for litigants to have 
the following legal right: the legal right to trigger a retrospective 
facial invalidation of rules that fail constitutional rule-validity 
schema. 
But what if this latter suggestion is wrong? The Supreme Court 
does not universally follow a facial-invalidation practice. Some­
times the Court partly invalidates rules instead of wholly repealing 
them;428 and, albeit not in the case of conduct-regulating rules, the 
Court sometimes remedies an unconstitutional rule by extending 
the rule's scope.429 I have synthesized these various alternatives, to 
a facial-invalidation practice, with the notion of an optimal-revision 
practice. Optimal revision, again, says this: the proper judicial rem­
edy, upon a judicial determination that a rule R breaches one or 
another constitutional rule-validity schema, is to issue an utterance 
promulgating (if only temporarily, pending legislative or adminis­
trative action) a rule R', which the court takes to be the morally 
optimal revision to R. 
If this practice (or something close to it) obtains, we will have a 
difficult -time explaining RESIDENTIAL PICKETING and CHILD POR­
NOGRAPHY. The optimal R' in RESIDENTIAL PICKETING is likely a 
rule that prohibits "residential picketing," rather than no rule at 
all;430 the optimal R' in CmLo PORNOGRAPHY is likely a rule that is 
tailored to cover obscene displays of naked children, rather than no 
rule at all.431 Thus, in both these cases, the action A of our stylized 
X remains covered by the optimal revision R'; it will not be the case 
that X's sanction should be overturned, as part of the judicial issu­
ance of R'. But the remaining cases can perhaps be explained, even 
on an optimal-revision view. The optimal revision R' of the rule in 
428. See supra note 425. 
429. See Kovacic, supra note 380, at 40-46. 
430. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (upholding law banning residential 
picketing). 
431. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 112-14 (1990) (upholding rule designed to com­
bat child pornography); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764-74 (1982) (same). 
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ABORTION is likely "no person may procure an abortion of a viable 
fetus except for maternal life or health" (or something narrower 
than that), not "no person may procure an abortion of a viable fetus 
except for maternal life or health, or an abortion of a non-viable 
fetus by means of coercive threats." The optimal revision R' of the 
rule in FLAG DESECRATION is likely a repeal, as opposed to "no 
persons shall desecrate flags, if they do so by means of arson, bat­
tery, or pollution." As for ALcoHoL, it seems that the optimal revi­
sion R' is either a general extension of R to include all persons 
between eighteen and twenty-one, or a repeal; it is not a rule that 
provides, "persons between eighteen and twenty-one may not 
purchase alcohol, if they do so fraudulently." Similarly, the optimal 
revision R' in ANIMAL SACRIFICE is likely either a general exten­
sion to prohibit the killing of any animals, or a repeal; it is not a rule 
that prohibits "the killing of pandas" or "cougars" or "eagles" (the 
specific animal killed in ANIMAL SACRIFICE), given the existence of 
a preexisting rule prohibiting the killing of endangered species. If 
repeal is morally better than general extension, in ALcoHOL and 
ANIMAL SACRIFICE - and that is, at least, a real possibility - then 
X's action in these cases will not be covered by the optimal revision 
R', and he will have the legal right to have his sanction overturned. 
Let me put the point this way. X's action A is harmful or 
wrongful in our stylized cases; that is their very essence. But given 
the epistemic limitations of actors and state officials, it is likely or at 
least plausible that the optimal revision R' does not include A. This 
is likely the case in FLAG DESECRATION and ABORTION, and may 
well be the case in ANIMAL SACRIFICE and ALCOHOL (if, in fact, 
the actions of animal-killing and alcohol-purchase-by-a-person­
between-eighteen-and-twenty-one are, without more, not harmful 
or wrongful). An action of battering flag-desecration is wrongful, 
but only because it is battery, not because it is flag-desecration. 
And enacting a rule that prohibits "flag-desecration by battery" 
would be silly. The existence of this rule would increase legal com­
plexity, without apparent countervailing benefit. Given the episte­
mic limitations of state officials and actors, legal complexity without 
countervailing benefit is not morally indifferent, but morally nega­
tive. (Speakers might be deterred from desecrating flags, if they 
knew that the flag-desecration laws remained on the books with 
various complex provisos.432) Similarly for the remaining rules: 
432. Cf. Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, supra note 83, at 883-84 (ar­
guing that "rule of privilege" applied to revise overbroad statute must be sufficiently clear to 
enable an actor to predict whether her conduct falls within revised rule). 
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provisions that cover "abortions of non-viable fetuses, by means of 
coercive threats," "the fraudulent purchase of alcohol by persons 
between eighteen and twenty-one" or "the killing of pandas" would 
not figure in the various R', because these hypothetical provisions 
are not needed to cover any harmful or wrongful actions that other­
wise would escape legal rules. If legal terms were costless to apply, 
and if officials applied them perfectly, and if actors anticipated that 
state officials would apply provisions perfectly, then the hypotheti­
cal provisions would not matter, morally. But given the epistemic 
limitations of actors and state officials, moral reason obtains not to 
include the provisions in R'. Therefore, for at least some of the 
stylized cases, X will plausibly have the legal right to overturn his 
sanction, even though his action is wrongful or harmful, and even if 
a court's legal role is to enact what it takes to be the morally opti­
mal revision R' of the invalid rule R. 
B. Institutional Objections 
I have completed the moral defense of the Derivative Account. 
Moral reason can obtain to change, in some measure, the predicate 
of rules - specifically, of rules that fail the Liberty Schema or the 
Discrimination Schema. This explains why the rules in our stylized 
cases are unconstitutional. And, on plausible remedial views (such 
as a retroactive facial-invalidation view or even a retroactive­
optimal-revision view), X can have a legal right to secure the invali­
dation of a rule, including his own sanction or duty, even if X's very 
action is properly sanctioned or coerced under a different descrip­
tion. This explains why, on the facts of our stylized cases, the ac­
tors' constitutional rights are violated. 
What is there left for the defender of the Direct Account to say? 
She might raise certain institutional objections to the Derivative Ac­
count.433 She might concede the moral plausibility of the account, 
but argue that courts are the wrong institutions for invalidating 
rules. Thus we must return to the Direct Account, however morally 
implausible it might be. In the remainder of this section, I will con­
sider and rebut two institutional objections to the Derivative Ac­
count: (1) that the concept of "adjudication" embodied in Article 
III of the Constitution requires constitutional rights to be morally 
433. On the importance of institutional considerations in shaping and limiting the prac· 
tice of judicial review, see Adler, supra note 4, at 771-80; Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: 
The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1212, 1213-20 
(1978); David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 190, 190-95 
(1988). 
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direct, not morally derivative; and (2) that even if this is untrue, the 
remedies employed by reviewing courts in constitutional cases are 
too weak for the Derivative Account. 
1. Article III and the Concept of Adjudication 
Imagine that Congress enacts the following act, styled the "In­
validation Act." 
The Invalidation Act 
Any person whose conduct is regulated by a state or federal 
statute (currently in force) that is subject to a colorable chal­
lenge under the First Amendment, the Equal Protection 
Clause, or the Due Process Clause may, if subject to a clear 
threat of prosecution under the statute, bring suit in federal 
district court against the officials responsible for enforcing the 
statute. If the plaintiff adequately represents the class of per­
sons subject to the challenged statute, the court shall certify the 
suit as a class action; shall hear the suit; and, if the court con­
cludes that the challenged statute is morally invalid under the 
First Amendment, etc., shall enter appropriate declaratory and 
injunctive relief in favor of the class of persons subject to the 
statute. 
The position I am advancing in this article is that constitutional 
rights, in general, are neither more nor less morally robust than the 
legal rights conferred by this hypothetical Invalidation Act. The 
Invalidation-Act plaintiff has the legal right to secure the judicial 
invalidation of a (state or federal) statute that goes morally awry -
independent of the full details of her own conduct and the strength 
of her personal moral claim. My position is that constitutional 
rights are, in general, legal rights with precisely this moral content. 
As an initial matter one might object that constitutional 
"rights," thus conceptualized, are not really rights at all. The objec­
tion might be framed thus: Rights are, by definition, trumps; a 
right, by definition, identifies some aspect of the rights-holder's 
own moral position - for example, an important interest of hers, or 
a valid claim she possesses under corrective or distributive justice 
- that outweighs the general good.434 But surely the Derivative 
434. Cf. DwoRKIN, TAKING R.IGHrS SERIOUSLY, supra note 1, at xi ("Individual rights are 
political trumps held by individuals. Individuals have rights when, for some reason, a collec­
tive goal is not a sufficient justification for . . .  imposing some loss or injury upon them."). In 
fact, I do not believe that Dworkin's subtle conceptualization of rights-as-trumps supports 
the Direct Account. A rights-as-trumps thesis does so only if legal rights must incorporate 
moral trumps. But to require this conflates the legal and the moral. See WELLMAN, supra 
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Account should not be defeated at the definitional stage, through a 
narrow and demanding definition of "rights." As I explained ear­
lier, in Part I, my concept of a constitutional right is deliberately 
catholic; it is designed to leave open, for substantive debate, the 
merits of the Direct and Derivative Accounts. A constitutional 
right, understood in this catholic sense, is simply a legal power to 
secure the invalidation, in some measure, of a rule - of the rights­
holder's own treatment under the rule, on the Direct Account, and 
of the rule overall, on the Derivative Account. It is a legal "right" 
in the broad sense of constituting a legal advantage: a Hohfeldian 
position that is advantageous to the holder.435 
If the defender of the Direct Account insists that legal advan­
tages are not truly rights unless they fit a more narrow and demand­
ing definition, then my response is that "constitutional rights" are 
not necessarily rights within the meaning of a more narrow and de­
manding definition. Nothing in the so-called "Bill of Rights"436 -
a name the Constitution itself does not use - demands that the 
legal mechanism by which to secure the values of free speech, free 
exercise, equal protection, and due process must be a mechanism 
that provides narrowly-defined rights to narrowly-defined rights­
holders. Indeed, the relevant provisions of the "Bill of Rights" are 
framed, not as "rights," but as moral constraints upon government 
decisionmaking. The First Amendment says, "Congress shall make 
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press."437 The Fifth Amendment provides that "No person shall . . .  
note 45, at 3-11 {distinguishing between legal and moral rights); DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS 
SERIOUSLY, supra note 1, at 90-94 {distinguishing between institutional and background 
rights); id. at 94-95 (noting that an institutional right to free speech is possible within a back· 
ground theory of utilitarianism). 
In any event, my claim here does not rest upon the best exegesis of Dworkin's rights-as­
trumps thesis, or the best understanding of "rights." If legal "rights" must indeed incorpo­
rate moral trumps, then the Free Speech Clause, Free Exercise Clause, Equal Protection 
Clause, and the substantive component of the Due Process Clause ground legal powers, and 
other legal advantages for claimants, but not "rights." 
435. See supra note 45; supra text accompanying notes 90-91. 
436. Dworkin himself has taken some care on this textual point. See DWORKIN, 
FREEDOM'S LAw, supra note 1, at 7 {"The clauses of the American Constitution that protect 
individuals and minorities from government are found mainly in the so-called Bill of Rights 
- the first several amendments to the document - and the further amendments added after 
the Civil War."). But cf. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of 
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."). 
437. U.S. CoNST. amend. I. The First Amendment goes on, of course, to refer to the 
"right of the people peaceably to assemble," U.S. CONST. amend. I, but this cuts against the 
Direct Account. If the advocate of the Direct Account wants to argue that {l) rights are 
morally robust, and (2) the text of the Constitution creates morally robust rights, then the 
First Amendment's reference to the "right" of assembly, but not the "right" of free speech or 
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be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law."438 The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[no] State 
[shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws."439 The Derivative Account is per­
fectly consistent with these provisions, standing alone - that is, 
taken apart from Article III of the Constitution. 
The better objection to the Derivative Account is one that re­
lies, not upon the concept of constitutional rights, but rather upon 
the concept of adjudication embodied in Article III. What the De­
rivative Account claims is not merely that (1) rules can go morally 
awry; and not merely that (2) persons can possess legal powers 
(which are "rights" in my catholic sense) to secure the invalidation 
of rules that go morally awry; but further that (3) the rights-holder 
is entitled to secure the invalidation of a morally invalid rule by a 
federal court. How is this last part of the Derivative Account con­
sistent with the institutional limits on federal courts that are set 
forth by Article III of the Constitution? Article III constrains fed­
eral courts to be adjudicatory bodies; it vests them with the ."judicial 
Power of the United States,"440 and authorizes them only to hear 
"Cases" or "Controversies."441 How is it consistent with Article III, 
and the concept of adjudication therein embodied, to conceptualize 
the practice of judicial review by federal courts as th.e invalidation 
of rules? 
This question brings us back to my hypothetical Invalidation 
Act. The Invalidation Act creates a mechanism by which federal 
courts effectively invalidate rules: the anticipatory class-action that 
culminates in a declaratory judgment and injunction. A declaratory 
judgment and injunction against an invalid rule, when entered in 
favor of the entire class of persons subject to the rule, will operate 
roughly like a repeal of the rule: this remedy will rescind the legal 
authority of enforcement officials to prosecute anyone for violating 
the rule, and will preclude future courts, under the principle of res 
free exercise, hardly supports claim (2) with respect to free speech or free exercise. Tue best 
that its advocate can say is that the First Amendment was loosely drafted. 
438. U.S. CoNST. amend. V. 
439. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV. 
440. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in 
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time 
ordain and establish."). 
441. See U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2. 
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judicata, from sanctioning actors pursuant to the rule.442 Further, 
the Invalidation-Act mechanism appears to comport with the vari­
ous Article III constraints upon federal courts. The plaintiff's suit 
will be constitutionally ripe, because the duty of compliance with 
the challenged rule, backed by a clear threat of prosecution for its 
breach, constitutes an immediate setback for her.443 The plaintiff 
will have standing, because she can "allege personal injury fairly 
traceable to the defendant's unlawful conduct" - the setback to 
her own interests constituted by the sanction-backed duty that the 
rule imposes upon her - such that this setback is "likely to be re­
dressed by the requested relief."444 The suit will not be moot or 
advisory, because the challenged rule is currently in force.445 Fi­
nally, the plaintiff class-action has become a standard446 and consti-
442. See Fallon, supra note 83, at 880-81, 902-03 (discussing legal force of classwide relief 
in constitutional challenges to state statutes); David Shapiro, State Courts and Federal Declar­
atory Judgments, 14 Nw. U. L. REv. 759, 777-79 {1979) (same). My claim here about the legal 
force of classwide relief should be qualified by a point I alluded to above, see supra text 
accompanying notes 416-17: the classwide declaratory judgment and injunction may explic­
itly, and arguably should implicitly, leave open the possibility of a salvaging narrowing con­
struction of the rule by its authoritative interpreter. 
443. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fedn., 497 U.S. 871, 891 {1990) {"The major exception 
[to ripeness constraints on preenforcement review] is a substantive rule which as a practical 
matter requires the plaintiff to adjust his conduct immediately. Such agency action is 'ripe' 
for review at once . . . .  " (citing Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967))). The Abbott 
Laboratories ripeness test also looks to the temporal fitness of the legal issues raised by the 
claimant, see 387 U.S. at 149, but this latter component of ripeness is arguably prudential not 
constitutional, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 290, § 2.4.1, at 116, and in any event the ques­
tion whether the challenged rule satisfies a constitutional rule-validity schema is temporally 
"fit." I have added the proviso that there be a "clear threat" of prosecution, so as to assure 
the ripeness of the preenforcement Invalidation-Act suit even under a ripeness doctrine 
more stringent than current doctrine. See infra text accompanying notes 587-98 (further dis­
cussing ripeness). 
444. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) {"The requirement of standing . • .  has 
a core component derived directly from [Article III of] the Constitution. A plaintiff must 
allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and 
likely to be redressed by the requested relief."). On the existence of standing for the Invali­
dation-Act plaintiff, which hypothetical statute I will argue below just embodies the over­
breadth doctrine, see Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, supra note 83, at 
847-48 ("An overbreadth claimant must ask that normal rules of standing be relaxed, only if 
'standing' is taken to include canons about the kinds of constitutional claims a party may 
raise, as well as such basic requisites of a justiciable controversy as actual grievance and a 
lively dispute. The former conception of standing is not a deduction from article III." (foot­
note omitted)); Fallon, supra note 83, at 868-69 (same). 
445. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 290, §§ 2.2, 2.5 (discussing Article III 
prohibitions on a federal court's issuance of an advisory opinion, or its adjudication of a moot 
dispute). 
446. See Shapiro, supra note 442, at 777 (noting, but criticizing, frequent use of class­
action device in constitutional challenges to state statutes). 
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tutionally unremarkable447 device by which federal courts properly 
consolidate the adjudication of legal rights.448 
Nonetheless, it might be objected, the Invalidation Act violates 
Article ill. The violation is subtle, but important - or so the de­
fender of the Direct Account might argue. The argument would 
run as follows: "The legal rights that federal courts adjudicate must, 
by virtue of Article ill, have a minimally robust moral content. 
Where a plaintiff P1 brings a meritorious nonclass suit in federal 
court against some defendant D, claiming a violation of a legal 
right, and seeking a remedy that benefits only her, the following 
holds true: there exists a moral reason sufficient to provide P1 that 
remedy, independent of the remedies provided to other plaintiffs 
Pi, P 3 • • • P n against D or against other defendants. The ancient, 
common-law rights that courts classically adjudicate - the com­
mon-law right of an injured person to collect damages from a 
tortfeasor; the common-law right of a disappointed promisee to col­
lect damages from the breaching promisor - do indeed have this 
kind of robust moral content. These common-law rights are the ex­
emplars for the types of legal rights that federal courts may permis­
sibly adjudicate. Now, if there exists a class of plaintiffs Pb Pi, P3 
. . .  Pn such that each P; standing alone can advance a robust legal 
right against the same defendant D, and there are common issues of 
law or fact, the federal courts can consolidate the plaintiffs' suits 
through the class-action device. But it would subvert the very con­
cept of adjudication, and the constraints set forth in Article III, to 
aggregate the moral claims of the class of persons purportedly rep­
resented by the Invalidation-Act plaintiff, and effectuate a remedy 
that is morally justified in the aggregate - repealing a morally 
invalid rule - even though the plaintiff herself may have no moral 
claim to a personal remedy." Or so the argument might go.449 
It is plausible to think that the classic, common-law rights of the 
injured tort victim, or the disappointed promisee, do indeed have a 
fairly robust moral content. Consider, for example, the corrective­
justice theory of tort law that Jules Coleman has recently <;lefended 
447. See, e.g., Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 697-706 (1979) (upholding certification 
of nationwide class and entry of injunctive relief in suit, predicated on Due Process Clause, 
against federal agency). 
448. See generally Douglas Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The 
Need for Prospective Relief, 1977 SUP. CT. REv. 193 (describing and defending federal pro­
spective relief -including class relief - against state criminal statutes). 
449. See Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Offi­
cials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys Genera� 88 CoLUM. L. REv. 247, 309-12 
(1988) (noting possible Article III objections to the adjudication of a class action, where 
individual class members do not, standing alone, have justiciable cases). 
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in his book Risks and Wrongs.45° Coleman argues, plausibly, that 
the plaintiff's legal claim in a classic torts case has the following 
moral content: the plaintiff P claims that the defendant D is a 
moral wrongdoer who has the distinct moral responsibility, by vir­
tue of corrective justice, to repair the losses to P that her wrongdo­
ing has occasioned. 
In the typical action tort suits bring victim-plaintiffs together with 
injurer-defendants, and only within this structure do questions regard­
ing who should bear a particular accident's costs arise. That is, the 
goals of tort law are pursued only within a structure of case-by-case 
adjudication between individual victims and their respective injurers. 
It is not as if victims are free to bring suit against anybody. Normally, 
the victim is not free to �rgue that he should be compensated for his 
loss by someone simply because that person is a good risk spreader or 
reducer . . . .  Instead, the injurer is held liable simply because she is 
responsible for the loss. She is the one who has the duty in corrective 
justice to make good the loss.451 
We might construct a parallel corrective-justice account for the 
contract-law rights or property-law rights that courts classically ad­
judicate.452 But it would be mistake, I suggest, for constitutional 
scholars to extrapolate from the private-law analogy and insist that 
court-enforced constitutional rights must be equally robust. The 
concept of adjudication, insofar as it figures in Article III, does not 
require the legal rights that federal courts adjudicate to possess the 
kind of moral content that private-law rights typically, or some­
times, possess. 
In defending the Derivative Account from the Article III objec­
tion, I will rely upon the view of Article III famously developed by 
Owen Fiss, most trenchantly in his 1978 article The Forms of Jus­
tice. 453 Fiss's aim in The Forms of Justice was to vindicate what he 
called the "structural reform"454 suit: the kind of suit, exemplified 
by desegregation suits against school systems and by prison-reform 
litigation, "in which a judge, confronting a state bureaucracy over 
values of constitutional dimension, undertakes to restructure the 
organization to eliminate a threat to those values posed by the pres­
ent institutional arrangements. The injunction is the means by 
450. CoLEMAN, supra note 189. 
451. Id. at 374. 
452. Cf. Moore, supra note 171, at 182 (grouping together deontological theories of the 
institutions of punishment, tort compensation, property, and contract as alternatives to utili· 
tarian accounts of these institutions). 
453. FISs, supra note 20. A contemporaneous article that, like Fiss's, famously rejects a 
dispute-resolution view of federal adjudication, is Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in 
Public Law Litigation, 89 HAR.v. L. REv. 1281 (1976). 
454. Fiss, supra note 20, at 2. 
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which these reconstructive directives are transmitted."455 Specifi­
cally, Fiss wanted to vindicate the procedural devices characteristic 
to the structural-reform suit - the class-action form, and the entry 
of a permanent injunctive decree against the defendant bureaucracy 
(by which to create an ongoing supervisory role for the federal 
judge).456 
Fiss's analysis of the class action helps the Derivative Account 
tremendously. As Fiss put it: "The victim of a structural suit is not 
an individual, but a group."457 
Once we take the group perspective on the victim, it . . .  becomes 
clear that the spokesman need not - indeed, cannot - be the victim. 
A group needs people to speak on its behalf. An individual member 
of the victim group can be a spokesman, but there is no reason why 
individual membership should be required, or for that mat�er even 
preferred . . . .  
. . . [Thus] certain technical qualifications for the victim - that he 
be subject to a risk of future harm, or that he be subject to irreparable 
injury - need not be satisfied by the spokesman. For the structural 
suit it is sufficient if these requirements are satisfied by the victim 
group. What the court must ask of the spokesm� is whether he is an 
adequate representative . . . .  458 
The Fissian view - of the structural-reform plaintiff as a represen­
tative for a class of persons to whom the state has done moral injury 
- is just the kind of view set forth by the Derivative Account.459 
But how can we square this representative conception of the struc­
tural-reform plaintiff with the concept of adjudication and the re­
quirements of Article III? Fiss's answer was to reconceptualize 
adjudication itself - to deny that a more traditional conception, 
what Fiss called the "dispute-resolution" view of adjudication, was 
the right one. 
455. Id. 
456. See id. at 18-22, 27-28, 44-58. 
457. Id. at 19. 
458. Id. at 19-20 (footnotes omitted). 
459. With the exception, of course, that the Derivative Account need not include a 
FISsian conceptualization of the class as a "group" in the strong sense of FISs's work on equal 
protection. See FISs, supra note 20, at 147-70 (defining groups as "natural" entities distinct 
from their members, and defending "group-disadvantaging principle"). For example, the 
class of persons protected by the plaintiff who challenges a rule that violates the Liberty 
Schema is simply those persons within the scope of the rule who are coerced not to perform 
actions that, constitutionally, they should be free to perform. See supra text accompanying 
notes 315-33 (discussing Liberty Schema). They need not, and likely do not, have a "group" 
identity in FISs's strong sense. And indeed, while FISs adverts to this strong conceptualization 
of groups in The Forms of Justice, he also weakens it somewhat. See Fiss, supra note 20, at 19 
(noting that group benefitted by structural-reform suit may have an identity apart from the 
suit-targeted institution, or may be defined in terms of the institution, e.g., as "welfare 
recipients"). 
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There is nothing in the text of article III - in the rather incidental use 
of the words "cases" or "controversies" - that constitutionally con­
stricts the federal courts to dispute resolution. The late eighteenth 
century was the heyday for the common law, and . . .  the function of 
courts under the common law was paradigmatically not dispute reso­
lution, but to give meaning to public values through the enforcement 
and creation of public norms, such as those embodied in the criminal 
law and the rules regarding property, contracts, and torts . . . .  The 
judicial function implied by contemporary constitutional litigation, of 
which structural reform is part, is continuous with and maybe even 
identical to that of the common law.460 
In short, for Fiss, "[t]he function of a judge is to give concrete 
meaning and application to our constitutional values."461 
Think of this as a custodial, rather than a structural view of adju­
dication.462 On the Fissian view, the legal body we call a "court" is 
defined by the particular moral criteria that are entrusted to this 
body for protection and care - what Fiss calls "constitutional val­
ues" or "public values"463 - and not by the particular moral rela­
tions that may obtain between plaintiffs and defendants, or by the 
fact that judicial activity may be occasioned by concrete disputes. 
Now, I should emphasize that the exponent of the Derivative 
Account need not adopt a wholly Fissian view of adjudication and 
the requirements of Article III. Fiss's claim is particularly strong. 
He claims that "adjudication" is nothing but a custodial concept, 
and that Article III constrains federal courts only to eschew those 
procedures and devices that undermine their care for and protec­
tion of "constitutional values."464 This may or may not be true, but, 
in any event, all that the Derivative Account requires is a weaker 
claim: The concept of adjudication, standing alone, does not take 
lexical priority, over the custodial role of federal courts, in the inter­
pretation of Article III. Imagine that the concept of adjudication, 
standing alone, does entail a robust moral relation between plaintiff 
and defendant of the kind Coleman describes. Even so, Article III 
cannot be read on its own, any more than other constitutional pro-
460. FlSs, supra note 20, at 36-37 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
461. Id. at 9. 
462. See id. at 36 (distinguishing between "form" and "function" of adjudication, and 
giving conceptual priority to latter). 
463. See generally id. at 5-17 (defending "public values" or "constitutional values" view of 
adjudication). 
464. See id. at 13 (defending certain formal features of adjudication, e.g., existence of 
judicial opinion, and absence of judge's control over her agenda, as integral to judicial 
function). 
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visions.465 Federal courts have the dominant or at least a co-equal 
role466 in safeguarding, from governmental infringement, the parts 
of morality set forth with sufficient specificity in the Bill of 
Rights.467 Article ID should not be interpreted to compromise this 
role in a serious way. But I have demonstrated that the Direct Ac­
count does indeed seriously dilute and compromise the moral crite­
ria set forth in the Bill of Rights. Therefore, the Derivative 
Account does not violate Article III, all things considered. 
I have formulated the argument this way so as to avoid a lengthy 
detour into the theory of adjudication. Fiss might be right: the con­
cept of adjudication must just be custodial. Or, Fiss might be 
wrong, but the proper non-custodial concept might not entail a ro­
bust moral relation between plaintiff and defendant. (For example, 
in his well-known article The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 468 
Lon Fuller focuses upon participation as the essential ingredient of 
adjudication - "[a]djudication is a process of decision that grants 
to the affected party a form of participation that consists in the op­
portunity to present proofs and reasoned arguments"469 - and not 
upon the moral robustness of the participants' legal claims.) The 
exponent of the Derivative Account can, if she wishes, develop a 
matching theory of adjudication. I will not try to do that, for my 
point is that - given the moral flaws in the Direct Account - Arti­
cle III and the Bill of Rights should not, jointly, be read to require 
it. 
Note that a negative response to the Article III objection is 
well-supported by existing doctrines. If the Article III objection 
holds true, then my hypothetical Invalidation Act is unconstitu­
tional. But of course the Invalidation Act is not unconstitutional! 
465. See generally CHAru.Es L. BLACK, STRUCIURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CoNsTITU­
TIONAL LAW (1965) (arguing that the Constitution should be read holistically, not as se­
quence of discrete provisions). 
466. The advocate of judicial supremacy will say that courts have the dominant role. The 
advocate of departmentalism will say that other institutions, such as Congress, or the Presi­
dent, have a coequal role. See infra text accompanying notes 503-05 (discussing depart­
mentalism). The Derivative Account is consistent with both. See id. But to accord courts 
the truncated role accorded by the Direct Account - safeguarding the epistemic rights of 
particular claimants - while Congress and the President repeal or amend rules that do 
nonepistemic wrong, is to make courts neither dominant nor coequal. 
467. Let me emphasize again that the originalism-nonoriginalism debate, and other such 
debates about the requisite specificity, etc., of constitutionalized moral criteria, see Adler, 
supra note 4, at 780-85, are independent of the debate between direct and derivative views of 
constitutional rights. The advocate of the Derivative Account can, if she wishes, demand a 
highly specific textual warrant for the criteria that courts enforce against rules, and require 
them to enforce the Framers' rather than their own conceptions of those criteria. 
468. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REv. 353 (1978). 
469. Id. at 369. 
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This hypothetical act is simply the First Amendment overbreadth 
doctrine in a thin disguise. The legal rights held by Invalidation Act 
plaintiffs have precisely the moral content of the legal rights that 
federal courts actually do enforce, under the rubric of the over­
breadth doctrine. The official exegesis of that doctrine runs as 
follows: 
It has long been recognized that the First Amendment needs 
breathing space and that statutes attempting to restrict or burden the 
exercise of First Amendment rights must be narrowly drawn and rep­
resent a considered legislative judgment that a particular mode of ex­
pression has to give way to other compelling needs of society . . . .  
Litigants, therefore, are permitted to challenge a statute not because 
their own rights of free expression are violated, but because of a judi­
cial prediction or assumption that the statute's very existence may 
cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally pro­
tected speech or expression. 
The consequence [of the overbreadth doctrine] is that any en­
forcement of a statute [declared over broad] is totally forbidden until 
and unless a limiting construction or partial invalidation so narrows it 
as to remove the seeming threat or deterrence to constitutionally pro­
tected expression.470 
Thus the Court in Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the font of current over­
breadth doctrine.471 To be sure, that doctrine is seen as an "excep­
tion" to the normal type of constitutional right - the overbreadth 
litigant is seen to rely, exceptionally, upon the moral claims of other 
persons covered by the statute she challenges, rather than upon her 
own moral claims - but my point here is that this purported excep­
tion must nonetheless be consistent with Article III. Exceptional or 
not, the overbreadth doctrine conceives the litigant as holding a 
legal power to secure the invalidation of the rule under which she 
falls, despite the absence of moral reason to protect her. 
Indeed, the idea of courts invalidating statutes goes back well 
before the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, which entered 
the Court's jurisprudence after the New Deal. The idea was suffi­
ciently entrenched, by 1935, to prompt the legal scholar Oliver 
Field to write an entire treatise on the topic, The Effect of an Un­
constitutional Statute. Field began the treatise by observing that: 
470. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-13 (1973) (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted). 
471. For similar statements by the Court, which go both to the proposition that the over­
breadth claimant is not asserting his own moral claims and to the related proposition that an 
overbreadth holding prevents the enforcement of the invalidated statute against anyone, see 
cases cited supra note 148. The classic scholarly statement of this view is Note, The First 
Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, supra note 83, at 844-47, 852-58. 
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"For over a hundred years, state and federal courts in the United 
States have been declaring statutes unconstitutional."472 Field con­
trasted the view that a statute declared unconstitutional is "void ab 
initio" - "entirely abrogated, except for the formality of a re­
peal"473 - with the view that courts merely invalidate the applica­
tion of statutes to particular litigants. Strikingly, Field found the 
first view to be dominant.474 As Field put it: "It is no exaggeration 
to say that this theory that an unconstitutional statute is void ab 
initio is the traditional doctrine of American courts as to the effect 
of an unconstitutional statute."475 And he continued: "[U]nder the 
void ab initio view . . . the rule is properly applied that a statute, 
once declared unconstitutional, need not be pleaded and assailed in 
subsequent cases. "476 
To be sure, specifying the conditions under which courts exer­
cise the sweeping power described by Field has, both before and 
since the New Deal, been a matter of some dispute. In particular, 
there has been a heated and long-running controversy about the 
conditions for federal judicial invalidation of state statutes.477 The 
dispute goes back to the Court's 1908 decision in Ex parte Young, 478 
which crafted an Eleventh Amendment fiction to permit federal 
courts to enjoin state officials from enforcing statutes. It continued, 
in the pre-New Deal period, with the enactment of three-judge­
court acts (requiring injunctions to be entered by panels of judges, 
rather than a single federal judge) and then the passage of the De­
claratory Judgment Act479 (intended in part as a less coercive tech­
nique for judicial invalidation of state statutes).480 And it was 
carried forward, in the post-New Deal period, with the line of cases 
from Dombrowski v. Pfister481 to Younger v. Harris482 to, finally, 
472. OLIVER P. FIELD, THE EFFECT OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE 1 (1935). 
473. Id. at 10. 
474. See id. at 2-8. 
475. Id. at 2 (emphasis added). 
476. Id. at 4. 
477. See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 134-36 
(1991) (describing this long-running controversy). 
478. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
479. 28 u.s.c. §§ 2201-02 (1994). 
480. See Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 112-15 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (discussing history and purpose of three-judge-court acts and Declara­
tory Judgment Act). 
481. 380 U.S. 479 (1965). 
482. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
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Steffel v. Thompson, 483 and Wooley v. Maynard484 (all of which con­
cern the proper timing of federal injunctive and declaratory relief 
against the state ).485 But this dispute merely proves my point. Its 
fervor simply reflects the fact that a federal court's entry of a de­
claratory or injunctive order prohibiting the enforcement of a state 
statute, in a class-action suit or even (as we shall see in a moment) 
in an individual suit, will effectively repeal the targeted statute. 
The Court, in crafting the First Amendment overbreadth doc­
trine, combined the judicial power to invalidate statutes, with the 
notion that invalidation might be justified at the instance of a liti­
gant whose own moral claims were attenuated. "[A]n individual 
whose own speech or expressive conduct may validly be prohibited 
or sanctioned is permitted to challenge a statute on its face because 
it also threatens others not before the court - those who desire to 
engage in legally protected expression but who may refrain from 
doing so rather than risk prosecution . . . .  "486 The proper scope of 
this "exceptional" doctrine has, again, been a matter of considera­
ble dispute: from the initial enthusiasm during the Warren Court, 
to the Burger Court's retrenchment in cases such as Broadrick v. 
Oklahoma487 and Brockett v. Spokane Arcades488 that require "sub­
stantial" rather than merely some overbreadth.489 But the dispute 
about the scope of overbreadth - among the Justices and among 
constitutional scholars writing in this area490 - has generally taken 
for granted the permissibility of some such doctrine, under Article 
III. 
To put the point another way: the official view sees constitu­
tional rights as morally robust, but it does not see this robust cast as 
entailed by Article III. The Direct Account is traditional, in main­
taining the robust content of constitutional rights; but an Article Ill 
defense of the Direct Account would dramatically revise the official 
view, and rescind doctrines (such as overbreadth491) that presume 
483. 415 U.S. 452 {1974). 
484. 430 U.S. 705 {1977). 
485. See CHEMERINsKY, supra note 290, ch. 13 {discussing Younger abstention, and avail· 
ability of federal declaratory and injunctive relief absent pending state proceeding, as per 
Steffel and Wooley). 
486. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, 472 U.S. 491, 503 {1985). 
487. 413 U.S. 601 {1973). 
488. 472 U.S. 491 (1985). 
489. See Redish, supra note 83 {describing this history). 
490. See sources cited supra note 83. 
491. Other "prophylactic" constitutional doctrines, such as the exclusionary rule, may be 
similar to overbreadth, in conferring a legal right upon one person so as to protect the moral 
rights of others. See Fallon, supra note 83, at 869 n.96 {discussing ubiquity of prophylactic 
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the permissibility of morally minimal litigants. For the reasons I 
have discussed - the reasons most trenchantly articulated by Fiss 
- the official view of Article III is right. 
2. The Strength of Judicial Remedies 
The second institutional objection to the Derivative Account is 
that the remedies employed by reviewing courts, in constitutional 
cases, are too weak: the judicial decision simply reverses the treat­
ment pursuant to a rule of a particular litigant, and does not gener­
ally rescind the legal authority of state officials to enforce the rule, 
or generally relieve actors of the duty to comply with it. This sec­
ond objection is easily parried, now that I have rebutted the first 
and deeper objection: that judicial invalidation of rules at the in­
stance of morally minimal litigants violates Article III and the con­
cept of adjudication therein embodied. Given the failure of the first 
objection, the second objection becomes merely technical. For the 
various kinds of constitutional cases in the federal courts - class­
action cases, Supreme Court cases that are not class-actions, and 
non-class cases in the lower federal courts - I simply need to ex­
plain how the remedies entered in these cases operate to repeal the 
rules against which those remedies are targeted. The question, 
now, is not whether courts can (consistent with Article III) invali­
date rules, but merely how they do. 
For the sake of simplicity, I will focus on the techniques by 
which federal courts invalidate state or federal statutes. My analysis 
readily extends to the invalidation of non-statutory rules (for exam­
ple, regulations enacted by state or federal agencies, or rules an­
nounced in administrative adjudications) but because the thrust of 
this article is theoretical, not technical, a discussion of the most sali­
ent type of rule-invalidation - the invalidation of statutes -
should suffice.492 Further, because the standard judicial remedy 
with respect to conduct-regulating rules (at least as evidenced by 
Supreme Court case law) is a facial or partial invalidation, not an 
extension, I will not belabor matters by discussing the issue of ex­
tension here. 
Let us begin with the easiest case: a class-action suit in the fed­
eral courts that challenges a state or federal statute on constitu-
rules in constitutional law); Strauss, supra note 433 (same). Certainly the jus tertii doctrine is 
similar to overbreadth in this way. See infra text accompanying notes 558-72 (discussing jus 
terti1). 
492. See Adler, supra note 4, at 806-10 (emphasizing that judicial review is not solely or 
mainly comprised by the invalidation of statutes). 
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tional grounds and that terminates with declaratory and perhaps 
injunctive relief. T,b.e declaratory judgment - to the effect that the 
statute is either facially invalid, or partly invalid to the extent speci­
fieg in the court's judgment493 - will, under accepted principles of 
res judicata, protect the class members from being sanctioned pur­
suant to the (invalidated portion of the) statute, in any subsequent 
enforcement suits that state officials might try to bring.494 If the 
Derivative Account is correct, then the following also holds true: 
this class-wide declaratory judgment should be taken by enforce­
ment officials as rescinding their legal authority to enforce the stat­
ute (within its invalidated scope), and by actors (within that scope) 
as rescinding their duty to comply with the statute. The declaratory 
judgment may or may not be accompanied by a permanent injunc­
tion - the effect of which would be to back up the court's rescis­
sion of official authority, with the clear threat of criminal or civil 
sanctions for contempt of court if state enforcement officials ignore 
the rescission.495 It remains open to debate, within the Derivative 
Account, whether injunctions should normally accompany declara­
tions when courts invalidate statutes. (The Derivative Account will 
reject a conceptual attack on injunctions, to the effect that courts 
lack the power to rescind the powers of state officials, but there 
might be pragmatic grounds against routine injunctive relief.496) 
Further, the class-wide declaratory judgment, with or without in­
junction, will not operate as a precise repeal of the targeted statute, 
in the following sense: As scholars such as Richard Fallon and 
David Shapiro have quite properly emphasized, this remedy should 
not necessarily be taken to prevent enforcement officials from se­
curing (through means other than an enforcement suit) an authori­
tative and narrowing interpretation of the statute, from the bodies 
responsible for interpreting it, that renders the thus-narrowed stat­
ute constitutionally valid.497 But the Derivative Account can read-
493. See Shapiro, supra note 442, at 767 (noting this possibility). 
494. See id. at 762-70 (generally discussing res judicata effect, for parties to a non·class 
federal declaratory suit, of a declaratory judgment holding a state statute to be partly or 
wholly unconstitutional); id. at 777-79 (extending discussion to class actions). 
495. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 471 (1974) (noting that " 'noncompliance 
[with a declaratory judgment] . . .  is not contempt' " (quoting Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 
126 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part))). 
496. See 415 U.S. at 460-72 {describing differences between declaratory judgments and 
injunctions, in particular less coercive cast of former). 
497. See Fallon, supra note 83, at 854-55, 898-903; Shapiro, supra note 442, at 768-70. 
Shapiro and Fallon agree - consistent with the Derivative Account - that the curative 
effect of this narrowing interpretation should only be prospective. 
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ily incorporate this point:498 the truly optimal response to a statute 
that goes morally awry might be not its facial invalidation, nor the 
revision R' that the reviewing court takes to be optimal, but the re­
revision that the statute's authoritative interpreter subsequently 
chooses under the rubric of statutory interpretation. 
What about a non-class case that reaches the Supreme Court -
perhaps an appeal from a state or federal enforcement action, or 
perhaps an appeal from a individual's declaratory or injunctive suit 
in state or federal court? Here, too, the Derivative Account is 
straightforward. A holding by the Supreme Court that a state or 
federal statute is facially or partly invalid operates to rescind the 
legal authority of enforcement officials and lower courts to apply 
the statute (within the invalidated portion) to anyone, at least pend­
ing an authoritative narrowing construction of the statute. Profes­
sor Fallon, in his thorough recent study on overbreadth, explains: 
"Supreme Court ho�dings of overbreadth . . .  should confer immu­
nity on all conduct occurring after the judgment is entered and 
before a constitutionally adequate narrowing construction is ob­
tained."499 The doctrinal basis for Fallon's rightful confidence in 
the authority of the Supreme Court to invalidate state or federal 
statutes is the Court's famous announcement in Cooper v. Aaron.500 
The Court in Cooper, in the face of a defiant refusal by the 
Arkansas authorities to desegregate the Arkansas schools, an­
nounced that the holding of Brown v. Board of Education was bind­
ing law for government officials everywhere, not just for the 
particular parties in Brown. 
[T]he federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the 
Constitution, and that principle has . . . been respected by this Court 
and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our con­
stitutional system. It follows that the interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the 
supreme law of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of 
binding effect on the States "any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of 
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."501 
498. As it can the proposition that a federal court should perhaps abstain, pending con­
struction of the statute by its authoritative interpreter, or certify the interpretive question to 
that body. See generally Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 117 S. Ct. 1055, 1072-74 
(1997) (discussing techniques of certification and "Pullman" abstention to obtain authorita­
tive constructions of state statutes challenged in federal courts on constitutional grounds). 
499. Fallon, supra note 83, at 908. Professor Shapiro, who shares Professor Fallon's skep­
ticism about the scope of judicial remedies in non-class suits in the lower federal courts, 
agrees with Fallon about the broad scope of a Supreme Court holding. See Shapiro, supra 
note 442, at 777. 
500. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
501. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18. 
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Cooper means that the Court's constitutional utterance has far 
greater scope than, as a matter of res judicata alone, it should: the 
utterance binds the world. 
In recent years, the Cooper doctrine has ignited a fair amount of 
scholarly controversy. One, radical objection is that courts simply 
cannot bind non-parties.s02 This objection trades upon a conceptual 
point about "adjudication" and Article III, of the kind that, I have 
already argued, we should reject. The second, less radical objection 
points to the co-equal and "dialogic" role of institutions other than 
the Supreme Court - for example Congress, or state legislatures 
- in interpreting the Constitution.so3 The Derivative Account can 
readily incorporate this less radical objection. It is consistent with 
the Account to stipulate that Congress can permissibly engage in 
constitutional dialogue with the Court by re-enacting the very same 
statute that the Court has previously invalidated; or even perhaps 
that the President can trigger a dialogue on his own, by directing 
the Department of Justice to enforce an invalidated statute.504 
What is inconsistent, and implausible, is the claim that govemmen· 
tal bodies beneath this top tier - specifically, enforcement agencies 
operating in the absence of a legislative, presidential or gubemato· 
rial mandate to defy the Supreme Court, and lower state or federal 
courts - are also free to ignore the Court's utterances, when the 
Court declares statutes to be constitutionally invalid.sos 
We come, finally, to the toughest case for the Derivative Ac· 
count: a non-class case in the lower federal courts, whether an en· 
502. For opposition to Cooper that trades upon a general opposition to the idea of judi­
cial decisions binding non-parties (as against a specific opposition to decisions binding certain 
institutions, e.g., legislatures), see Edwin Meese, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TuL. L. 
REv. 979 (1987); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations 
for Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 43 (1993). See also Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most 
Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 272-76, 274-84 
(1994) (arguing that judicial decisions do not bind executive branch with respect to nonpar­
ties, but also asserting that judicial judgments are not binding against executive). 
503. See RoBERT BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CoNFLicr (1992). For an overview of 
departmentalism, including this less radical, "dialogic" view, see Walter F. Murphy, Who 
Shall Interpret? The Quest for the Ultimate Constitutional Interpreter, 48 REv. PoL. 401 
(1986). 
504. Note, however, that a departmentalist who espouses some degree of Presidential 
autonomy in interpreting the Constitution need not go so far. See Frank H. Easterbrook, 
Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 905, 906-11, 913-16 (1989-90) (distinguishing 
between less and more controversial types of presidential nonacquiescence). 
505. I should note that Professors Estreicher and Revesz - the leading proponents of 
federal agency nonacquiescence - are specifically concerned \vith agency nonacquiescence 
in statutory decisions by federal courts, and have been unwilling to extend their arguments to 
support agency nonacquiescence on constitutional matters. See Samuel Estreicher & Richard 
Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 720 & n.214 
(1989). 
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forcement action, or a declaratory and injunctive action by the 
claimant in federal district court, or an administrative review pro­
ceeding commenced in the federal court of appeals, or a habeas suit 
in district court. The difficulty here is that: (1) as a matter of res 
judicata, the lower federal court's purported invalidation of the 
statute (even in the shape of an injunction prohibiting its enforce­
ment) binds state officials only with respect to the claimant, not 
with respect to the other actors covered by the statute;506 and (2) 
Cooper v. Aaron does not apply.507 As Professor Fallon notes, in 
the case of a purported lower-court invalidation of a state statute 
for overbreadth: 
Because state courts and lower federal courts stand in a coordinate, 
rather than a hierarchical, relationship, the binding effect of the fed­
eral judgment extends no further than the parties to the lawsuit. 
Against nonparties, the state remains free to lodge criminal prosecu­
tions. Civil actions can also go forward.5os 
Fallon concludes that "[t]he familiar vocabulary of 'voidness,' 'in­
validation,' and 'striking down' thus does more to mislead than 
describe. "509 
But Fallon's skeptical conclusion must, somehow, be wrong. 
The basic premise of the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine is 
that a federal court, by invalidating a statute, protects nonparty 
speakers within the statute's scope. If lower federal courts cannot, 
in fact, invalidate statutes (outside of class actions), then an over­
breadth challenge should be unavailable in lower federal court 
(outside of a class action). That is not the official doctrine, at all.510 
The way to avoid Fallon's skeptical conclusion, and more generally 
to explain lower court utterances within the. Derivative Account, is 
by conceptualizing these utterances as partial steps in a multi-step, 
temporally extended process of judicial repeal. We might say, for 
506. This is true, at least, if the res judicata effect of the federal judgment is itself a matter 
of federal law, see Shapiro, supra note 442, at 763 (arguing that it is), and if the Supreme 
Court's decision in the Mendoza case, see United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154 (1984) 
(nonmutual collateral estoppel generally unavailable against federal government), protects 
state governments as well, see Note, Nonmutual Issue Preclusion against States, 109 HARv. L. 
REv. 792 (1996) (discussing applicability of Mendoza to state governments). 
507. See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 38, at 283 n.219 (stating that "on questions of federal law, 
the state courts are bound only by the United States Supreme Court, and not by the lower 
federal courts," and citing sources). 
508. Fallon, supra note 83, at 853-54 (footnotes omitted); accord, Shapiro, supra note 442, 
at 770-76. The Supreme Court has said the same quite explicitly, see Doran v. Salem Inn, 422 
U.S. 922, 931 (1975) (noting that "neither declaratory nor injunctive relief can directly inter­
fere with enforcement of contested statutes or ordinances except with respect to the particu­
lar federal plaintiffs, and the State is free to prosecute others who may violate the statute"). 
509. Fallon, supra note 83, at 854. 
510. See supra text accompanying note 470 (official statement of doctrine). 
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example, that a federal district court utterance purporting to invaliM 
date a state statute is not generally binding on state officials, except 
in the case of a class action, until the holding is concurred in by the 
state supreme court or (some or all) of the state courts of appeals. 
Or, for a federal statute, we might say that federal prosecutors, abM 
sent a class action, are bound (beyond the scope of res judicata) 
only to refrain from enforcing statutes that have been held unconM 
stitutional in all, or a majority of, the federal circuits. The basic 
idea is that, for a particular rule R, there are multiple lower courts 
(by which I mean, here, courts other than the federal Supreme 
Court) with jurisdiction to adjudicate a federal constitutional chalM 
lenge to R: lower federal versus state courts, or lower federal 
courts with different geographic jurisdictions. For epistemic reaM 
sons, it may well make sense to require something approaching 
unanimous agreement among the relevant lower courts, before enM 
forcement officials should count themselves under a legal obligation 
not to enforce the invalidated statute; and to use the federal 
Supreme Court as the institution for resolving disagreements 
among the lower courts. Legal scholars outside of constitutional 
law, addressing the issue of federal agency nonacquiescence in the 
non-constitutional rulings of federal appellate panels, have adM 
vanced this kind of suggestion: the suggestion is that federal agen­
cies are free to "nonacquiesce" in appellate rulings, but only given 
nonunanimity among the circuits.s11 
The idea of intertemporal repeal - of a voting process among 
the relevant lower courts, those with jurisdiction over some rule R 
- fits comfortably with the Derivative Account. The proponent of 
that account can concede the epistemic benefits of requiring someM 
thing approaching unanimity among the relevant lower courts prior 
to holding enforcement officials obligated (beyond the scope of res 
judicata) not to enforce a rule. This helps explains why the law of 
res judicata has not been changed:512 why judicial rulings against 
the government are not, technically, res judicata beyond the particM 
ular prevailing litigant. What the proponent of the Derivative AcM 
count will not concede is that if, for example, both the state courts 
511. I take this, essentially, to be the view of Professors Estreicher and Revesz. See 
Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 505, at 753 (arguing that "agencies should not engage in 
intracircuit nonacquiescence unless [inter alia] the agency is reasonably seeking the vindica­
tion of its position both in the courts of appeals and before the Supreme Court"). 
512. It also explains perhaps why lower courts ought not automatically certify class ac­
tions in constitutional cases, even assuming representative plaintiffs. See Shapiro, supra note 
442, at 779 (arguing for judicial caution in certifying classes if that would "unfairly deprive 
state courts of the opportunity to express their views"); Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 505, 
at 721 n.218 (making a similar suggestion for statutory challenges to federal agency action). 
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and the lower federal courts concur in deciding that a state statute 
should be invalidated, and there is no reasonable chance of federal 
Supreme Court review, state prosecutors should nonetheless con­
sider themselves legally free to continue enforcing it. And Fallon 
presents no argument to the contrary.513 
It is a further question whether, absent a Supreme Court ruling 
on point or a class-wide injunction, a state or federal official enforc­
ing a statute that the relevant lower courts have declared invalid 
should be subject to sanction in the shape of criminal penalties 
under 18 U.S.C. § 241514 and § 242,515 or monetary damages under 
§ 1983516 and Bivens. 511 Perhaps the line between an incomplete 
and a completed intertemporal repeal is too fuzzy to warrant sanc­
tions against enforcement officials who may innocently stray across 
the line. (Innocent straying may need to be corrected by a subse­
quent class-action suit.518) Nonetheless, enforcement officials have 
a constitutional, legal duty (sanction-backed or not) to observe the 
line. Legal duties can exist without sanctions;519 for example, a 
sanctionless duty could be a legal duty because it is grounded, via 
the legally correct methods of derivation, in some legal text. The 
Supreme Court, the legal body responsible for interpreting the Bill 
of Rights, has announced (at least in the context of overbreadth 
doctrine) that enforcement officials have a legal duty not to enforce 
statutes that the federal courts invalidate. To quote the Court: 
"The consequence of [a judicial declaration invalidating a statute as 
overbroad] is that any enforcement of a statute thus placed at issue is 
totally forbidden until and unless a limiting construction or partial 
invalidation so narrows it as to remove the seeming threat or deter­
rence to constitutionally protected expression."520 And this an-
513. See Fallon, supra note 83, at 880-82 (discussing limited scope of lower court relief in 
non-class cases). 
514. See 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1994) (prohibiting conspiracy to deprive persons of constitu­
tional rights). 
515. See 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1994) (prohibiting deprivation of constitutional rights under 
color of law). 
516. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). 
517. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388 (1971). See generally Kent Greenawalt, Constitutional Decisions and the Supreme Law, 
58 CoLo. L. REv. 145, 171 (1987) (noting these possibilities, with respect to nonacquiescence 
in Supreme Court decisions). 
518. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 505, at 758 (stating that class-action device is 
warranted in event of unjustified agency nonacquiescence). 
519. See RAz, supra note 54, at 154-62, 158 (discussing generally the conceptual possibil­
ity of sanctionless legal norms, and noting that, although mandatory norms addressed to ordi­
nary individuals are always in practice sanction-backed, there exist "mandatory norms 
addressed to officials which are not backed by sanctions"). 
520. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973) (emphasis added). 
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nouncement is indeed legally correct. The legally correct method of 
deriving legal rights and duties from the moral criteria set forth in 
the Bill of Rights is (some kind of) moral reasoning; the Derivative 
Account is the morally best account of those criteria; and the legal 
implication of the Derivative Account is that state and federal offi­
cials have a legal duty not to enforce statutes that the federal courts 
have invalidated, whether through a class action, a Supreme Court 
announcement, or what I have called an intertemporal lower-court 
repeal. 
Professor Fallon, who undertook an empirical survey of state 
prosecutorial responses to lower-federal-court holdings of over­
breadth, found the following: 
[The survey identified] 45 cases [in the relevant time period] in which 
lower federal courts held state statutes unconstitutionally overbroad, 
but only three cases - two involving the same statute - in which 
state prosecutors, following federal holdings of overbreadth, brought 
actions to enforce the affected statutes . . . .  This sample suggests . . .  
that overbreadth holdings by lower federal courts may be far more 
potent in practice than the surrounding legal doctrines would require 
them to be.521 
My conclusion would be a bit different. To my mind, the over­
whelming incidence of prosecutorial compliance with lower-federal­
court overbreadth holdings demonstrates that the remedial tech­
niques available to the federal courts are, in practice, quite potent 
enough to support what legal doctrine should be, namely, the De­
rivative Account. 
CONCLUSION 
What is the moral focus of judicial review? Are constitutional­
reviewing courts essentially concerned with the treatment of partic­
ular litigants? Or is their task essentially legislative? Are they fo­
cused, not on the morality of the particular sanction, duty, or other 
negative treatment that the litigant at hand has received, but rather 
on the moral reasons for and against the underlying rule? And is 
the litigant's case, then, merely an occasion for judicial amendment 
or repeal of rules that go morally awry? The aim of this article has 
been to address and answer, as rigorously as possible, these founda­
tional questions about the nature of judicial review. I have tried, 
here, to get straight our basic picture of constitutional adjudication. 
The right picture, unfamiliar though it may be, is what I have called 
521. Fallon, supra note 83, at 888 n.219. 
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the Derivative Account.522 Constitutional rights are morally deriv­
ative, not morally direct (at least insofar as rights are substantively 
infringed by sanctions or coercive duties, those most elementary 
sources of rights-violation).523 And this revision to our basic pic­
ture of constitutional adjudication should, in turn, have wide doctri­
nal implications - for the wide variety of doctrines, both 
procedural and substantive, that a basic picture informs. The avail­
ability of facial challenges to rules; the contours, indeed very exist­
ence, of the overbreadth doctrine; the proper timing for the 
adjudication of constitutional claims; the proper parties to litigate 
such claims; the scope of judicial remedies; the content of substan­
tive constitutional doctrines governing the predicate and history of 
rules under the Free Speech Clause, Free Exercise Clause, Equal 
Protection Clause, and the substantive component of the Due Pro­
cess Clause - these matters, and others, will depend crucially upon 
whether the Direct Account or the Derivative Account of constitu­
tional rights holds true. 
Given the breadth and diversity of such matters, it is beyond the 
scope of this article to specify, in detail, the doctrinal changes that 
flow from the Derivative Account. A full discussion of the affected 
doctrines would require at least as much space and effort as the 
basic theorizing that this article has tried to complete. Rather, in 
this Conclusion, I will simply describe, in a brief and general way, 
the main areas of constitutional doctrine implicated by the morally 
derivative cast of constitutional rights. It is these areas, principally, 
that the Derivative Account will require us to rethink and to revise. 
Let us begin with the problem of facial challenges. This is a 
problem that, in recent years, has excited great controversy at the 
Court, in areas of constitutional law ranging from commercial 
speech, to political speech, to equal protection, the Establishment 
Clause, the Takings Clause, and, finally, substantive due process 
(both abortion rights and, just recently, assisted suicide ).524 Indeed, 
the controversy over facial challenges now rivals, in intensity and 
breadth, the controversy over standing that became acute during 
the 1980s.525 What triggered the now-familiar disputes over stand-
522. See supra Part II {arguing against Direct Account); supra Part ill (arguing in favor 
of Derivative Account). 
523. See supra text accompanying notes 56-57 {discussing and defending article's focus on 
sanctions and sanction-backed duties). 
524. See supra note 39 (citing cases in these areas). 
525. The scholarly literature from this period that was animated by the resurgent impor­
tance of the standing requirement includes: Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Reme­
dies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. RE.v. 1 
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ing was the Court's adoption of a highly restrictive approach - an 
approach linked to the Direct Account - that threatened to close 
the courthouse doors to large classes of constitutional litigants.526 
Similarly, the current debates (equally ardent and wide-ranging)527 
about facial challenges have been triggered by the Court's an­
nouncement and repeated affirmation of a doctrinal test that threat­
ens to eviscerate the practice of facial invalidation. 
This is the Salemo test. In United States v. Salemo, 528 the Court 
announced: 
A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most diffi­
cult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must estab­
lish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be 
valid. The fact that the [statute reviewed in Salerno] might operate 
unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is in­
sufficient to render it wholly invalid, since we have not recognized an 
"overbreadth" doctrine outside the limited context of the First 
Amendment.529 
Salemo says, or appears to say, the following: Given some rule R, a 
court should facially invalidate R only if, for every person X against 
whom R might be enforced, the application of R to X would be 
unconstitutional.530 And indeed this is the correct test if the Direct 
Account holds true. Salemo starts with the notion that constitu-
(1984); William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE LJ. 221 (1988); Gene R. 
Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. RBv. 635 
(1985); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. RBv. 
1432 (1988); Steven L. Wmter, The Metaphor of Standing, 40 STAN. L. RBv. 1371 (1988). 
526. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (denying standing); 
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (same); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) 
(same); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976) (same); Warth v. Sel· 
din, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (same). On the link between a restrictive approach to standing and 
the Direct Account, see infra text accompanying notes 584-85. 
527. To be sure, the ardent and wide-ranging debates about facial challenges have, hith­
erto, remained debates within the judiciary. There has not, yet, been a broad scholarly ap· 
preciation of the depth and import of this judicial debate. Although there is a well­
developed scholarly literature on overbreadth, see sources cited supra note 83, this focuses on 
facial challenges in the First Amendment context, and largely predates the current judicial 
debates. The only general scholarly piece on facial challenges is Professor Dorfs Facial Chal· 
lenges to State and Federal Statutes. See Dorf, supra note 38. A number of student notes have 
been written recently on the problem of facial challenges in the abortion area. See Ruth 
Burdick, Note, The Casey Undue Burden Standard: Problems Predicted and Encountered, 
and the Split over the Salemo Test, 23 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 825 {1996); John Christopher 
Ford, Note, The Casey Standard for Evaluating Facial Attacks on Abortion Statutes, 95 MICH. 
L. RBv. 1443 (1997); Skye Gabel, Note, Casey "Versus" Salemo: Determining an Appropri· 
ate Standard for Evaluating the Facial Constitutionality of Abortion Statutes, 19 CARDOZO L. 
RBv. 1825 (1998). 
528. 481 U.S. 739 {1987). 
529. Salemo, 481 U.S. at 745. 
530. See Dorf, supra note 38, at 241 ("Under [Salerno's] 'no set of circumstances' test, the 
government need only produce an example in which the statute could be applied constitu­
tionally to defeat the facial challenge."). 
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tional adjudication is, centrally, as-applied adjudication.531 What 
concerns the reviewing court, first and foremost, is whether X's own 
treatment is unconstitutional. If it turns out that the application of 
rule R to X is not unconstitutional, then what claim - asks the 
Salemo Court - does X have to judicial relief? X's only claim 
would be an overbreadth claim: a claim that R should be facially 
invalidated because it is unconstitutional as applied to too many 
other litigants. But, officially, there is no overbreadth doctrine 
outside the First Am.endment;532 the Court has never said other­
wise. So, outside the First Amendment, a rule should be sustained 
over a facial challenge if there is some set of circumstances under 
which an as-applied challenge to the rule fails. This is currently the 
official doctrine for facial challenges, and it follows inexorably from 
the morally direct cast of constitutional rights that the Salemo 
Court, quite standardly, takes to obtain. 
To see the import of Salemo, consider a sweeping law regulating 
abortion. I pick abortion as an example because the implications of 
Salemo, here, are particularly counterintuitive - at least for law­
yers, scholars, and jurists who accept the justiciability of abortion 
rights533 - and, relatedly, because the judicial disputes here about 
facial challenges have been particularly fiery.534 Consider, for ex­
ample, Guam's statute outlawing all abortions except in cases of 
medical emergency, which the Ninth Circuit held to be facially inva­
lid.535 The Supreme Court thereupon denied Guam's petition for 
531. See Ada v. Guam Socy. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 506 U.S. 1011, 1012 (1992) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (defending Salemo by describing as-applied 
adjudication as central and standard type of judicial review). 
532. See Ada, 506 U.S. at 1012 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Salemo, 
481 U.S. at 745. In its First Amendment overbreadth cases, the Court has consistently de­
scribed overbreadth as a First Amendment exception to the normal practice of adjudication. 
See, e.g., Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 112 n.8 (1990); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 
767-69 (1982); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-15 (1973); see also Ford, supra note 
527, at 1450-55 (discussing Court's use of an unarticulated overbreadth doctrine in its abor­
tion cases). 
533. See Ford, supra note 527, at 1445-46 (noting that "[i]f the Supreme Court were faith­
ful to Salemo, it would reject every facial attack on statutes restricting access to abortions"). 
534. See Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, 517 U.S. 1174, 1175 (1996) (denying certiorari) 
(memorandum of Stevens, J.); Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Schafer, 507 U.S. 1013, 1013 
(1993) (denying stay) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Ada, 506 U.S. at 1011 (denying certiorari) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
972-73 (1992) (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
Indeed, the problem of reconciling Salemo with the Court's willingness (most recently, in 
Casey) to sustain facial challenges to laws restricting abortion has generated a circuit split. 
See Burdick, supra note 527, at 872-75 (describing circuit split); Ford, supra note 527, at 1447-
48 (same); Gabel, supra note 527, at 1837-41 (same). 
535. See Guam Socy. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists v. Ada, 962 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir.), 
cerl denied, 506 U.S. 1011 (1992). 
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certiorari, prompting a vigorous dissent by Justice Scalia,536 who ar­
gued that Salemo precluded a facial invalidation of even this highly 
restrictive statute. 
Under this Court's current abortion caselaw, including Casey, I see no 
reason why the Guam law would not be constitutional at least in its 
application to abortions conducted after the point at which the child 
may live outside the womb. If that is so, the Ninth Circuit should 
have dismissed the present, across-the-board challenge.537 
The same might be said of a law prohibiting all previability abor­
tions; we can imagine instances of previability abortion that would 
be wrongful under other descriptions (for example, a previability 
abortion secured through a coercive threat, as in ABORTION). Sa­
lemo implies that most of the major cases, up to and including 
Casey,538 in which the Court has sustained abortion-rights claims, 
were wrongly decided - for most of these cases involved facial in­
validation of rules that, one would imagine, had some morally ac­
ceptable applications.539 
Not surprisingly, then, the applicability of Salemo to laws regu­
lating abortion has been rejected by Justice O'Connor, who (along 
with Justices Souter and Kennedy) authored the joint opinion for 
the Court in Casey. As Justice O'Connor has explained: 
In striking down Pennsylvania's spousal-notice provision [in Casey], 
we did not require petitioners to show that the provision would be 
invalid in all circumstances. Rather, we made clear that a law restrict­
ing abortions constitutes an undue burden, and hence is invalid, if, "in 
a large fraction of the cases in which [the law] is relevant, it will oper­
ate as a substantial obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo an 
abortion. "540 
536. See Ada, 506 U.S. at 1011 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
537. 506 U.S. at 1013 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
538. 505 U.S. at 887-99 (facially invalidating spousal-consent provision of statute regulat­
ing abortion). 
539. The cases I mean are: Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 
417 (1990); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 
(1986); Planned Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); City of Akron v. 
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Belloti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 
622 (1979); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 
(1973); and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). All of these are, I suggest, best categorized as 
involving facial invalidations. 
The only exception to the Court's reliance on facial invalidation, in sustaining abortion­
rights claims, is its occasional narrowing of statutes under the rubric of statutory interpreta­
tion, see, e.g., Planned Parenthood Assn. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 490-93, which is properly 
seen as a kind of partial invalidation, see generally Adler, supra note 4, at 834-39. 
540. Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Schafer, 507 U.S. 1013, 1014 (1993) (O'Connor, J., 
concurring in denial of stay and injunction) (second alteration in original) (quoting Casey, 
505 U.S. at 895). Interestingly, Justice Souter joined Justice O'Connor's concurrence in 
Fargo, but Justice Kennedy did not. See 507 U.S. at 1013. 
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But the proponent of Salemo is entitled to ask: Why should Justice 
O'Connor's be the test? Why should a rule be facially invalidated if 
there is some context in which an as-applied challenge to the rule 
would fail? Neither the judicial nor the scholarly critics of Salemo 
have, in my view, given a satisfactory answer to that question. The 
answer, I suggest, is simply this: There is no such thing as a true as­
applied constitutional challenge.541 The very idea is a mistake. Un­
til we get rid of that idea, our doctrines for adjudicating facial chal­
lenges will remain confused. The concept of unconstitutionality 
does not attach to the treatment of particular litigants; it attaches, 
on the Derivative Account, to the enactment of statutes and other 
rules. Salemo conceives of the facial invalidity of a rule as the limit­
ing point of as-applied invalidity: a rule is facially invalid if, for 
every application of the rule, that application is constitutionally in­
valid. Justice O'Connor, in her response to Salemo, tries to soften 
the test somewhat: a rule is facially invalid if, for many applications 
of the rule, those are constitutionally invalid.542 But both tests are 
mistaken, because both trade upon the mistaken, albeit standard, 
notion that rule-applications can be properly described as 
unconstitutional. 
Let me put the point this way. On the Derivative Account, 
every constitutional challenge involves the facial scrutiny of rules. 
In every constitutional case (at least where claimants substantively 
challenge sanctions or sanction-backed duties), the court's task is to 
assess the predicate and history of the underlying rule against one 
or more rule-validity schema. Substantive constitutional doctrines, 
such as the narrow-tailoring doctrines familiar from free speech 
541. By this I mean just that constitutional litigation does not concern the morality of the 
application of a rule to a particular claimant; it does not concern whether the claimant's 
treatment should be overturned, independent of further invalidating the rule. "As-applied" 
adjudication in the (less robust) sense of adjudication that depends, in part, on facts about 
the claimant rather than depending exclusively on the predicate and history of the rule, is 
quite consistent with the Derivative Account, as I have already explained, see supra text 
accompanying notes 140-45, 414-21. 
542. One might object that Justice O'Connor's test means to ask, not whether a large 
fraction of an abortion-regulating rule's applications are unconstitutional, but rather whether 
a large fraction of the rule's applications (say, sanctions) are morally wrong. If so, the 
O'Connor test is consistent with the facial rather than as-applied cast of constitutional adjudi­
cation; but one can still debate whether the absolute or relative number of morally problem­
atic applications should be a factor in constitutional rule-validity schema. A rule breaches 
the Liberty Schema or the Discrimination Schema if the rule, without sufficient reason, re­
stricts liberties or includes a discriminatory predicate, see supra text accompanying notes 326, 
384; there is no further question of the rule being largely, or only a little bit, wrong. But 
perhaps a further question of this kind is appropriate for courts to ask, e.g., if docket­
congestion or the exigencies of judicial efficacy in constitutional cases, see GERALD N. 
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 336 (1991) (questioning efficacy of judicial remedies), re­
quire limiting judicial intervention to the most serious cases of morally problematic rules. 
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law,543 the "undue burden" doctrine announced in Casey for abor­
tion rights,544 or the antidiscrimination doctrines for free exercise 
and equal protection,545 are all facial doctrines, in the following 
sense: these doctrines serve to determine whether morality re­
quires some change in the canonical language of the scrutinized 
rule. Now, it remains an interesting remedial problem how the re­
viewing court should remedy a rule that fails the moral scrutiny 
subserved by these familiar rule-validity tests. This is the problem I 
adverted to in section III.A.3. One possible remedy is facial invali­
dation, another is partial invalidation or even extension, and there 
are pros and cons to each. Facial-challenge doctrine, properly un­
derstood, is a .doctrine that addresses this remedial problem - and 
no more than that. It is a doctrine that answers the question: 
Where a rule is constitutionally invalid, should the revie\ving court 
repeal the invalid rule, or should the court instead amend the rule in 
some way? The answer might be that courts should never repeal 
rules if there exists a narrower, curative amendment - which 
would have the effect of making facial invalidation quite rare. But 
if that is the correct answer, it is correct because of the moral losses 
that flow from facial invalidation, the skill of courts in crafting cura­
tive amendments, and so forth, and not because of the morally di­
rect cast of constitutional rights.546 
The flip side of the Court's confusion about facial challenges is 
its confusion about the overbreadth doctrine.547 The overbreadth 
doctrine, as the Court conceptualizes it, purports to create a special, 
bonus right with respect to laws regulating speech. "Outside the 
area of free speech, a litigant merely has the right to challenge the 
application of a rule to himself. However, in the area of free 
speech, the litigant has the bonus right - a right he can invoke, 
even if his as-applied challenge fails - that the reviewing court 
facially invalidate a rule which is substantially overbroad." Or so 
the standard conceptualization goes. As the Court has explained: 
The First Amendment doctrine of overbreadth was designed as a 
"departure from traditional rules of standing," to enable persons who 
are themselves unharmed by the defect in a statute nevertheless "to 
challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be ap-
543. See supra text accompanying notes 321-25. 
544. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 869-79. 
545. See supra text accompanying notes 98-113. 
546. See supra text accompanying notes 414-21 (discussing pros and cons of facial vs. 
partial invalidation of rules). 
547. See supra notes 470-91 and accompanying text (describing overbreadth doctrine, and 
citing leading cases and scholarly articles). 
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plied unconstitutionally to others, in other situations not before the 
Court." . . .  
It is not the usual judicial practice . . . to proceed to an over­
breadth issue unnecessarily - that is, before it is determined that the 
statute would be valid as applied . . . . [T]he lawfulness of the particu­
lar application of the law should ordinarily be decided first.548 
But the overbreadth doctrine is just as empty as the idea of an as­
applied challenge, and for the same reason. Every constitutional 
claimant has one and the same type of legal right: a right to secure 
the invalidation (whether a partial invalidation, a facial invalida­
tion, or something else) of a rule that goes morally awry. This is the 
kind of right that the overbreadth doctrine purports to describe, but 
it is not in fact special to free speech, nor is it a bonus above and 
beyond a more basic as-applied right. Consider our stylized case, 
CHILD PoRNoGRAPHY, which is meant to exemplify a classic over­
breadth case: the case where a child pornographer is sanctioned 
pursuant to a sweeping rule that prohibits pictures of naked chil­
dren. It is indeed true in CHILD PoRNOGRAPHY that the claimant 
has no as-applied claim; moral reason does not obtain for a court to 
invalidate the claimant's sanction, independent of further invalidat­
ing the rule under which that sanction falls. But the same, I have 
argued, is true of the claimants in FLAG DESECRATION, ABORTION, 
RESIDENTIAL PICKETING, ALCOHOL, and ANIMAL SACRIFICE. And 
if the Derivative Account is correct, the same is always true (or 
might be true) of every constitutional litigant. A constitutional liti­
gant always lacks, or might lack, a valid moral claim; the strength of 
the litigant's own moral claim is simply not an issue for the constitu­
tional reviewing court; and therefore the idea of a special over­
breadth right, for litigants whose own moral claims misfire, is 
nonsense. 
Indeed, I am not the first scholar to criticize the standard con­
ceptualization of overbreadth. Henry Monaghan, in his well-known 
article on Overbreadth, has done just this.549 Monaghan argues that 
laws regulating free speech, just like other rules, are unconstitu-
548. Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 484-85 (1989) (citations omitted) (quoting 
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610, 613 (1973)) . For a similarly clear description of 
the right to raise a First Amendment overbreadth challenge as a bonus right, additional to 
the claimant's right to raise an as-applied challenge, see Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 323-24 
(1991). And what Fox and Geary say explicitly is implicit in other standard discussions by the 
Court of the overbreadth doctrine. See, e.g., Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 
503 (1985) ("In [overbreadth] cases, an individual whose own speech or expressive conduct 
may validly be prohibited or sanctioned [i.e., who lacks a successful as-applied challenge] is 
permitted to challenge a statute on its face because it also threatens others not before the 
court . . . .  "). 
549. See Monaghan, supra note 44. 
160 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 97:1 
tional if and only if they fail applicable rule-validity schemas.55o In 
the area of free speech, the relevant schema simply demands that 
the rule be narrowly tailored or (equivalently) that it not be over­
broad. There is no special overbreadth doctrine for free speech, 
above and beyond the basic requirement - true both of rules regu­
lating speech and of other rules - that such rules be constitution­
ally valid. 
[T]he dominant idea [overbreadth] evokes is serious means scrutiny. 
Wherever [the Constitution] mandates strict or intermediate scrutiny, 
a requirement of regulatory precision is involved . . . . Thus the Court 
has reacted interchangeably to "overbreadth" and "least restrictive 
alternative" challenges both inside and outside the First Amendment 
context.551 
Like Monaghan, I agree that constitutional adjudication always and 
only involves judicial assessment of the predicate and history of 
rules against applicable rule-validity schema. Unlike Monaghan, I 
think it is a grave mistake to conceptualize this judicial task as rest­
ing upon the proposition that, in his words: "[A] litigant has always 
had the right to be judged in accordance with a constitutionally 
valid rule of law."552 This is the proposition that the Direct Ac­
count tries to prove: the Direct Account tries to demonstrate that 
sanctioning some X, pursuant to a rule that is constitutionally "in­
valid," violates X's moral rights. But the Direct Account is unper­
suasive - rule-validity schema are not best construed as identifying 
improper features of rules such that to apply a rule with that kind of 
feature is, itself, to violate a moral right of the sanctioned person, 
independent of the proscribability of her action under another de­
scription - and to attempt a rescue of Monaghan's claim by saying 
that a litigant has the legal, if not moral, right to be judged in ac­
cordance with a constitutionally valid rule of law is a confusion. A 
litigant has that legal right only because, in turn, her case is an occa­
sion for judicial repeal or amendment of the rule rather than merely 
the litigant's own treatment. 
550. As Monaghan puts it: 
[There is] little support for viewing overbreadth as a special, speech-protective standing 
doctrine. Rather, . . .  overbreadth methodology simply applies the conventional princi­
ple that any litigant may insist on not being burdened by a constitutionally invalid rule. 
What is different from the conventional run-of-the mill case is not standing but the sub­
stantive content of the applicable constitutional law. 
Id. at 37. 
551. Id. {footnotes omitted). 
552. Id. at 3; see also Henry Monaghan, Harmless Error and the Valid Rule Requirement, 
1989 SuP. CT. REv. 195, 196-97 {reiterating claim that litigant has the right to be judged in 
accordance with a constitutionally valid rule); Dorf, supra note 38, at 242-49 (concurring in 
Monaghan's claim); Fallon, supra note 83, at 874 (same). 
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In short, the overbreadth doctrine is quite correct (pace 
Monaghan) in stating that the role of reviewing courts is to repeal 
and amend rules at the instance of morally minimal litigants. 
Where the overbreadth doctrine goes wrong is in thinking that this 
is a special role, reserved for the Free Speech Clause, and that the 
ordinary role of reviewing courts outside the area of free speech is 
something other than this. 
Is there any way to salvage the overbreadth doctrine? Perhaps 
it might be reconceptualized, not as a doctrine that confers bonus 
rights upon litigants in the area of free speech, but as a special re­
medial doctrine - a doctrine that makes facial invalidation an es­
pecially accessible remedy here. 
A Reconceptualized Overbreadth Doctrine? 
If a law fails a rule-validity schema, except for a free-speech 
schema, then facial invalidation is an appropriate remedy 
under conditions Q. If, however, a law fails a free speech rule­
validity schema, then facial invalidation is an appropriate rem­
edy under conditions Q or Q'. ss3 
But even this remedial reconceptualization of overbreadth is prob­
lematic, given the Court's actual remedial practices. In practice, 
many and perhaps most of the cases in which the Court has sus­
tained constitutional challenges to conduct-regulating rules have 
eventuated in facial invalidation: not just free speech cases, but 
also abortion rights cases, free exercise cases, and equal protection 
cases.ss4 And, even more strikingly, the overwhelming bulk of the 
cases where the Court has cured invalid conduct-regulating rules 
through some remedy other than facial invalidation, have in fact 
been free speech casesisss The partial invalidation or, for that mat­
ter, the extension of conduct-regulating rules that violate equal pro­
tection is virtually unheard of;SS6 now that the Free Exercise Clause 
closely parallels the Equal Protection Clause, the same should gen­
erally hold true there; and, in practice, as I have already noted, the 
standard remedy for conduct-regulating rules that violate substan-
553. Cf. Stem, supra note 414, at 82-106 (describing, circa 1937, Court's varying practices 
of facial versus partial invalidation, and discussing the choice between those alternatives as a 
remedial problem). 
554. See supra note 425. 
555. See supra note 425. Notably, these include not just commercial-speech cases, where 
the overbreadth doctrine is formally inapplicable, see Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 
(1989), but "core" speech cases as well. 
556. See supra note 144. 
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tive due process has been facial invalidation.ss7 So a remedial 
reconceptualization of First Amendment overbreadth is, at the very 
least, quite problematic. 
A third doctrine that - like the Salerno test for facial chal­
lenges and the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine - must be 
dramatically reconceptualized is the doctrine of jus tertii stand­
ing. sss The Court has repeatedly invoked this doctrine in cases 
where a person who falls within the scope of a conduct-regulating 
rule seeks to invalidate the rule, even though that person is not, or 
may not be, the moral beneficiary of the constitutional clause upon 
which he relies. For example, the doctrine was invoked in Mc­
Gowan v. Maryland, ss9 where department store employees were 
prosecuted for making sales in violation of a Maryland Sunday­
closing statute, and challenged their convictions on free exercise 
grounds;s60 in Griswold v. Connecticut, S61 where doctors who pre­
scribed contraceptives were sanctioned as "aider and abettors" pur­
suant to a Connecticut statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives, 
and challenged their sanctions on substantive due process 
grounds;s6z in Eisenstadt v. Baird, S63 where a distributor of contra­
ceptives was sanctioned for violating a Massachusetts statute that 
prohibited their distribution (not their use), and raised an equal 
protection challenge;s64 and in Craig v. Boren,s6s where the statute 
prohibited the sale of low-alcohol beer to men but not to women 
557. The standard response in abortion cases, which have comprised the bulk of substan­
tive due process cases with respect to conduct-regulating rules, has been facial invalidation. 
See supra note 539. In other types of substantive due process scenarios, the Court has re­
sorted to partial invalidation. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking 
down law prohibiting contraception, with respect to use of contraceptives by married per­
sons); Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (striking down law restricting 
distribution and advertisement of contraceptives, with respect to nonprescription 
contraceptives). 
558. See generally Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 CoLuM. L. RE.v. 277 
(1984) (discussing jus tertii standing doctrine); Robert Allen Sedler, The Assertion of Consti­
tutional Jus Tertii: A Substantive Approach, 70 CAL. L. RE.v. 1308 (1982) (same); Note, 
Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Terti� 88 HAR.v. L. RE.v. 423 (1974) (same). 
559. 366 U.S. 420 (1961). 
560. See McGowan, 366 U.S. at 429-30 (holding that employees lacked jus tertii standing 
with respect to free exercise challenge). 
561. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
562. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481 (holding that doctors had jus tertii standing). 
563. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
564. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 443-46 (holding that distributor had jus tertii standing); 
see also Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 682-84 (1977) (holding that distributor 
had jus tertii standing to challenge statute restricting distribution and advertisement of 
contraceptives). 
565. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
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between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one, and a beer vendor 
challenged the statute on equal protection grounds.566 
The Court has conceptualized these kind of cases as posing a 
question of prudential (not Article III) standing:567 Did the em­
ployee in McGowan, the doctor in Griswold, the distributor in 
Eisenstadt, and the vendor in Craig have "third party" standing to 
raise the constitutional rights of, respectively, the department store 
patrons, the doctor's patients, the distributees of contraceptives, 
and the vendor's customers? As the Court explained in Craig: 
The legal duties created by the statutory sections under challenge are 
addressed directly to vendors such as appellant. She is obliged either 
to heed the statutory [command], thereby incurring a direct economic 
injury . . .  or to disobey the statutory command and suffer . . .  "sanc­
tions and perhaps loss of license." This Court repeatedly has recog­
nized that such requirements establish the threshold requirements of 
a "case or controversy" mandated by Art. III. 
As a vendor with [Article III] standing to challenge the lawfulness 
of [the statute prohibiting the sale of beer, she] is entitled to assert 
those concomitant rights of third parties that would be "diluted or 
adversely affected" should her constitutional challenge fail and the 
statutes remain in force. Otherwise, the threatened imposition of 
governmental sanctions might deter [the vendor] from selling 3.2% 
beer to young males, thereby ensuring that "enforcement of the chal­
lenged restriction . . .  would result indirectly in the violation of third 
parties' rights."568 
The Court concluded that the vendor had "standing to raise rele­
vant equal protection challenges to Oklahoma's gender-based 
law."569 
But if the Derivative Account is correct, cases such as Craig, 
Eisenstadt, Griswold, and McGowan do not create a standing prob­
lem - any more than, say, R.A.V.570 (where a trespassory and as-
566. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 192-97 (holding that vendor had jus tertii standing). Tue doc­
trine also arises in areas other than substantive challenges to conduct-regulating rules. For 
recent examples, see Miller v. Albright, 118 S. Ct. 1428, 1442 (1998) (O'Connor, J., concur­
ring) (arguing that child lacked jus tertii standing to raise equal protection claim of citizen 
father with respect to naturalization scheme distinguishing between the children of citizen 
fathers and citizen mothers); Campbell v. Louisiana, 118 S. Ct. 1419, 1422-24 (1998) (holding 
that white criminal defendant had jus tertii standing to raise equal protection claim of dis­
crimination against blacks in the selection of grand jurors). 
567. On the prudential, rather than constitutional, nature of jus tertii standing doctrine, 
see, e.g., Craig, 429 U.S. at 193 (stating that "limitations on a litigant's assertion of jus tertii 
are not constitutionally mandated, but rather stem from a salutary 'rule of self-restraint' 
designed to minimize unwarranted intervention into controversies where the applicable con­
stitutional questions are ill-defined and speculative"). 
568. 429 U.S. at 194-95 (citations omitted) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479, 481 (1965)). 
569. 429 U.S. at 197. 
570. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
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saultive speaker was prosecuted pursuant to a no-hate-speech law) 
or Eichman571 (where flag burners who took and destroyed flags 
belonging to others were prosecuted for flag mutilation). In what 
sense is the vendor in Craig, and her counterparts in Eisenstadt, 
Griswold, and McGowan, relying on the "rights" of other persons, 
rather than "her own" rights? If "rights," here, are taken to be 
moral rights, then the fact that the vendor and her counterparts are 
not asserting their own moral rights is not distinct to these cases. 
Rather, as I have argued at length, the morally derivative cast of 
constitutional litigants is a pervasive feature of constitutional law. 
What about saying that the vendor and her counterparts are not 
asserting their own legal rights? This, too, would be a mistake, be­
cause if the statutes in Craig, Eisenstadt, Griswold, and McGowan 
do indeed violate constitutional rule-validity schema, there is no 
reason to think that (morally-minimal) litigants other than the per­
sons sanctioned pursuant to those statutes should have the primary 
legal right to secure the statutes' invalidation. 
In short, the issue in Craig, Eisenstadt, Griswold, and McGowan 
is simply an issue about the content of constitutional rule-validity 
schema. Does the substantive component of the Due Process 
Clause merely proscribe a rule that prohibits the use of contracep­
tives, or does it also proscribe a rule that prohibits the sale of con­
traceptives? Does the Equal Protection Clause proscribe rules that 
discriminate, not on the basis of the actor's race or gender, but 
rather on the basis of the race or gender of the actor's customers or 
clients? These are important questions, that go to the content of 
the
· 
moral criteria set forth in the Bill of Rights, and to the role of 
courts in enforcing these criteria - but the questions have nothing 
to do with jus tertii standing. Framing them in "standing" terms 
threatens to obscure their correct answers - for example, by sug­
gesting that the vendor in Craig and her counterparts in Eisenstadt, 
Griswold, and McGowan can only proceed to court if the "rights­
holders" they purportedly represent are unable to do so them­
selves. 572 On the Derivative Account, there is no better litigant to 
571. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990). 
572. See, e.g., Campbell v. Louisiana, 118 S. Ct. 1419, 1423 (1998) (stating that the pre­
conditions for jus tertii standing are " 'injury in fact' " on the part of the claimant, a " 'close 
relationship' " between her and the rights-holders, and "some hindrance to [their] asserting 
their own rights"); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446 (1972) (stating that "the case for 
according standing to assert third-party rights is strong( ] . . . because unmarried persons 
denied access to contraceptives in Massachusetts . . .  are not themselves subject to prosecu­
tion and, to that extent, are denied a forum in which to assert their own rights"); McGowan v. 
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 430 (1961) (denyingjus tertii standing to employees because "(t]hose 
persons whose religious rights are allegedly impaired by the statutes are not without effective 
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challenge a law prohibiting sale, prescription, or distribution, than a 
vendor, doctor, or distributor. 
What about Article III standing itself? The Article III standing 
requirement, as the Court announced in the leading case of Allen v. 
Wright,513 is the following: "A plaintiff must allege personal injury 
fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and 
likely to be redressed by the requested relief."574 Here, too, the 
Derivative Account has important implications. There is no incon­
sistency between that account and the existence of an Article III 
standing requirement. One might say, for example, that it is impor­
tant to have litigants with interests sufficiently affected by the rules 
they challenge, so that these persons are likely to litigate with full 
vigor their claims that the challenged rules do not satisfy applicable 
rule-validity schema.575 Crucially, however, as I have already 
noted,576 a standing requirement is extrinsic to the Derivative Ac­
count. Constitutional adjudication, intrinsically, involves the repeal 
or amendment of rules, and X's "constitutional right" is a legal right 
to secure the invalidation of an invalid rule; it is no entailment of 
such a right that, further, X have a personal interest in that invalida­
tion. X could just be a concerned citizen. By contrast, on the Di­
rect Account, X's "constitutional right" is a legal right to secure the 
invalidation of her own treatment; if she fails to identify some such 
treatment, some "personal injury," then a necessary condition for 
the very practice of constitutional adjudication has failed.577 The 
notion of standing is intrinsic to the Direct Account, but not the 
Derivative Account, and this difference means that the proponents 
of the two accounts are likely to flesh out Allen's standing require­
ment in quite different ways. 
ways to assert these rights"); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER's THE 
FEDERAL COURTS AND nm FEDERAL SYSTEM 195 (4th ed. 1996) (noting that existence of 
"obstacles to tbird parties' asserting their own rights" is a recurrent theme in jus tertii case 
law). 
573. 468 U.S. 737 (1984). 
574. Wright, 468 U.S. at 751. 
575. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 525, at 1448 (noting that a standing requirement has been 
defended, inter alia, as ensuring sincere and effective litigants, but denying that such a re­
quirement is well-matched to that goal). 
576. See supra text accompanying note 405. 
577. For discussions by the Court that link the injury-in-fact, causation, or redressability 
components of standing to the (allegedly) personal nature of adjudication, see, e.g., Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576-78 (1992); Wright, 468 U.S. at 759-61; Simon v. East­
ern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 37-39 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 
U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975). 
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The various aspects of Article III standing are too complex to 
discuss seriatim here.578 Rather, I will illustrate my point about the 
differing implications of the Direct and Derivative Accounts by dis­
cussing one aspect that has been particularly salient and contested 
in recent years. Tb.at concerns whether persons who seek more 
stringent government regulation have Article III standing to chal­
lenge a regulatory regime that, they claim, is not stringent 
enough.579 For example, in Allen v. Wright itself, black schoolchil­
dren claimed that the Internal Revenue Service's failure to ensure a 
denial of tax exemptions to racially discriminatory private schools 
violated the Equal Protection Clause as well as statutory require­
ments. 580 The Court held that the schoolchildren lacked standing, 
given the absence of a clear causal link between the IRS's tax­
exemption policies and any concrete harm the schoolchildren might 
suffer - for example, the harm of attending segregated public 
schools.581 And a broadly similar scenario has arisen in other lead­
ing Supreme Court standing cases, such as the recent Lujan case, 
where again the Court denied standing to (alleged) beneficiaries 
(this time, to environmentalists who challenged on statutory 
grounds the government's failure to enforce the Endangered Spe­
cies Act abroad);582 and in the Akins case last Term, where the 
Court (over the dissent of three members) granted standing to vot­
ers who challenged the Federal Election Commission's decision not 
to proceed with an enforcement action against an alleged violator 
of the election laws. 583 
578. For a survey, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 290, § 2.3. 
579. See generally Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561-62 (stating that Article III standing is much 
more difficult to establish where the target of the challenged government action, or inaction, 
is not the claimant herself, but some third party). 
580. See Wright, 468 U.S. at 740-50. 
581. See 468 U.S. at 752-61. 
582. See Lujan, 504 U.S. 555. 
583. See FEC v. Akins, 118 S. Ct. 1777 (1998). Other important standing cases where this 
scenario has arisen include: Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 
U.S. 26 (1976) {denying standing) (challenge by indigents to favorable tax treatment, by IRS, 
of hospitals that fail to provide full services to indigents); United States v. Students Challeng­
ing Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 683-90 {1973) (granting standing) 
(challenge by environmentalists to decision, by ICC, permitting surcharges by railroads); 
Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 {1973) {denying standing) (equal protection challenge, 
by mother of illegitimate child seeking support for that child, to Texas child-support statute 
that covered only the parents of legitimate children); and Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 
(1972) (denying standing) (challenge by environmentalists to forest service's approval of plan 
by an entertainment company to develop portion of national forest). See also Steel Co. v. 
Citizens for a Better Environment, 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998) (denying standing) (suit by envi­
ronmental group against manufacturer pursuant to "citizen suit" provision of Emergency 
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act). Technically, Sierra Club and SCRAP in­
volved standing under the Administrative Procedure Act, but the issues involved in these 
cases (injury-in-fact and causation) would now be understood as going to Article III standing. 
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To put the problem in terms of our stylized cases: imagine that, 
in ALcoHoL, a rule prohibiting the sale of alcohol to men (but not 
to women) between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one is chal­
lenged on equal protection grounds by an association of bicyclists. 
The bicyclists believe that women under twenty-one, like men, are 
prone to driving while intoxicated; they seek, optimally, a judicial 
extension of the rule to women or, failing that, a judicial invalida­
tion which (they hope) will in tum prompt a legislative extension. 
Do the bicyclists have standing? The proponent of the Direct Ac­
count is likely to say no, for two reasons. First, she will demaiid a 
threshold showing of some setback to the bicyclists' interests, such 
that (the bicyclists will then claim) moral reason obtains to reverse 
that setback. If, for example, the bicyclists cannot show at the 
threshold that women between eighteen and twenty-one are indeed 
prone to drive while intoxicated, then the gender-discriminatory 
scope of the rule does not affect their safety, and the bicyclists lack 
the feature of a personal setback which - on the Direct Account 
- is an integral feature of constitutional adjudication. Second -
whether this is seen as a problem of Article III or of prudential 
standing - the question will arise whether the bicyclists are the 
moral beneficiaries of the Equal Protection Clause.584 Imagine, for 
example, that the Clause is seen to be animated by the morally un­
warranted stigma that flows from discrimination, or by the exclu­
sion of outside groups from political participation.585 Bicyclists are 
not stigmatized by the rule in ALCOHOL, nor have they been ex­
cluded from the political process. Thus, at least on this reading of 
the Equal Protection Clause, the proponent of the Direct Account 
will find it anomalous to let the bicyclists challenge the no-alcohol 
rule: even if the rule does cause them a personal setback, that set­
back violates no constitutionalized moral right of theirs. 
By contrast, for the proponent of the Derivative Account, a per­
sonal setback on the bicyclists' part is extrinsic to the process of 
constitutional adjudication. She may, at the threshold, require 
some non-trivial probability that the scope of the no-alcohol rule 
affects their interest in safety or some other suitably personal inter­
est - as a means to ensure sufficiently adverse litigants, or perhaps 
for other reasons - but she will likely eschew the elaborate thresh-
584. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 
(1970) (holding that standing requires, beyond the existence of a case or controversy, that 
"the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of inter­
ests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question"). 
585. For a discussion of possible defenses of the Direct Account grounded upon these 
rationales, see supra section II.B.2; supra text accompanying notes 254-55. 
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old inquiry into the litigant's personal setback that the Direct Ac­
count requires, and that was evident in Allen and Lujan. 586 As for 
the fact that the bicyclists, themselves, may not be the moral benefi­
ciaries of the Equal Protection Clause: that is simply irrelevant for 
the Derivative Account. The Equal Protection Clause, on that ac­
count, simply identifies certain morally unwarranted rule-types; any 
(sufficiently adverse) litigant has the legal right to secure the invali­
dation of such rules. The bicyclist harmed by the discriminatory 
rule may, himself, not have a moral claim to overturn that treat­
ment grounded in the Equal Protection Clause; but, then again, 
neither does the young man who breaches the no-alcohol rule by 
purchasing beer with a stolen credit card. 
A similar point can be made about a constitutional and pruden­
tial doctrine closely related to standing: the doctrine of ripeness. 
This doctrine concerns the timing of judicial review. It looks both 
to the "hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration" 
and to the "fitness of the issues for judicial decision."5S7 For the 
proponent of the Direct Account, the ripeness doctrine - like 
standing - is (at least in part) intrinsic to the very practice of con­
stitutional adjudication. If the litigant has not, yet, suffered "hard­
ship," then there is not yet, for her, a personal setback to which her 
claim of constitutional right can attach. 
Preenforcement challenges to rules pose one major category of 
ripeness problems.sss Can a claimant whose freedom is allegedly 
restricted by a rule adjudicate her constitutional or statutory chal­
lenges to the rule immediately upon its enactment, or must she wait 
until the rule is enforced against her? The proponent of the Direct 
Account may well make the claimant wait, at least absent specific 
evidence that the rule has a coercive effect on the claimant. On the 
Direct Account, the paradigmatic constitutional suit is a retrospec­
tive challenge to some sanction the claimant has received for an 
action she has already performed. In such a temporal posture, 
. there can no question about the existence of a concrete setback to 
the claimant. By contrast, in a preenforcement challenge the ques­
tion remains open whether the rule's duty constitutes a true hard­
ship for claimant: whether she really wants to perform an action 
covered by the rule and, if so, whether the chance of her being sane-
586. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562-71; Wright, 468 U.S. at 752-61. 
587. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 {1967). See generally Gene R. Nichol, 
Jr., Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 153 (1987) (surveying and discussing 
ripeness jurisprudence). 
588. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 290, § 2.4, at 115. 
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tioned for that is significant. As the Court explained in United 
Public Workers v. Mitchell,589 the high-water mark of a stringent 
ripeness doctrine, where the Court declined to hear a preenforce­
ment free speech challenge to the Hatch Act (prohibiting political 
activity by government employees):59o 
The power of courts, and ultimately of this Court, to pass upon the 
constitutionality of acts of Congress arises only when the interests of 
litigants require the use of this judicial authority for their protection 
against actual interference. A hypothetical threat is not enough. We 
can only speculate as to the kinds of political activity the appellants 
desire to engage in or as to the contents of their proposed public 
statements . . . . It would not accord with judicial responsibility to 
adjudge, in a matter involving constitutionality . . .  except when defi­
nite rights appear upon the one side and definite prejudicial interfer­
ences upon the other.591 
Strains of the Direct Account are clearly audible here. 
In the years following Mitchell, the Court considerably relaxed 
the ripeness barrier to preenforcement challenges to rules - most 
visibly in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 592 which permitted a 
preenforcement statutory challenge to an FDA regulation, and 
thereby opened the door to routine preenforcement review within 
federal administrative law.593 A similar relaxation occurred for 
constitutional suits. As one commentator has noted: "The Court 
. . .  routinely entertain[ s] suits to declare statutes unconstitutional, 
invoking the ripeness requirement only occasionally."594 But it is, 
now, far from clear whether this relaxed ripeness regime will con­
tinue. The Court took a sharp tum toward renewed stringency in 
Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc., 595 where it sua sponte rejected 
as unripe a preenforcement class-action challenge to a benefit­
conferring rule. 
"[I]njunctive and declaratory judgment remedies . . .  are discretion­
ary, and courts traditionally have been reluctant to apply them to ad­
ministrative determinations unless these arise in the context of a 
controversy 'ripe' for judicial resolution," that is to say, unless the 
589. 330 U.S. 75 (1947). 
590. See Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 86-91 (declining to hear preenforcement challenge); 330 
U.S. at 91-94 (agreeing to hear challenge by employee who had already been charged by Civil 
Service Commission with political activity, and where the Commission had entered a pro­
posed order for his removal). 
591. 330 U.S. at 89-90. 
592. 387 U.S. 136 (1967). 
593. See MAsHAw, supra note 423, at 179 (noting that "[p]reenforcement review has be­
come the norm" within administrative law). 
594. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 498 (2d ed. 1994). 
595. 509 U.S. 43 (1993). 
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effects of the administrative action challenged have been "felt in a 
concrete way by the challenging parties." . . .  
. . . [T]he promulgation of the challenged regulations did not itself 
give each . . .  class member a ripe claim; a class member's claim would 
ripen only once he took the affirmative steps [of applying individually 
for the benefit and being rejected].596 
The Court has not, yet, extended Reno's renewed stringency to con­
duct-regulating rules - but there are some hints that it may do just 
that.597 
The proponent of the Direct Account will be cheered by Reno; 
the proponent of the Derivative Account will be alarmed. Ripe­
ness, like standing, is extrinsic to the Derivative Account. There is 
no preference, within that account, for retrospective rather than an­
ticipatory challenges. Just the opposite: if a rule is morally and 
constitutionally invalid, then, ceteris paribus, the rule ought to be 
repealed or amended as soon as possible. I say "ceteris paribus" 
because there may well be countervailing considerations, accepta­
ble to the Derivative Account, that weigh in favor of postenforce­
ment rather than preenforcement review. For example, as Jerry 
Mashaw has noted, "review at the application stage . . .  provid[ es] a 
better information base."598 Further, by invoking the threat of 
preenforcement review against an administrative agency, organized 
litigants may be able to force changes, benefiting themselves, in the 
terms of perfectly valid rules. These kind of considerations may, 
perhaps, lead the proponent of the Derivative Account to concur in 
a tightening of the ripeness requirements for anticipatory chal­
lenges. What is the optimal timing for constitutional challenges, 
such that invalid rules are maximally repaired, yet with minimal ju­
dicial interference against the enforcement of valid rules? It is 
upon that question, and not upon some further preference for a 
596. Catholic Social Servs., 509 U.S. at 57, 59 (footnote and citations omitted) (quoting 
Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967)); cf. 509 U.S. at 67-70 (O'Connor J, 
concurring in the judgment) (criticizing majority's ripeness holding); 509 U.S. at 77-83 (Ste­
vens, J., dissenting) (same). 
597. See 509 U.S. at 58 (suggesting that "a controversy concerning a regulation is not 
ordinarily ripe for review . • .  until the regulation has been applied to the claimant's situation 
by some concrete action"); Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 320-23 (1991) (finding unripe antic­
ipatory, free-speech challenge to provision of California Constitution - albeit enforceable 
only by injunction - that prohibited political parties from endorsing candidates for nonparti­
san offices); see also Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200 (1994) (holding that 
statute precluded preenforcement challenge, by mine operator, to sanction-backed agency 
order requiring operator to designate union members as representatives for safety inspec­
tions at mine). For recent evidence, in other contexts, of the Court's seriousness about ripe­
ness doctrine, see Texas v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1257 (1998), and Ohio Forestry 
Association v. Sie"a Club, 118 S. Ct. 1665 (1998). 
598. MAsHAw, supra note 423, at 179. 
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maximally concrete harm to the litigant that, within the Derivative 
Account, the viability of preenforcement review should hinge. 
The points I am making here could be multiplied, and _applied to 
other procedural doctrines besides ripeness, standing, and the 
others I have discussed. Virtually any procedural doctrine will be 
viewed one way within the Direct Account, and another way within 
the Derivative Account. Consider, for example, .abstention doc­
trine. The Court's announcement, in Younger v. Harris, 599 that a 
federal court must abstain from issuing an injunction against a state 
criminal statute where a prosecution of the claimant pursuant to 
that statute has already begun, was clearly shaped by the view that 
the sweeping relief effected by an injunction was not the kind of 
relief inherent to constitutional rights: "The power and duty of the 
judiciary to declare laws unconstitutional is in the final analysis de­
rived from its responsibility for resolving concrete disputes brought 
before the courts for decision. "600 Or consider nonacquiescence 
doctrine, which I discussed above in section III.B.2. Here, it is the 
Derivative Account, not the Direct Account, that makes an intrin­
sic demand upon this procedural doctrine: intrinsic to the Deriva­
tive Account is the proposition that (most or all) nonjudicial actors 
should acquiesce in judicial decisions declaring statutes to be inva­
lid, at least where the relevant courts are unanimous. By contrast, 
the proponent of the Direct Account can be agnostic about 
nonacquiescence. 601 
But it bears emphasis that the deepest implications of the Deriv­
ative Account are substantive, not procedural. The Direct Account 
makes stringent demands on the content of substantive constitu­
tional doctrines. How can moral reason obtain to overturn X's own 
treatment, independent of further invalidating the rule under which 
that treatment falls? Someone who stipulates the existence of such 
reason, as an entailment of X's constitutional right, must choose 
one of two options. Either she abandons the Basic Structure en­
tirely, and therewith the judicial focus on the predicate and history 
of rules. In that event, constitutional adjudication changes radi-
599. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
600. Younger, 401 U.S. at 52. Relatedly, and even more fundamentally, the proponents 
of the Direct and Derivative Accounts may well disagree about the proper scope of the fic­
tion established by Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), permitting federal suits for prospec­
tive relief against state officers despite the Eleventh Amendment. See Idaho v. Coeur 
d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2038-40 (1997) (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (arguing that 
Ex parte Young should be applied on a case-by-case basis to suits for prospective relief, 
rather than automatically). 
601. See supra notes 499-513 and accompanying text (discussing nonacquiescence). 
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cally, and becomes a moral inspection of X's action or actions 
rather than of some rule that X challenges. Or, less radically, she 
identifies some feature of rules such that sanctioning actors pursu­
ant to rules with that feature violates their moral rights independent 
of the proscribability of their actions under different descriptions. 
But what would such a feature be? If anything, it would be the 
discriminatory cast of a rule. Sanctioning X pursuant to a discrimi­
natory rule can violate her nonepistemic moral rights, as in the case 
of racial stigma. Failing that, it can arguably violate her epistemic 
moral rights, insofar as discrimination evidences false beliefs, 
among legislators, about the moral relevance of the rule­
predicate. 602 
So, if the Direct Account obtains, constitutional law should be­
come a series of antidiscrimination norms: norms that constrain 
rules not to discriminate on the basis of gender, race, speech, or 
religion. At a minimum, a right against discrimination should be­
come the central and animating paradigm of a constitutional right. 
And indeed, in recent years, the Court has become increasingly 
concerned with the discriminatory cast of rules, to the exclusion of 
other moral failings that the Derivative Account might recognize. 
In Smith, 603 the Court reworked its free exercise doctrine so as to 
eliminate any right of religious actors to be exempt from nondis­
criminatory rules;604 in the area of free speech, too, "content dis­
crimination" has become the major if not quite exclusive trigger for 
judicial intervention. 605 Has this trend, in fact, been caused by the 
Justices' adherence to the Direct Account? Who knows. Should it 
be reversed, if the Derivative Account is instead correct? Not nec­
essarily - for there may be independent reasons why the Discrimi­
nation Schema should be the sole or main rule-validity schema 
within that account. 
I tend to doubt that such reasons exist. The Liberty Schema, 
not just the Discrimination Schema, is integral to constitutional law 
- or so I have already argued.606 But the point I want to make 
here is a more basic one. Assume, for example, that the constitu­
tional criterion of "free speech" picks out some liberty (some type 
602. See supra section II.B.2; supra text accompanying notes 218-19 (discussing possible 
nonepistemic and epistemic defenses of Direct Account, linked to concept of discrimination). 
603. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
604. See supra text accompanying notes 109-13 (discussing change in free exercise doc­
trine worked by Smith). 
605. See supra note 357 and accompanying text (noting increasing focus, in free speech 
doctrine, on rules that discriminate against speech or speech-types). 
606. See supra text accompanying notes 358-69. 
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of action it is morally important for persons to be free to perform, 
absent overriding reason); that judicial invalidation of rules abridg­
ing the liberty of speech is not self-defeating; and that courts are 
epistemically, democratically, and otherwise well placed to identify 
some such rules.607 If so, courts should invalidate (some) rules that 
violate the liberty of speech, whether or not those rules are discrim­
inatory. There .is no bias, within the Derivative Account, toward 
rule-validity schema that preserve the "personal" cast of constitu­
tional rights, since constitutional rights do not have such a cast. 
Discrimination may or may not be definitive of constitutional 
rights; but on the Derivative Account, there is nothing about the 
moral content of constitutional rights that requires it to be. The 
Direct Account - if its implications were truly drawn - would 
tightly constrain the ways in which rules can be constitutionally in­
valid. In this sense, the Direct Account encapsulates an argument 
for judicial restraint, within the very concept of a constitutional 
right. The Derivative Account, the correct account, does not. 
607. These are, within the Derivative Account, the individually necessary and jointly suf­
ficient conditions for rules violating the liberty of speech (in the sense set forth by the Liberty 
Schema) to be properly invalidated by constitutional reviewing courts. On the problem of 
self-defeating review, see supra text accompanying notes 361-64; on the problem of the epi­
stemic and remedial capacities of courts, see Adler, supra note 4, at 771-80. 
